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Abstract 
Theoretical models predict that ambiguity is an asset pricing factor in 
addition to risk, however few of them have been tested in the real 
market. This thesis tests one of the hypotheses that, investors’ 
propensity to invest in stocks is reduced when ambiguity in the 
marketplace increases. The hypothesis is tested by using equity fund 
flows and households’ equity holding as measurements of the market 
participation, and using dispersion in analysts’ forecasts about 
aggregate returns as measurement of ambiguity. The results confirm 
this hypothesis, since the increases in ambiguity are significantly and 
negatively related to equity fund flows, as well as the likelihood that 
the average household invests in equities. Moreover, the results also 
find that the fund flows in non-dividend paying stocks are more 
sensitive to the changes in ambiguity, and investors transfer capital 
from the equity market into more liquid asset classes during high-
ambiguity periods.  
In addition, this thesis also tests whether there is heterogeneity in 
individuals’ ambiguity aversion, and examines the psychological 
roots of ambiguity aversion. FNE theory explains ambiguity aversion 
as the result of fearing negative evaluation from others. It predicts 
that married households are more ambiguity averse; while 
households with higher income and education, or households that are 
more mature, are less ambiguity averse. On the other hand, self-
evaluation theory explains ambiguity aversion as the result of 
minimizing anticipated regret. It predicts that households that are 
more optimistic, or have less income, are less ambiguity averse; 
while households that have negative market experience, or have 
higher income, are more ambiguity averse. The results show that 
married households, or households with high income / negative 
market experience, are more ambiguity averse; and households that 
are more optimistic / more mature, are less ambiguity averse. 
Therefore, both theories have successful predictions, suggesting that 
the ambiguity aversion is the combined result of the two motivations.  
 
Keywords: Stock market participation; ambiguity aversion; fund 
flows; household portfolio 
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Chapter1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis reports on the results of an empirical study about the impact of ambiguity on 
the US stock market. The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of market 
ambiguity on stock market participation, and to identify the assets that are more 
ambiguous, and the investor groups that are more ambiguity averse. The first chapter of 
the thesis outlines the purpose of this study, and provides the context of the problem.  
 
1.2 Background   
 
Modern risk-theory has been widely applied in the financial sector and it has made an 
enormous impact on the global economy.  According to the risk-return trade-off theory, 
investors can either use simple risk models such as CAPM for basic asset pricing, or 
choose more sophisticated ones for the derivatives. However, in 2008 the financial 
crisis proved that some of the risk-based pricing models can be faulty: research about 
the crisis shows that many of these failures come from unexpected market condition 
changes. For example, the pricing of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) is based on the 
assumption that the default risks of many geographically diversified mortgages are 
independent or, at least, are at low correlations. This assumption had been correct for a 
long time until the crisis brought a liquidity shock to the market, after which the 
correlation between mortgages defaults suddenly deteriorated. The expensive lessons 
from the crisis thus suggested it is important to admit that our information is imperfect 
and that the estimations of the parameters could be imprecise. However, since the 
traditional risk models require a perfect market condition and fully-rational investors’ 
behaviour, such models are not capable of handling the situation.   
Given the limited capacity of risk models, many sources suggest that ambiguity-
based models might be a solution. Frank Knight (1921) was the first to point out that the 
pure risk models may fail to handle unpredictable changes, and he suggested that 
investors may think differently under ambiguity compared to risk. In his opinion, risk 
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refers to the events where changes are predictable, while under ambiguous events 
changes are not predictable. Knight’s theory was backed up by Ellsberg (1961)’s study, 
which summarised that ambiguous events are events with low quality or conflicting 
information, or, more precisely, events where the probability of the outcomes is not 
known. Therefore, under ambiguity investors have to rely on their estimations while 
making their decisions. For example, to decide the fair price of the stock of a company 
which has conflicting analysts’ forecasts, investors must generate a subjective opinion 
about different forecasts. Ellsberg’s experiment shows that individuals are ambiguity 
averse, as they always make their decisions based on pessimistic results when they are 
not sure about precise probability, and thus they heavily undermine their predictions 
about ambiguous outcomes.    
Such unique behaviour makes ambiguity aversion distinct from risk aversion, 
and there are studies which have developed detailed behavioural models for ambiguity. 
For example, the worst-case-scenario model assumes extreme ambiguity aversion, and 
it suggests that people try to maximize their utility under the worst possible case when 
they are engaged with ambiguity. On the other hand, the alpha-max-min model allows 
both ambiguity aversion and ambiguity loving behaviour, and it sees the final decision 
as a combination of the worst and the best result, which is weighted by the level of 
investors’ ambiguity aversion. The worst-case-scenario model, thus, can be seen as an 
extreme version of the alpha-max-min model, where investors are absolutely ambiguity 
averse with their focus on the worst result.  
There are two main-stream explanations of the psychological roots of ambiguity 
aversion: a Fear of Negative Evaluations by others (FNE) and a fear of self-evaluation.  
FNE assumes that the fear of negative evaluations from others is the main reason for 
ambiguity aversion: while the failure of a risky decision can be explained as pure bad 
luck, failure on an ambiguous decision makes people doubt their ability to make a 
judgement. Thus, it predicts that when people are grouped they become more ambiguity 
averse, as they are more concerned about others’ opinions. Meanwhile, if people have a 
higher social status, i.e. better education or higher income, they are less affected by FNE 
and therefore become less ambiguity averse. The self-evaluation theory, on the other 
hand, suggests that people dislike ambiguity because they are afraid they will regret the 
decision they have made. This theory predicts that those who are more optimistic, or 
have lower income, are less ambiguity averse. 
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Due to its nature, ambiguity can exist in many areas of the market: investors can 
be ambiguous about the quality of information or confused about the factors pertaining 
to which model to use, or not sure about which model they can rely on. Thus, there are 
many possible ways to measure ambiguity. For example, Zhang (2006) focuses on the 
quality of information and he argues that some fundamentals, such as young firm age, 
no dividend payments and poor analyst coverage, can be indicators of ambiguity since 
they suggest low information quality. Zhang (2006) found that market returns are 
positively related to these measures thus implying ambiguity premium. On the other 
hand, Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens (2009) used a level of conflict in the available 
information to measure ambiguity. They built a beta-weighted average of analysts’ 
forecasts on future market returns, and found that market return is positively related to 
this measure. In addition, they showed that under a given risk being controlled, 
portfolios with a higher ambiguity can outperform those with a lower ambiguity by up 
to 3% per year, which is a significant premium for the ambiguity.  
Despite the findings of the ambiguity premium, previous researchers have 
reached little agreement on the mechanism of how these premiums are generated in the 
market.  Many different reasons have been suggested for the existence of the ambiguity 
premium. Firstly, investors can be ambiguous about their expected market returns 
(Anderson et al., 2009; Zhang, 2006). Secondly, investors can be ambiguous about 
market volatility (Epstein and Schneider, 2006). Thirdly, ambiguity aversion can result 
non-trade and thus bring a liquidity pressure (Routledge and Zin, 2009; Ozsoylev and 
Werner, 2009). Fourthly, ambiguity can be related to investors’ sentiments and can 
therefore affect their trading (Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam, 2014; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2006). Finally, ambiguity aversion may cause limited market participation 
(Easley and O’Hara, 2009), which would result in a price premium.   
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1.3 Statement of research objectives  
 
The stock market has a long-lasting puzzle of the participation rate: in the last century 
the global stock market had on average a 3.5% annual premium over government bonds 
(Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, 2006). Based on this factorable return, the expected-
utility model predicts a very high willingness for risk-averse investors to participate in 
the stock market. However, stock market participation was very low compared to the 
predicted level: during the period 1982-1995 the US Consumer Expenditure Survey 
found that two thirds of all households did not invest in stocks. The study of Campbell 
(2006) shows that even at the eightieth percentile of wealth, almost 20% of households 
have no public equity. Williamson (1994) and Allen and Gale (1994) suggested that 
liquidity needs and transaction costs can reduce stock market participation. Yaron and 
Zhang (2000) suggested that the high fixed cost of entering the stock market also limits 
participation. Hsu (2012) argues that a household with low human capital has less 
diversified demand for stocks. Haliassos and Bertatut (1996) state that borrowing 
constraints and minimum investment requirements can also reduce market participation. 
However, none of these assumptions are strong enough to explain the non-participation 
puzzle completely. 
On the other hand, many studies suggest that non-participation is driven by 
ambiguity aversion (Dow et al., 1992; Mukerji and Tallon, 2001; Easley and O’Hara, 
2009; Epstein and Schneider 2010, Werner, 2001; Takashi, 2011). However, few of 
them have been empirically tested and, hence, there is a gap in the knowledge about 
how ambiguity affects the market participation and what the scale of the impact is.  In 
addition, the ambiguity-based non-participation models assume that some stocks are 
more sensitive to ambiguity; however, the characters of these stocks are not described. 
Zhang (2006) found that some of the fundamental variables, such as firm age or analyst 
coverage, represent a high ambiguity level and indicate a higher return. Therefore, it is 
worth investigating empirically as to whether some of the fundamental characters can 
indicate ambiguity and, thus, affect the stock participation rate.   
Another gap in the knowledge is the investor’s ambiguity aversion level. While 
many models assume that investors have the same ambiguity aversion level, Easley and 
O’Hara (2009)’s model assumes heterogeneity in individual ambiguity aversion. Their 
model shows that such difference in the level of ambiguity aversion can affect 
willingness to participate in the market: the most ambiguity averse ones are more likely 
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to become sellers in the market, while the least ambiguity averse ones are buyers. 
Moreover, the divergence in their level of ambiguity aversion can determine whether 
the market will be in a ‘no-trade’ equilibrium. However, this model has not yet received 
empirical support, therefore, it is important to find evidence to  prove its assumptions.   
The final gap in the knowledge is an empirical study of the psychological 
reasons for the ambiguity aversion. As stated, there are two main-stream theories 
explaining ambiguity aversion: FNE and self-evaluation. FNE suggests that people are 
ambiguity averse, because they have a fear that failing in their decision making under 
ambiguity would render a negative evaluation from others. Therefore, people tend to 
make decisions which are easier to justify rather than making optimal ones. Researchers 
have found evidence that people are more ambiguity averse when making decisions as a 
group; however, there is no supporting evidence of this fact from the market. Self-
evaluation theory assumes that people are afraid of future self-regret when making 
decisions under ambiguity, and they try to minimise such regret. This theory suggests 
that optimistic people are less ambiguity averse, but it has very little support from real 
market data. Therefore, although there are theoretical explanations for ambiguity 
aversion, the empirical evidence from the real market is still very important.  
 
1.4 Purpose of study  
 
According to the previous studies (Dow et al., 1992; Mukerji and Tallon, 2001; Easley 
and O’Hara, 2009; Epstein and Schneider 2010, Werner, 2011; Takashi, 2011), 
ambiguity aversion could be a reason for the limited stock market participation, and, 
thus, bring forth a price premium similar to the risk premium. Although these models 
claim that ambiguity should be an asset-pricing factor in addition to risk, there is a lack 
of empirical support to prove this.  Therefore, the first purpose of this study is to use a 
quantitative method and empirically test the ambiguity’s influence on stock market 
participation, and try to identify whether there is any asset class which carries a higher 
ambiguity premium than the others.  As a result, the first research question which needs 
to be answered is:   
1. Does ambiguity aversion affect stock market participation at all? And if it does, 
what is the scale of the impact? Is there any asset class which is affected by 
ambiguity aversion more than others?  
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Based on the previous studies, ambiguity can be measured empirically by using 
the divergence of opinions among analysts (Anderson et al., 2009). In addition, Kamstra, 
Kramer, Levi and Wermers (2014) report that as a direct measure of stock market 
participation the mutual fund flow can also reflect the changes in the investors’ risk 
aversion level, due to withdrawals of money from mutual funds when their risk aversion 
level becomes higher. Consequently, it is assumed in this thesis that if ambiguity 
aversion can affect the stock market, there will be a similar effect. Therefore, the 
analysts’ divergence will be used as a proxy of ambiguity and the mutual fund flow as a 
proxy of stock market participation in order to provide the empirical answers to the first 
questions. 
Furthermore, if ambiguity aversion can in fact affect the stock market, then its 
micro mechanism needs to be understood. Models such as Easley and O’Hara (2009)’s 
work suggest heterogeneity in the individual ambiguity aversion level, and further 
reveal that such heterogeneity can affect individual market participation. There are 
various theories to explain such heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion by its 
psychological roots, such as negative evaluations by others (FNE) and fear of self-
evaluation. However, these assumptions have not been empirically tested by using the 
financial market data either. Therefore, the second purpose of this study is to explore the 
following questions by using an empirical approach: 
2. Does ambiguity affect the stock market participation at household level? If so, 
do different investors have a different level of ambiguity aversion? What are the 
reasons for it? 
 In answering these questions, the data of the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) 
is used. SCF reports the stock holding status of American households, and, therefore, it 
can be used to test the ambiguity’s influence on individual stock market participation. In 
addition, according to FNE and self-evaluation theory, social status such as age, marital 
status and income, could indicate a different ambiguity aversion level. Based on the data 
from the SCF, households are divided into sub-groups according to these indicators and 
are tested on whether they have a different ambiguity aversion level. This will answer  
the research questions of the second part.  
To sum up, in this thesis the research interest is in using empirical measures of 
ambiguity and stock market participation to test how, and to what degree, ambiguity 
aversion can affect stock market investors. It also empirically explores which asset class 
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bears a higher ambiguity premium, and what type of investors are more ambiguity 
averse.  
 
1.5 Methodology of the study  
 
This research applies a quantitative method to investigate the impact of ambiguity 
aversion on stock market participation. Chapter 3 uses a mutual fund flow and exchange 
as measurements of the market participation, and the ambiguity is measured by the 
divergence of analysts’ opinions. The proxy for ambiguity is constructed by following 
Anderson et al. (2009), where it is measured by a divergence of forecasts. The forecast 
used is the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which has been produced since 
1968. The forecasters are majorly from large financial institutions and the report is 
officially released by the Federal Reserve. Therefore, it reflects professional opinions 
and can be widely applied by the market. SPF forecasters give their forecasted results 
for economic variables such as the GDP, GNP and deflator from the previous quarter to 
the next five quarters of the US market, which are then used to produce the forecasted 
future stock market return.  
In this study mutual fund flow is used as an empirical measure, to measure the 
stock market participation. The net mutual fund flow measures the net value of all cash 
inflow and outflow through the mutual funds, and thus provides a straight measurement 
of stock market participation. This data was provided by the Investment Company 
Institute (ICI) from 1985 to 2010. For each type of fund, the monthly data comprises 
sales, redemption, exchanges in, exchanges out and total net assets, which are used to 
calculate the mutual fund flow and exchange. Funds are divided into five categories by 
the asset class: equity, hybrid, corporate fixed income, government fixed income and 
money market. The main focus of this study is the equity fund category and, since the 
ambiguity measure is based on the US stock market only, the equity fund group must be 
modified to contain domestic stocks only. Therefore, the funds that are invested mainly 
outside the States - global equity, international equity, regional equity and emerging 
markets, are deleted. As a result, the final components of the equity fund groups are: 
aggressive growth, growth, sector, growth and income, income equity.  
To ensure that the ambiguity measure does not just capture the risk, the model 
also contains conditional volatility as a measure of the risk. In order to net out the 
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influence of other factors that might affect mutual fund flow, the regression also 
includes the following control variables: lagged fund exchange/flows, saving rate, 
capital gain, adverting cost of the funds, past return of the funds, past return of the stock 
market and dummies for end-of-the-year effect. Capital gains and advertising costs data 
is provided by Kamstra et al. (2011); while saving rate is taken from the Federal 
Reserve data and the past stock market return is calculated from The Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP)’s market return index. Since the regression errors 
are serially correlated, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is not viable, and 
thus the regression method used is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with 
monthly data, ranging from the year 1985 to 2010. The regression model is firstly tested 
on the equity-based mutual funds, and then on other asset classes. In addition, to 
examine whether some stocks are more affected by ambiguity aversion, the regression 
for the five fund styles is also run within the equity fund family. Additionally, it is also 
reasonable to assume that ambiguity can be predicted by some of the fundamental 
economical variables. Therefore, Chapter 3 also tests a regression model of the one-
quarter-ahead ambiguity measure on the economical variables from Sibley, Xing and 
Zhang (2013). 
To ensure the results are robust, three different methods are applied: firstly, the 
model with quarterly data is tested instead of monthly data to assure the interpolation 
has no impact on the conclusion. Secondly, a variable of median value of analyst 
forecast and a market sentiments proxy from Baker and Wurgler (2006) are added, 
therefore the conclusion made does not simply catch the effect of market sentiments. In 
addition, to ensure that the ambiguity measure is not just capturing the risk, the model is 
tested with the different risk measures including GARCH predicted volatility, realized 
volatility and VIX volatility index. Finally, since the ambiguity measure in this thesis is 
a weighted-average of the analysts’ opinions, it is necessary to test the model’s 
robustness against different weighting parameters. Therefore the model is tested again 
with different ambiguity series, which are generated by using a wide range of weighting 
parameters v.  
Chapter 4 uses the data from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) in order to 
further investigate the influence of ambiguity aversion on the individual household’s 
stock market participation. This survey is conducted every three years by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve, and it gathers the demographic and financial 
information from a large number of different households. In Chapter 4, the data from 8 
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different surveys which concluded in 2010 is used. Since 1989, the SCF data files 
applied the multiple-imputations technique and, therefore, it contains five data sets 
(multiple-imputations is a technique commonly used to deal with missing information 
on the individual items in survey data, which employs multivariate statistical methods to 
impute the missing data, resulting in multiple complete data sets). As a result, in the 
regression the repeated imputation inferences (RII) technique is applied according to 
Rubin (1987), which combines the results obtained independently on each of the 
separate implicates using the multiple imputation combining rules.  
The stock market participation of individual households is measured by their 
holdings of equity assets. If any household reports a direct stock holding or an equity-
based fund holding, the dummy variable of the market participation is set to 1, 
otherwise it is 0. To ensure the results are consistent with Chapter 3, the ambiguity 
aversion is measured by using the method according to Anderson et al. (2009), which is 
the beta-weighted average of the analysts’ forecasts. In addition, since the survey is 
conducted every three years, ambiguity is also measured by the average ambiguity 
between year t-1 and t-3. The control variables for the individual participation include 
household age, marital status(dummy is set to 1 if a household is reported as married,  
otherwise it is 0), an income (natural logarithm of income deflated into 2010 dollars), 
education level (dummy is set to 1 if the household has a college degree or higher, 
otherwise it is 0),  anchoring of past prices (equals to the value of average Dow index 
price of the last year of the survey divided by the historical high price of Dow index till 
the last year of the survey), race (dummy is set to 1 if the household is white and 0 for 
the rest),  retirement status (dummy is set to 1 if the respondent is retired, otherwise it is 
0) and risk attitude (dummy is set to 1 if  the household is not willing to take any 
financial risks;  2 if they can take average financial risks expecting to earn average 
returns; 3 if they can take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns; 
and 4 if they can take financial risks above average expecting to earn above average 
returns). After constructing the variables, firstly it is tested to see whether the ambiguity 
still reveals a significant impact on the individual level of the market participation by 
using a linear logistic model to examine the probability that a household owns equities 
conditionally on the predictors stated above. To check the robustness of this result, a 
similar process to Kumar (2009) is used, which drops households with a reported annual 
income less than 1000 dollars, and households with a head who is less (more) than 24 
(75) years old.  
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The second task of Chapter 4 examines the psychological root of ambiguity 
aversion: if the fear of negative evaluation (FNE) is the main reason, then households 
with lower income (income<$15000 in 1993 dollar) / higher education level (have 
college degree) / less social capital (not participating in volunteering activities) will be 
more ambiguity averse, as well as married households. On the other hand, a household 
with a higher income (income > $125000 in 1993 dollar), older age (age>65) will be 
less ambiguity averse, because they are more resistant to FNE.  Meanwhile, according 
to the self-evaluation theory, households that are more optimistic (believe the US 
economy will improve in the next 5 years) will be less ambiguity averse, and 
households that experienced the negative life-time stock market return (have negative 
value of cumulated CRSP index return from the age of 10 of the household’s head to the 
year when the survey was conducted) will be more pessimistic and, therefore, more 
ambiguity averse. Moreover, the self-evaluation theory makes a contrasting prediction 
on the relationships between ambiguity and income: low income households will regret 
it more if they miss the reward from ambiguous stocks. Therefore, they are less 
ambiguity averse. In addition, based on laboratory experiments previous studies suggest 
smoking as an indicator of ambiguity aversion (research from Sutter, Rutzler and 
Trautmann (2010) shows that impatient people tend to consume more alcohol and 
tobacco, demonstrate  less saving behaviour and a lower ambiguity aversion level) and 
therefore, this assumption is tested in the real market condition here.  All the parameters 
above are tested by using the same regression method, and to ensure the robustness of 
the result a joint test is also run that combines all the dummy variables related to the 
ambiguity aversion according to the assumptions.  
 
1.6 Conclusion  
 
The first part of the chapter presents the concept of ambiguity aversion and the potential 
existence of the ambiguity premium in the stock market in order to provide background 
knowledge for the research. The second part reviews the previous literature; it discusses 
the impact of ambiguity on market participation and the knowledge gap in empirical 
studies. The third section presents the purpose of this thesis, which is to explore the 
ambiguity’s impact on stock market participation empirically, and highlight research 
questions. The last section discusses the methodology used to develop the answers to 
the research questions; it also provides the details about the data source, the 
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construction of variables, the regression method and robustness testing. The next 
chapter reviews the literature introducing the limitation of traditional risk models, and 
thus providing the motivation for the ambiguity research. Also it reviews the concept of 
ambiguity aversion and its potential impact on the market and gives evidence for the 
ambiguity premium. 
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Chapter2. Literature review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
For a long time the risk management concept has been an important topic in modern 
financial theory, and has lead to many highly developed models and theories.  However, 
the recent financial crisis revealed that traditional risk theory may have missed some 
important issues, which may lead to serious results. For example, the pricing of a 
Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) product may rely on the assumption of independence 
of defaults for many individual mortgages in different locations. However, when the 
market collapsed and liquidity deteriorated, the correlation between these defaults 
suddenly increased, and hence brought about the catastrophic chain effect.  
The assumption of a limited correlation between the mortgage defaults was 
predicted from the historical data, and was seen as being correct for a long time. It was  
not until the change in the market happened that investors finally realised that their 
models were wrong. As Jorion (2009) argued, failures in the risk models are normally 
due to known unknowns, such as model risk, liquidity risk and counterparty risk. 
However, during the 2008 crisis, risk models majorly failed because of unknown 
unknowns. That is, the risk management system is not able to foresee the structural and 
regulatory changes in the capital market. For example, a sudden restriction on short-
sales can destroy risk-hedging plans based on short-selling. Moreover, to deal with 
counterparty risk it is not enough to know only about the counterparty; investors have to 
know about their counterparty’s counterparties too. In Lehman’s case, knowledge about 
the entire global financial network is required to foresee its total risk level. Therefore, 
the question is, can we really predict such changes to make the risk models prefect?  In 
other words, can we truly gain the information that precisely reflects the market 
condition?  
From Frank Knight (1921)’s point of view, this is impossible. Furthermore, 
Knight believed that in general people did not differentiate between the concept of risk 
and that of ambiguity. The ‘risk’ is usually described as the situation, where changes are 
foreseeable, or where the results may be unknown, but where the distribution of 
possible outcomes is informed.  The ‘risky’ outcome could be described by applying the 
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law of numbers, and can be easily discounted to a current cost or hedged. In such a case, 
any abnormal returns will disappear in the long-term, because all the data has been 
discounted perfectly to the price. Since, in reality, the abnormal return did exist, and 
sometimes lasted for a long time, Knight believed that some of the dynamic changes 
could not be anticipated, insured or hedged against, and he called it ambiguity. When 
such ambiguity exists, people have no valid information base from which to make their 
decisions, and Knight suggested that they would have a special process of decision 
making, called the estimation. In addition, he argued that the process of ‘estimating’ is 
very different from the process of making decisions for the risky events.  
Knight (1929)’s argument was supported mainly by the following studies, which 
showed that decision making under ambiguity is different from decision making under 
risk. Ellsberg (1961)’s experiment showed that individuals revealed preference to the 
risky event over the ambiguous event, and thus provided evidence of ambiguity 
aversion. Later  studies further developed different models of decision making that 
involved ambiguity aversion, such as, for example, the worst case scenario model and 
the alpha-max-min model.  Also there are studies which discuss the potential influence 
of ambiguity aversion in financial markets and in the corresponding pricing premium.  
Although there is much theoretical literature about the ambiguity concept, one of 
the main issues is the lack of empirical support. Thus, this thesis aims to test the 
ambiguity’s impact on financial markets empirically in order to find evidence that 
would support the existence of the ambiguity premium. To back up such an empirical 
study, the first part of this chapter reviews the limitations of the traditional risk theories, 
and explains the motivation for the research in ambiguity. The second part introduces 
the concept of ambiguity including the definition, potential viable measurements, and 
behavioural models for ambiguity aversion. The third section further discusses the 
impact of ambiguity aversion in financial markets as well as the factors that may lead to 
the ambiguity premium.   
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2.2 Classic risk-return trade off and its problems 
 
2.2.1 Risk models 
 
For modern financial economic theory, the risk-return trade-off is always recognised as 
a first fundamental law. It has a wide application from the explanation of an individual 
investor’s decision-making process to the management of an assets portfolio. The key 
reason for the risk being a pricing factor is due to the assumption of a risk aversion.  A  
risk aversion, as Friedman and Savage (1948) defined, is that, with a given identical 
amount of return, investors should always choose the one with the lowest risk. As Katt 
(1965) observed, the person with a higher level of risk aversion will require a higher 
expected return or a lower price for the same level of risk. Therefore, when expressed in 
terms of wealth,  risk aversion results in a risk premium and brings the trade-off.  
Based on this trade-off, some of the most important financial theories have been 
developed, such as the modern portfolio theory and the CAPM model. The Markowitz 
portfolio theory suggests that given a certain level of expected return, investors can 
reduce the risk of their portfolio by diversification. So the optimal portfolio for 
individual investor depends on the assessment of the risk and their risk aversion level.  
This theory uses variance as an official proxy of the risk and this is a fundamental 
assumption. Also it is the first framework that introduces the risk-return trade-off in 
asset pricing when for a given expected risk the optimal expected return can be 
calculated. However, the Markowitz theory does not describe a clear relationship 
between the risk and the expected return for an individual asset, since the optimal 
solution depends on the available securities.  
Based on the Markowitz theory, the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964) model further states 
that after eliminating the diversifiable risk, the return of any individual asset should be 
in line with its systematic risk, i.e. 
                                                             (2.1) 
where    is the risk-free rate, and   stands for the sensitivity of the excess expected 
asset return to the excess expected market return. It describes the relationship between 
the asset risk and the expected returns for both portfolio and individual assets, and is 
perceived as one of the most fundamental risk-based pricing models. This model 
presents any risky asset’s price as the result of three determining factors: level of 
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systematic risk, price of systematic risk, and a risk-free rate. The CAPM is very simple 
and the model is straightforward, because investors can estimate the price of a single 
asset only by using its correlation with the market risk, rather than its individual risk.  
Moreover, Merton (1973) introduced the ICAPM model, where the conditional 
expected market excesses return is positively related to the conditional variance of the 
market price: 
                                                                (2.2) 
  is the abnormal return and should be equal to zero in a complete market, and   is the 
coefficient of the relative market level of the risk aversion. 
Within both CAPM and ICAPM, beta is a key pricing factor for the individual 
assets, but in reality this is very difficult to measure. For example, for new listed stocks, 
due to a lack of historical data it is impossible to estimate a reliable beta. In addition, 
since beta can only be calculated from the historical data, it cannot reflect changes in the 
market conditions. Fama and French (1993) believe that beta is not the only measure of 
the risk and they improved the CAPM into a three factor model.  They argue a size and 
book to market value ratio are also important factors for measuring risk. Therefore, their 
new model is: 
                                                   (1.3) 
Besides the traditional part, the difference between the return of small and big 
companies (SMB) and high book to market to low book to market (HML) are also 
included. Since the coefficient of    and    can either be positive or negative, the model 
is much more flexible than normal CAPM.  
Although the different types of the CAPM models use different measures and 
proxies of the risk, they all share some common assumptions:  
1. The market is perfect, so there is no transaction cost and all information is available    
to all investors at the same time.  
2. Investors are rational and risk-averse, thus they are looking to maximise utility.  
3. Investors are only price takers; their transactions do not affect the market price.  
4. Investors can lend and borrow unlimited amounts under the risk-free rate of interest.  
5. Investors have homogeneous expectations.   
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However, in the real market these assumptions can hardly be met.  Firstly, 
perfect market information is not available. Secondly, the investors are not the only 
price takers, and large demands can effectively change the market price. Thirdly, the 
trading costs and taxes are not zero, and unlimited borrowing facilities are not available 
for investors. Finally, the investors may not be perfectly rational: their expectations can 
be different, and they can sometimes make mistakes. Therefore, in reality, the 
application of risk models have many problems, which are discussed in detail in the 
next section.  
 
2.2.2 Problems with risk models 
 
As stated above, due to the strict assumptionsin the model, the risk-return trade-off 
described by CAPM is difficult to find in practice. Although Ghysels (2005) found a 
significant positive relation when mixed data sampling is used; other studies, such as 
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) and Baillie and DeGennaro (1990), observed a 
positive relationship between the conditional variance and the conditional expected 
return but it is not significant.  However, Campbell (1987) and Nelson (1991) found a 
significant but negative relationship. Moreover, Glosten, Jagannathan, Runkle (1993), 
and Harvey (2001), and Nelson (1991) observed both positive and negative relationship 
depending on how the average return and variance are measured.   
The main explanation for such a problem of risk-return trade-off is that it 
requires a perfect market. In a perfect market, people are rational and information is 
always completely reflected by price. However many studies show that, in reality, the 
market is imperfect. For example, Shefrin (2002) argued that investors have a biased 
reaction to earning estimation, which could result in a market momentum. Hvidkjaer 
(2006) believe that the traders in the market can be categorised into two different groups, 
i.e. rational traders and noise traders, and with the existence of noise traders the market 
is always imperfect. Some researchers still argue that even though there are such 
irrational investors, the arbitragers will eventually eliminate their influence on the price. 
However, due to the fact that arbitrage is not costless and risk-free, it is much less 
efficient than expected. Jones and Lamont (2002) suggest that the cost of short stocks 
can be very expensive and thus the stock can be overpriced due to a lack of short-sale. 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1991) further state four different 
constraints for arbitragers and they prove that noise traders can add more risk to 
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arbitrage and can limit the behaviour of arbitragers. Therefore, the real market price, in 
fact, is always influenced by certain unpredictable factors.  
Thus the traditional asset pricing models resulted an important dilemma for 
investors: to achieve a risk-return trade-off, investors need precise knowledge about the 
distribution of outcome, but due to the unpredictable factors in the market this is often 
impossible. Firstly, investors’ information can be ambiguous. For example, for small 
companies and new industries there is always a lack of accurate fundamental 
information and thus the future income stream does not have a valid base to be 
calculated. In such a case, since the mean and variance of return cannot be calculated 
precisely, any model based on those parameters does not work. The results of Olsen and 
Troughton (2006) prove this. The results of their survey show that investors think the 
quantitative part is of little help in small company valuation, and believe personal 
judgement is more important when evaluating small firms. Moreover, even for general 
stocks there is much ambiguous information. One of the most obvious examples is the 
analysts’ forecasts. Analysts barely reach agreement about the same stock, and, in a 
short time, even the reports about the same company from the same people may vary 
significantly. Therefore, if any investment decision is made using such forecasts, the 
outcome will be uncertain. In fact, Stickel (1991), Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 
(1996), and Gleason and Lee (2003) document that stock prices  start drifting right after 
the analyst forecast revisions. 
Secondly, the procedures involved in building models can also be ambiguous. 
For example, it is well known that stock price volatility is related to political events. 
However, to describe the political situation quantitatively is very difficult.  Therefore, it 
is controversial which independent variables should be included into the regression 
when one would like to introduce a political influence into the stock return models. 
Another example is the Fama-French (1993) three factors model. As they admit, in 
reality beta may not be a very good measurement of risk, and the variables in the 
traditional model need improvement. However, it is still controversial which 
measurement of risk would be the best to use.  
Thirdly, investors’ behaviour can be ambiguous due to the fact that they are not 
perfectly rational. There is a lot of evidence of biased decision making situations and 
irrational behaviours:  
18 
 
1. Investors cannot interpret past information fully and correctly, thus they can have 
heterogeneous beliefs. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) state that individual investors may 
have limited attention to detail and so they may omit certain important aspects of 
financial statements such as stock options that are not disclosed directly.  
 2. Investors cannot update the new information perfectly to receive different signals, 
and thus have un-unique prior beliefs. Hong, Scheinkeman and Xiong (2008) show that, 
if the market contains both informed and naive investors, the divergence in the advisors’ 
opinions will result in an upward bias of price. This is because, in the beginning stage of 
the bubble, the advisors had the motivation to give the upward biased price estimation. 
When a new industry arises, the advisors with better knowledge usually have the 
estimated figures higher than the ‘old-fags’. However, at the beginning it is very 
difficult for the investors to distinguish these experts from the others. Thus, the ‘experts’ 
would like to raise all their expectations to help investors identify their type. An 
informed investor will recognise this signal and will take a discount, but a naive 
investor will take them at face value and therefore causes the bubble in stock prices. 
 
2.2.3 Ambiguity: the missing parameter  
 
As stated above, in the real market the risk-return trade-off may not always hold since 
the situation is ambiguous rather than simply risky: investors cannot have precise 
information to estimate the expected return. However, the traditional asset pricing 
models do not consider such a situation, as they assume that investors will make the 
same decision for both risky and ambiguous situations.  
Savage (1954) argues that even though the situation is ambiguous and investors 
are not sure about the distribution, they can always assign a subjective priorbelief and 
stick to it. In such cases, he believes that the decision making process becomes exactly 
the same as with a risky situation. For example, assuming there is a black box 
containing an unknown number of red and black balls, and investors make a decision 
based on the probability of drawing a red ball out of the box. Savage’s theory believes 
that investors can assume a certain figure for this probability, and make decisions 
deductively and consistently based on this prior belief.  
Although Savage (1954)’s model may sound theoretical, empirical studies 
suggest otherwise. Ellsberg (1961) is the first who confirmed a different behaviour 
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when people are facing ambiguity. He designed an experiment to distinguish cases with 
precise and imprecise information: Consider two boxes with 100 red and black balls in 
total. The first one containing 50 red balls and 50 black ones; the second box has no 
further information. When a ball  is randomly picked out from box one and it is red,  the 
situation is called red 1, if it is black then  the situation is called black 1, similarly  for 
box two. The following questions are posed to the respondents: 
1. Which is more likely to happen, red 1, black 1, or they are equal? 
2. Which is more likely to happen, red 2, black 2, or they are equal? 
3. Which is more likely to happen, red 1, red 2, or they are equal? 
4. Which is more likely to happen, black 1, black 2, or they are equal? 
The results of Ellsberg’s test showed that in question 1 and 2 people responded that the 
chance should be equal. However, in question 3 and 4 they showed preference for the 
second box. Obviously, their prior beliefs were violated: from question 3, the preference 
of box two implied that people believed there are more red balls than black balls in the 
box. Meanwhile, choosing box two in question 4 means people also believed that, there 
were more black balls in the same box. Thus it can be seen that the decision making 
process is different when the information is ambiguous.  
The next part of Ellsberg’s work has some more interesting results regarding 
ambiguity. As shown in Table 2.1, consider the box containing 30 balls of red and 
another 60 balls of black and yellow in total. Picking up one ball randomly and the 
individuals are informed of the following bets: 
Case 1: if the outcome is red then get a reward of £1, otherwise nothing. 
Case 2: if the outcome is black then get a reward of £1, otherwise nothing. 
Case 3: if the outcome is red or yellow then get a reward of £1, otherwise nothing. 
Case 4: if the outcome is black or yellow then get a reward of £1, otherwise nothing.  
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Table2. 1 Ellsberg paradox 
This table reports the Cases in Ellsberg (1961)’s experiment. The experiment starts with a box 
of 30 balls of red and another 60 balls of black and yellow in total, but the numbers of black or 
yellow balls are unknown.  A ball is randomly picked out of the box; before its true colour is 
revealed, participants are asked to choose from the following bets to earn their rewards: Case 1: 
if the outcome is red then you get a reward of £1, otherwise nothing. Case 2: if the outcome is 
black then you get a reward of £1, otherwise nothing. Case 3: if the outcome is red or yellow 
then you get a reward of £1, otherwise nothing. Case 4: if the outcome is black or yellow then 
you get a reward of £1, otherwise nothing. 
 Red: p(R)=1/3 Black: p(B) = ? Yellow: p(Y) = ? 
Case 1 1 0 0 
Case 2 0 1 0 
Case 3 1 0 1 
Case 4 0 1 1 
 
The participants were firstly asked to choose between Case 1 and 2 and then 
choose again between 3 and 4. Intuitively, if any investor prefers Case 1 rather than 2, 
then he should prefer 3 to 4. However, the majority of the participants reversed their 
choice to avoid ambiguity. Therefore, Ellsberg (1961)’s result denies Savage (1954)’s 
theory that investors behave indifferently towards ambiguity and risk, and Ellsberg’s 
result is backed up by many other studies. Bossaerts, Ghirardato and Guarnaschelli and 
Zame (2010) improved Ellsberg’s experiment by transferring the stakes into real money 
gain for the subjects and again showed that ambiguity can affect the investor’s decision. 
In particular, they found that under ambiguity, there could be a point where an 
ambiguity-averse investor refuses to respond to market price change. Similarly, the 
study of Auman (1997) shows that if investors do not have enough information, they 
will become ‘bounded rational’, and so would rather have a satisfactory choice than an 
optimal choice, which leads to bias in the decision-making process. Gerdjikova (2006) 
has a similar result from the case-based study theory. The case-based study theory 
assumes that under ambiguity investors could only learn from past experience by 
evaluating a past act’s performance. The result shows that with ambiguity the investor, 
who follows the case-based study process, in general has a suboptimal option rather 
than an optimal one. This result is also supported by their experiments and empirical 
studies.  
Therefore, given the existence of ambiguity can cause ambiguity aversion 
(which is distinct from risk aversion), it is also reasonable to assume that ambiguity is 
another pricing factor, in addition to risk. However, unlike risk, ambiguity in the stock 
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market can be presented in many different ways. For example, investors can be 
uncertain in many parameters, such as expected returns, or expected volatility, or 
expected excess return. Thus ambiguity can affect the stock market in various ways, and 
even the measurement of ambiguity is very controversial. Anderson, Ghysels and 
Juergens (2009) used the divergence of analysts’ opinions as a proxy of ambiguity, and 
found that the excess market return is positively correlated to this measure. In addition, 
their results show that controlling for risk, stock portfolios that have a higher ambiguity 
yield up to 3% of annual return over low ambiguity portfolios. Zhang (2006) argues that 
the age of the firm and the analyst coverage can also present the level of ambiguity, and 
found that such measurements can predict the stock returns. Other potential measures of 
ambiguity are included: political stability, investor sentiment and bid-ask spread.  
To sum up, due to imperfect information, the market is sometimes ambiguous 
rather than risky, and investors behave differently towards ambiguity compared to risk. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that people aim to avoid ambiguity and thus 
this could result in a price premium. Therefore, the next section explores the concept of 
ambiguity further.  
 
2.3 Ambiguity: concept and theoretical works  
 
As stated above, the evidence shows that ambiguity aversion differs to risk aversion 
since there is a different decision making process is employed. Thus it is important to 
understand how to define the concept of ambiguity as well as how to measure and 
model it. Therefore, this section provides a detailed review of ambiguity.  
 
2.3.1 Origins from Knight   
 
Ambiguity, or the so-called Knightian uncertainty, has its origins in the work of Frank 
Knight in 1921. He believed that people misunderstood the concept of risk and 
ambiguity. ‘Risk’ is usually described as the situation in which changes are foreseeable, 
or in which the exact results of those may be unknown but the distribution of possible 
outcomes is informed. In such a case, the ‘risky’ outcome can be calculated by using 
expectations due to the law of numbers, and can be easily discounted to a current cost or 
hedged against. Thus a market with perfect knowledge only has a pure risk, and all 
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economic activities always move towards a zero abnormal return, as the perfect 
competition will discount every future event into cost. 
Since, in reality, the abnormal return does exist and sometimes lasts for a long 
time, Knight believed that some dynamic changes could not be anticipated, insured or 
hedged against, and he called this ‘ambiguity’. In fact, as was concluded in the last 
section, in reality the market where everybody is exposed to both risk and ambiguity is 
imperfect. Knight further argued that in cases where people have no valid information 
basis they use a special process of decision making, namely estimation. As both Knight 
and Ellsberg agree, ambiguity exists in cases where there are un-measureable 
probabilities, and Table 2.2 shows all the possible attributes of an event before it 
actually happens: 
Table 2.2 Divisions of Events 
This table reports all possible situations of the knowledge about a future event. The trails of 
possible results are the results that could happen in this event, e.g. toss a coin and the trails are 
‘head’ and ‘tail’. The distribution of possible results gives the probability distributions for all 
possible results, e.g. toss a perfect coin and the distribution of ‘head’ and ‘tail’ should be 50% 
and 50%, however if the coin is imperfect the distribution is unknown. The final result is the 
actual outcome of the event, such as ‘toss a coin and get a head’. 
Type of situation 
The trails of possible 
results 
The distribution of 
possible results 
Final  result 
1 known known known 
2 known known unknown 
3 known unknown known 
4 known unknown unknown 
5 unknown known known 
6 unknown known unknown 
7 unknown unknown known 
8 unknown unknown unknown 
 
Intuitively, it is impossible for anyone to know the real distributions without being 
informed by the set of possible results. Therefore, the distribution of possible results can 
be known only if the trails of possible results are known. So the only possible cases left 
are: 1, 2, 7, 8. Furthermore, Case 1 is the event that is certain since everything is known.  
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Case 2 matches the traditional description of the risk, where the distributions are 
perfectly known. As defined by Knight, both Case 7 and Case 8 belong to the ambiguity 
events, since their distributions are unknown and thus a precise prediction is impossible.  
The significant difference between the Case 7 and Case 8 is whether the trails of 
the possible outcomes are informed. In terms of this, Case 8 is even more ambiguous 
than Case 7, since the possible outcomes are unknown. From the original words of 
Knight, they should both be considered as ambiguity events; however, their natures are 
very different. In fact, Case 8 is now defined as ‘unawareness’, as people are unaware of 
what could happen. The research of unawareness is a separate section of financial and 
economic studies. Therefore, in this thesis ambiguity is defined as the situation where 
the outcome is known but the probability is unknown.  
 
2.3.2 Risk and ambiguity: SEU and Non-SEU 
 
To state the influence of ambiguity, it is firstly necessary to go through the traditional 
decision making process. The risk-return trade-off is based on the Savage (1954)’s 
subjective expected utility (SEU) theory: Considering a bet on a series of events 
                            in which the events    is mutually exclusive, and 
{      } is a complete collection of the event. Then there is utility function    and a 
subjective probability distribution   of events     . Therefore investors’ subjective 
expected utility (SEU) of events g is: 
        
 
                                                          (2.4) 
The model is very important because in most of the financial theories this is how 
the expected return is measured. It implies that the utility       of a certain gain    is 
certain, and independent with the probability distributions. The final outcome is a 
weighted-average of individual events. In many theories the outcome is weighted by the 
statistical probability, so the expected outcome is the probability-weighted average. 
Savage assumes that although the actual distribution is unknown, people can always use 
a prior belief by applying the Bayesian process from prior observations, so behaviour 
under ambiguity should be identical with the risk.  
However, Ellsberg (1961)’s experiments demomstrated that in reality people did 
behave differently when the distributions are unknown and violate the SEU. As a result, 
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many researchers tried to develop new utility models which could describe behaviour 
under ambiguity, and were named NON-SEU models. A good example of such a model 
is from Chen and Epstein (2002), who documented a way through the backward 
stochastic differential utility (BSDU) model. The model allows an agent to have 
multiple prior beliefs other than a single one in SEU. To define the ambiguity, let there 
be a state space      .  A decision maker maps   into outcome set  . Then according 
to the multi-variable models, the utility of an act   is:  
                                                             (2.5) 
Where        is the utility index and P is the subjective set of the probability 
measures from space      . The model becomes the traditional SEU model if P is a 
singleton. The other assumptions are: 
1. Time t,         
2. The probability space        . 
3. d-dimensional standard Brownian movement      
    
      
   
based on space        .  
4. A Brownian filtration      , where    is generated by             
Then let the        be a    valued process, which satisfies: 
      
 
 
     
  
 
     ∞                                              (2.6) 
It is called the density generator, and process   
  is a P-martingale and: 
   
  
   
                                                            (2.7) 
Therefore, given a set of density generator, there is a set of prior  
                                                                  (2.8) 
Now an unambiguous event   can be defined: 
                                  
                            (2.9) 
And all the other events are called ambiguous. In this model many differences with SEU 
model can be seen. For example, the expected outcome for the ambiguous events is no 
longer simply the probability weighted average. There are many other NON-SEU 
25 
 
models, and they all reveal a different decision making process than the traditional SEU 
model.  
 
2.3.3 Modeling ambiguity  
 
After the acknowledgement of Ellsberg’s experiment, many studies start to catch more 
features of people’s behaviour under ambiguity. Olsen and Troughton (2006) have 
summarised some main aspects observed from previous literature:  
1. Ambiguity can affect decision making and, in general, people are ambiguity 
averse. 
2. Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are not highly related.  
3. If there are any kinds of difficulties in estimating the value or distribution of the 
outcome, people tend to ask for a premium for the asset. 
4. Ambiguity averse people tend to put more emphasis on the negative information 
when they are engaged with ambiguity. 
Based on these facts, there are quite a few models trying to explain how people 
make their decisions under ambiguity, and there are two mainstream types of such 
models.  The first type is called alpha max-min model, where people combine their 
initial judgments with estimations, and the weight depends on the level of the ambiguity 
and their attitude towards the ambiguity. An example is from Kelsey, Ford and Pang 
(2013), who believe that the final expected utility is a weighted average of maximum 
utility, minimum utility and expected utility. The formula is presented below:  
                 ′                                                    (2.10)           
Here the Max (w) and Min (w) are the max and min utility of an event W, and E (w) is 
the initial expected utility. δ∈[0,1] is the level of the ambiguity, the lower the δ, the 
more the individual is certain about the situation and sticks to his initial judgment. α∈ 
[0, 1] is the attitude towards the ambiguity; a higher α means the individual puts more 
weight on a good outcome and is thus more optimistic. Further is stated that α is a 
character of the individual, which depends on the environment, and the Bayesian 
Updating rules should be applied here. In addition, α, δ should be measured 
experimentally. This model is the one that is closest to Knight’s original belief that 
people are ‘estimating’ under ambiguity. It also has the major advantage of allowing an 
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agent to seek the ambiguity, since such a situation can sometimes be observed in the 
market (Viscusi & Chesson, 1999). 
Another model is the max-min utility model, or what is better known as the 
worst case scenario model. It assumes that when engaged with ambiguity, ambiguity 
averse people act as they would when facing the worst case scenario, and they try to 
maximise their utility in such a situation. An example of such a model is from Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy (2007).  Firstly, a situation   is defined, which has a ‘real’ 
probability   , and the agent has its own ideal about the probability, which is   . Let 
  
      
             , then K captures the range of err   
  and so can 
characterize the ambiguity level. Again by defining an action C, which can be described 
by matrix   , the utility of C under situation w is 
        . Then in order to find 
the optimal action under the ambiguity, the following equation needs to be solved: 
                      
        
                                        (2.11) 
This ‘worst-case scenario’ approach can be seen as a modification of the previous 
model under extreme pessimism,  where α=0 and the highest level of the ambiguity is 
δ=1, thus the individual totally gives up his initial opinion and becomes totally 
pessimistic. In such a manner it causes the agent to behave symmetrically as so that 
their ambiguity aversion level stays the same (although the worst case can still be 
different depending on the individual position). Besides, this model is fundamental for 
many other models of ambiguity, for example, the smooth decision model.  
 
2.3.4 Measuring Ambiguity  
 
So far some models reviewing the behaviour under ambiguity have been already seen, 
however, in order to apply them, the level of ambiguity needs to be measured first.  
Unfortunately, this is something that both Knight and Ellsberg missed, as they left no 
mathematical definition.  Due to its nature of being non-quantitative, unlike risk, 
ambiguity is very difficult to measure directly. Later studies suggest that many different 
methods, which are majorly based on the idea of describing the quality of information, 
can be used to measure ambiguity.  An example is from Epstein and Schneider (2008).  
Assume an agent has a signal but he is not sure about it, and, as a result, the agent does 
not update his belief following the normal Bayesian process, but with multi-priors. Let 
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  be a parameter that an investor needs to learn, and assume the signal s is related to the 
parameter with a family of likeli-hood: 
              
     
                                            (2.12) 
When a=b, this case becomes a normal Bayesian case with a single likeli-hood, and the 
quality of the information is measured by 1/  
 . However, under the ambiguity situation 
the level of the ambiguity is captured in the range of [1/b, 1/ a].   
Following this theoretical approach, many studies try to measure the ambiguity 
with proxies empirically. Anderson et al. (2009) suggest measuring the ambiguity with 
the divergence of analysts’ opinions while using volatility for the risk. They assume that 
an agent has some imperfect knowledge about the market’s excess return, so it is 
distributed with the informed variance    and the unknown mean   .Thus the market 
risk is measured by   while the ambiguity is measured by the agent’s belief about the 
variance   . More precisely, let    be the best estimator of  , and the level of the 
ambiguity can be measured by        . In practice, this is expressed by a weighted 
variance of analysts’ opinions. Let x be a series of a forecast about the market return at a 
time t, which has    forecasts in total, and rank the forecasts from high to low. The 
weight of the  th lowest forecast is: 
       
            
   
     
  
   
           
                                            (2.13) 
where v is the parameter to decide the weight of  each forecast. Thus the disagreement 
can be measured by the beta-weighted variance of the forecast series x: 
                                             
  
    
   
                 (2.14) 
On the other hand, whether the ambiguity can be measured by one single 
variable is controversial, since even the risk cannot be measured by the beta only. 
Therefore, similar to the Fama-French three factors model, some researchers also 
suggest the multi-variable models. Zhang (2006) documented other proxies, such as 
firm size, firm age and analyst coverage, dispersion in analyst forecasts, return volatility, 
and cash flow volatility.  
Although it seems that those empirical proxies are quite different, they still serve 
the same purpose for the theoretical path, which is to catch the information quality. 
Intuitively, young and small companies have a lower information quality due to the lack 
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of records. And, as Anderson et al. (2009) argue, agents are likely to form their beliefs 
based on the professional forecasts, and if such forecasts have any arguments among 
themselves, the agent receives ambiguous information. In fact, a sophisticated agent 
may admit that his model is not totally reliable. Therefore, it is also reasonable to 
assume that the model explanation power is another kind of proxy for the ambiguity 
measure.  
 
2.4 Ambiguity and financial market  
2.4.1 Source of ambiguity in financial market  
 
As previously discussed, the stock market can sometimes be ambiguous rather than 
simply risky. The following section provides a detailed discussion about the possible 
reasons that lead to market ambiguity.  
a. Information ambiguity  
 
The first and most common way to be involved in market ambiguity is by receiving 
ambiguous information. As stated above, by operating under imperfect knowledge, all 
investor are exposed to ambiguity, and this can be recognised in many different ways. 
Zhang (2006) argues that the information quality in the market is ambiguous. He 
noticed that investors always under-react to the new information such as, for example, 
earnings announcements. And he further assumed that investors would under-react even 
more with a higher level of information ambiguity: when ambiguity is involved, 
investors tend to overweigh their initial information and underweigh new messages. So 
for the stocks under high ambiguity, a strategy of buying assets with good news and 
selling assets with bad news should work well. He suggests that there are some proxies 
for the information ambiguity, like firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, dispersion in 
analyst forecasts, return volatility, and cash flow volatility. The evidence he found 
suggests that the initial market reaction to new public information is incomplete, so bad 
news predict relatively lower future returns and good news predict relatively higher 
future returns. Moreover, the level of incompleteness of the market reaction increases 
with the level of the information ambiguity, which implies that high ambiguity leads to 
the situation where the agent is to under-react more with the new information. Therefore, 
higher information ambiguity produces relatively lower future returns following bad 
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news and relatively higher future returns following good news respectively. This is 
inconsistent with the assumption that ambiguity is a cross-sectional risk factor, and thus 
supports the view that the ambiguity is a unique factor in determining stock returns.   
Epstein and Schneider (2008) also believe in information ambiguity. In 
particular, they divide the information into tangible information such as dividends, and 
intangible information such as news and forecasts. The assumption is that the tangible 
information is certain and intangible information is uncertain. For example, people can 
always have a precise number of annual dividends by reading the earnings report.  
However, the forecast of the next annual return could be very useful or simply pointless, 
as it is totally depends on the analysts but very hard to confirm.  They also believe that 
people would apply the worst case scenario formula to such a situation. As a result, 
prices would respond stronger to the bad news than to the good news. Their results 
further state that the expected excess return of the market should decrease with future 
information quality, as the ambiguity adverse investors would require a compensation 
for the ambiguity they have to hold.  In other words, the investor would ask for a high 
ambiguity premium with a poor quality of information when the fundamental is more 
volatile. To prove this fact, Epstein and Schneider (2008) tested the model, which 
contains ambiguity averse factors in the traditional Bayesian model for the US market 
after 9.11.  They found that the ambiguity model works more efficiently.  
 
b. Model ambiguity  
 
The second important source of ambiguity has appeared from the models. There are two 
types of problems with the models. The first one is the flaws in modelling or variable 
selecting process. An example of flaws in modelling is the recent crisis caused by MBS. 
Those MBS securities were assumed to be safe and highly rated; because traditionally 
people assumed that the default of two mortgages that geographically diversified in 
America is independent or, at least, very lowly correlated. However, when the 
aggregated level of liquidity was drained, such correlation suddenly rocketed and the 
previous risk models became no longer reliable.  
Even where the agent is able to construct a correct model, in practice it may be 
very difficult to find a precise proxy for the variables and so the variable selecting 
process is flawed. For example, beta is a widely applied measure of risk, but also known 
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for its poor performance. Therefore, when CAPM is applied, an agent may anticipate a 
biased result. Another example is, as documented by Arin et al. (2007), there being 17 
proxies for the degree of political freedom in previous studies, and thus it is very 
difficult for investors to select the right ones. His results show that due to such model 
ambiguity, the relationship between the market return and political events are very weak. 
In addition, many models come with very strict constraints, which, in practice, can 
never be fulfilled; for example the assumption of rational behaviour. These 
disadvantages of the models may have the result of a sophisticated investor becoming  
uncertain about the predicted results.  
The second problem with models is choosing between different models. In many 
cases there are multiple ways of solving the same problem, e.g. to estimate an optimal 
global market portfolio return, one approach is to use the ICAPM model, where the 
weight is simply the percentage of each country’s return in the global capital market. 
Another way is to generate benchmark weights from a mean-variance optimisation with 
sample estimates of the mean and covariance matrix of asset returns as inputs. 
Apparently both of these approaches have disadvantages: the modelling approach only 
works when all the constraints of ICAPM are held. On the other hand, the data approach 
totally relies on the past return data and ignores everything else. Therefore, a 
sophisticated investor may accept neither of them unconditionally, but would take a 
weighted average of them. However, the actual weight depends on the individual’s 
decision making and cannot be measured precisely. Baele, Pungulescu and Horst (2006) 
studied the degree of home bias and found that investors do combine those two models 
and the weight varies through time. Therefore, if investors apply different models, they 
also bring ambiguity to market.  
 
2.4.2 Behaviour under ambiguity  
 
a. Empirical evidence of ambiguity aversion 
 
The previous section provided a detailed discussion about the reasons that may result in  
market ambiguity, however it is also very important to understand how investors would 
react to these ambiguous situations: if most people are ambiguity neutral, it simply has 
no effect on assets return. The reviews of the ambiguity models made an important 
prediction that people are ambiguity averse, and there is empirical evidence to support 
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this: Ellsberg (1961)’s experiment is the first, which revealed that people are in general 
ambiguity averse. Actually, Ellsberg observed strong pessimism when decisions were 
made under ambiguity: from the quotes someone explained,  
‘ … if the stakes are important… I must consider how much I might expect to lose, 
without being unreasonable…. So in the situation where I cannot really judge 
confidently among a whole range of distributions…pushing me towards actions whose 
expected value are relatively insensitive to the particular distribution of that 
range…that strikes me as a sensible, conservative rules to follow. What’s wrong with it?’   
(Ellsberg, 1961, p.663) 
This is very solid empirical evidence for ambiguity aversion. However, the result was 
observed in an experimental environment, therefore whether it could be held in the 
market is still unknown.  
Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2013) also observed 
ambiguity aversion under experimental conditions.  By using an internet survey which 
implements on more than 3,000 respondents in the American Life Panel (ALP), they 
found strong heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion: a large fraction of respondents (52%) 
is ambiguity averse, a small fraction (10%) ambiguity neutral, and the remainder (38%) 
ambiguity seeking. Their experiment follows the classic Ellsberg urn problem, and asks 
respondents to choose between lotteries with known probabilities, versus lotteries with 
unknown probabilities. Although all of the respondents are eligible to win real monetary 
incentives (a total of $23,850 was paid to 1,590 of the respondents), and thus their 
research shows some convincing results about an individual’s economic preferences, it 
is still not clear how ambiguity aversion will affect the real market.   
 
Anderson et al. (2009) found that the disagreements between analysts are 
positively related to the expected excess stock return. They explained that such 
disagreement was priced because the agents are aware of the model ambiguity. The 
result reveals that  ambiguity aversion is very significant and also, during the market 
time when ambiguity is unusually large, the market excess return also goes up. In 
addition, the constructed high-ambiguity portfolio outperformed the low-ambiguity 
portfolio by 3% annually, given the same level of risk.  
Although ambiguity is a possible missing parameter in the asset pricing model, 
empirical support is important for further research. This is also one of the main 
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motivations for this thesis: to find empirical evidence for ambiguity’s influence on the 
financial market.   
 
b. Biased decision from ambiguity and market anomalies 
 
Another important question regarding ambiguity is about how it affects people’s 
decision making, as this has an influence on trading and, hence, prices. The models of 
ambiguity, which have been previously discussed, show that decision making under 
ambiguity is quite different from the risk situation, as people violate the SEU model.  
Therefore, there are models based on the assumption that a decision made under 
ambiguity is biased and does not achieve the normal optimal goal. For example, Epstein 
and Schneider (2008) provide some details about such decision-making processes. 
Firstly, before information arrives, if investors are anticipating low quality information, 
they avoid any consumption plans following this information. Secondly, after 
ambiguous information arrives, the agents respond asymmetrically, i.e. the bad news 
would affect the investors’ decision more than good news. They interpret this applying 
the worst case scenario model and like to maximize their minimum utility. Similarly, 
Zhang (2006) documents that if the situation is ambiguous, an agent becomes 
pessimistic and undervalues the new signal until the final result is revealed. He states  
that in the market  investors can overweigh their own information and under-react in 
relation to the new information, which leads to an under-reaction to the events such as a 
better earning announcement.  
Biased decision making can produce many anomalies in the financial market. 
The first type is biased portfolio choice. As French and Poterba (1991) documented, that 
although the US stock market comprises less than 48% of the global equity market, US 
investors devoted 94% of their capital into the domestic market, and such phenomenon 
persists even in times when most direct obstacles to foreign investment have 
disappeared. They believe such a biased decision is caused by ambiguity aversion, as 
the investors have insufficient information from foreign companies. Similarly, Uppal 
and Wang (2003) stated that due to ambiguity aversion, investors tend to choose stocks 
that they are familiar with, i.e., a local company, rather than an optimal stock. Both of 
the two biases (home bias and familiarity bias) lead to under-diversification and thus 
increase unnecessary risk. 
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The second type of anomaly that ambiguity could cause is the biased asset price. 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) find that it is difficult to simultaneously explain large 
historical average equity returns and the small average risk-free rate by means. For the 
period from 1889-1978 they observe an annualised return of 7% from S&P 500, and an 
annualised risk-free rate, as represented by t-bills, around 1%. The result indicates a 
historical equity premium of roughly 6% per year; however, a pure risk model will not 
imply average annual excess returns above 0.4%, unless implausibly high levels of risk 
aversion are tolerated. Chen and Epstein (2002) argue that such a premium is partly 
caused by ambiguity aversion, as investors cannot eliminate their multi-priors by simply 
learning from the past. Therefore, the excess returns of stocks are not only a pure risk 
premium, but also a partly ambiguity premium. Meanwhile, Caskey (2009) believes that 
ambiguity averse investors will choose to trade on aggregate level of information, and 
therefore cause market momentums. (A market momentum refers to the fact that stocks 
which have outperformed the benchmark are more likely to keep outperforming in the 
future, and vice versa to the under-performing stocks.) Similarly, Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (1998) argue that price momentum will be stronger when there is 
high ambiguity. The reason is that when the level of ambiguity is high, information can 
hardly be justified. As a result, self-attribution bias and over-confidence is more 
difficult to control, which keeps investors’ attention on the previous winning / losing 
stocks.  
Finally, bias from ambiguity can cause liquidity issues. Easley and O’Hara 
(2010) stated that if the level of ambiguity is high enough, an ambiguity averse agent 
may stop trading, which can cause results ranging from limited market participation to 
market crash. Similarly, Both Kelsey et al. (2013) and Routledge and Zin (2004) believe 
that the biased decision from ambiguity can make it more difficult for the market-dealer 
to recognize informed traders. Since the dealer makes profit from noise traders and loses 
money to informed traders, under ambiguity the dealer will widen his bid-ask spread for 
compensation and, thus, cause a liquidity crisis in the market.  
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2.4.3 Ambiguity Premium  
 
As stated above, people in general avoid dealing with assets with ambiguity or respond 
more slowly to ambiguous information, which implies the possibility of an ambiguity 
premium. However, since the ambiguity has different sources, the ambiguity premium 
might not work in the same way as a risk premium. Olsen and Troughton (2006) 
suggest that the abnormal part of the risk premium, such as a risk premium puzzle and a 
small company effect, could come from the ambiguity. They interpret the risk as ‘a 
function of the possibility of incurring a loss’, while ambiguity is ‘lack of information 
about and lack of confidence in estimating future distributions of returns or incurring a 
loss’. Their results show that more than 70% of professional investors would not 
consider just quantitative figures to estimate the risk, but also have many other non-
quantitative factors as their concern. Plus, more than 90% of the investors agree that for 
small or extremely volatile companies, personal judgement plays a much more 
important role than quantitative results. Therefore, for such ambiguity-associated 
securities people may expect an excess return.  However, as stated above, ambiguity has 
various sources and may affect investment decision in many different ways, so the 
following part of the chapter is to discuss these possible impacts. 
 
a. Premium from ambiguity in expected return  
 
One main reason for the ambiguity premium is that investors have imperfect 
information about market returns, and this results in ambiguity aversion behaviour and a 
premium. One example is from Anderson et al. (2009), who documented a model with 
the theoretical impact on ambiguity premiums:  
Firstly consider the following states, which people believe follow the process: 
                                                                  (2.15) 
where    is a vector of independent standard Brownian motions and          and 
        are functions of the current state. The risk free rate is        ) and the 
price for the  th asset on the market is    : 
                                                                (2.16) 
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where            is scalar and            is vector.    and    are vectors, the  th 
elements are     and    .    is a matrix whose  th row is    . The first asset is 
interpreted as the market and the wealth of investor    is: 
       
′
                  
′
                                         (2.17) 
Here          is the excess return,    is the portfolio weigh vector, whose  th 
element presents the weight of investment on  th asset,     is consumption. However, as 
the investors perceive the ambiguity in their model, they only treat those formulas as 
references models. Now an agent believes that the conditional mean of the state is 
        instead of   , and the conditional expected return is         rather than   .  
        ,             and          have the same dimension with          
respectively. Thus in reality the true price of assets is: 
                                                                  (2.18) 
                                                                (2.19) 
       
′
     
′
                    
′
                        (2.20) 
Anderson et al. (2009) assume that agents know    and   , but do not know   . 
Therefore, rather than being Bayesian and using a distribution of   , agents  solve a 
robustness problem with    , which is  a function of exogenous state and wealth. 
Therefore in the paper they apply the worst case scenario model by penalising the 
deviation from the reference model with the quadratic term     
′
       , where 
            is a function of exogenous wealth and states. According to the worst 
case scenario model, the investors maximize their utility by solving:  
            
∞
 
 
  
   
   
 
 
   
   
′
                                     (2.21) 
where   is the parameter for the risk aversion and   is a time discount rate,    which 
stands for the expectation at time zero. As a result, there is a positive premium to the 
excess return under the ambiguity: 
                                                             (2.22) 
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In the model         is the excess market return at time t, while   measures the level of 
ambiguity aversion and   measures the level of the ambiguity in the market.   can be 
measured by the disagreement with analysts’ opinions. However, since the analysts 
have a different influence, it is unreasonable to apply a flat weight. Anderson et al. 
(2009)’s empirical study suggest the a flat-weighted model does not have any predictive 
ability on the returns. The alternative method is to use a beta-weighted way. They also 
found that the ambiguity and the risk do not have any significant relationship.  
 
b. Premium from ambiguity in market volatility 
 
So far some brief ideas about ambiguity in the market and the ambiguity premium have  
been discussed above. The following facts provide a brief summary: 
1. People reveal ambiguity aversion in the market  
2. Ambiguity can either come from low quality information or from an 
imperfect model 
3. Part of the equity premium should be the ambiguity premium  
4. Ambiguity premium is more related to excess return rather than return  
5. Ambiguity premium can vary  through time 
 As documented, ambiguity can come from multiple sources; therefore 
ambiguous expected return is not the only ambigious parameter. Epstein and Schneider 
(2006) argue that information can be divided into tangible and intangible information 
and people only feel uncertain about intangible information, such as return forecasts. 
Consequently, the interest arises in some other vital ‘intangible’ parts, such as volatility. 
It is well-known that volatility is essential for modern financial operations. The value-
at-risk is one of the most important approaches of estimating risk exposure and the 
estimation of volatility plays an important role in it.  Also, in the dynamic risk 
management process, an agent not only has to estimate historical volatility, but also has 
to forecast it for the future, or more precisely, prepare conditional volatility estimation. 
However, the stock’s volatility varies over time, and Campbell et al. (2006) showed that 
from 1962 to 1997 the firm level of stock volatility had significant changed.  They 
found the number of stocks needed to achieve a certain level of diversity within a 
portfolio was increased. Therefore, any forecasting method has a chance of failing on 
certain stocks. Intuitively, if an agent is ambiguity averse and feels uncertain about his 
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ability to forecast volatility in the future, they avoid the stock or requires a premium for 
it.  
In practice, there are a lot of methods of estimating volatility, but before 
considering them, some fundamental settings of return and variance need to be 
confirmed.  Let S be a stock in the market, and at time t its price is     . Then the 
return at time t is:  
       
  
    
                                                         (2.23) 
Since     usually is seen as a random variable, people may be more interested in its time 
series,   its mean value of    and its standard deviation  . In practice   is usually treated 
as zero, so   is more important for describing the returns. However, compared to returns, 
volatility is unobservable: the integrated volatility    is latent. Therefore, the market is 
in general more interested in a conditional volatility, which is               and 
provided the information up until now (   ), the variance of the financial 
return      over the next period. This forecast is based on the current information set, so 
the assumptions about the returns are crucial. For example, if investors assume the 
returns are independent and identically normally distributed, the volatility can be 
expressed as below, where   is the mean return over the period T and    is return at time 
t:   
                  
 
   
         
 
                                                    (2.24) 
Some more advanced ways to express market volatility include applying stochastic 
models. For example, the Heston model, where the conditional variance is in the form 
of: 
                                                             (2.25) 
where   is the long term mean volatility,   stands for the rate that the volatility reverts 
towards its long-term mean, and   stands for the volatility of the volatility process, and 
    is Gaussian with mean zero and unit standard deviation. The key assumption for 
this model is that the variance at least has the following features:  
1. Tends to revert to its long-term mean   
2. Has a volatility related to its standard deviation  
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Another popular model is the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, which constructs the forecasted volatility as: 
  
            
        
                                        (2.26) 
Comparing it to the previous model, GARCH assumes that the volatility of the variance 
is related to past variance rather than the square root of variance in the Heston model. 
Therefore, the forecast of conditional volatility shares one common problem with: the 
resulting volatility measures are only valid under the assumptions of the models and it is 
uncertain whether any of the assumptions provide a good description of actual volatility. 
It is important to note that investors are interested in the true integrated volatility   . 
Thus, due to the imperfect information set    , any conditional volatility forecast cannot 
perfectly represent the integrated volatility. In fact, the result from the models can be 
expressed as:    
              
    , where    
 
is the true volatility and    is the error 
term caused by the model which varies through different stocks. Hence  investors face 
the ambiguity about the distribution of the returns because of the model ambiguity, and 
the lower the explanation power of the model applied, the higher is the ambiguity. 
Since such model ambiguity arises from the nature of imperfect information, it is 
reasonable to assume that all existing models include ambiguity. So without loss of 
generality, some specific models, such as GARCH, can be used as a reasonable proxy 
for ambiguity in volatility. As Anderson et al. (2009) proved, the ambiguity in the 
expected return (which is measured by the divergence of analyst’s opinion) is related to 
the excess market return: a high-ambiguity portfolio yields 3% higher annual returns 
compared to a low-ambiguity portfolio, given the risk to be the same.  Their assumption 
is that investors see the market return with some unknown mean   and known standard 
deviation  ; the degree of divergence of opinion  presents the level of ambiguity    
Thus  it can also be assumed that the investors  are ambiguous about the distribution   , 
due to the model uncertainties.  
Therefore, without loss of generality, the predicted value     by GARCH, the 
investors see the result as the true value of   plus an error             
  .       
  
will vary through different stocks, as GARCH has a different performance with stocks. 
The smaller the       
 , the less ambiguous the result will be. However, since       
  
is unobservable in practice the other proxies need to be used.  
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One possible way of doing this is to construct the interested company X with 
two time series of volatility, the realised one and the GARCH forecasted one, then  a 
linear regression is run between these two. The r-square of the regression should be a 
reasonable measure of the overall performance of the GARCH model on stock X. The 
higher the r-square, the better the predictive ability the GARCH has, and the smaller the 
      
  should be. Thus investors can obtain the information about the        
  from 
the r-square, and then decide the level of ambiguity on the stock X and consequently the 
ambiguity premium.  
 
c. Ambiguity premium from market liquidity 
 
 Recent studies show a strong link between ambiguity and the market liquidity and the 
liquidity premium. It is possible that, part of the liquidity premium is the result of 
ambiguity aversion.  
From Easley and O’Hara (2009)’s model, the most optimistic investors provide 
the ask price and the least optimistic investors provide the bid price. As a result, the bid-
ask spread is, in fact, the ambiguity premium, and, therefore, the ambiguity level should 
be positively related to the bid-ask spread. Similarly, Routledge and Zin (2009) also 
suggest that ambiguity can increase the bid-ask spread and can reduce the probability of 
trade.  
From Ozsoylev and Werner (2009), ambiguity aversion can cause arbitragers to 
choose not to trade and thus reduce market liquidity. They assume the market has three 
participants: risk-averse informed traders, risk-neutral arbitragers and noise traders who 
trade randomly. The market contains one risky asset and one risk-free asset. The 
ambiguity arises from the pay-off of the risky asset, and the trading volume of the noise 
traders.  At time 0 both informed traders and arbitragers are uncertain about the pay-off 
of the risky asset and so they have multi-beliefs. At time 1 the informed traders receive 
private signals which reveal the exact distribution, while the arbitragers stay uncertain 
and try to extract information from a market price. Since arbitragers are ambiguous, 
they are assumed to follow the max-min utility model. Thus if the market price is lower 
than the minimum expected price over his set of priors, an arbitrager will take a long 
position; and if the market price is higher than the maximum expected price over the set 
of priors, the arbitrager will take a short position. However, if the price is between the 
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maximum and minimum price, the arbitragers will choose not to trade, as the max-min 
utility model indicates that any transaction would not be profitable. Thus, 
Ozsoylev and Werner (2009)’s results show that ambiguity about the means of the 
information and a random asset supply create a range of price, where arbitragers will 
not trade and this implies an illiquid market.  
The above study further compared the impact of ambiguity over the mean and 
the variance of the returns: higher ambiguity over the means leads to a higher liquidity 
risk (the probability of the market being illiquid) and a lower trading volume, but no 
effect on the market depth. On the other hand, higher ambiguity over the variance has 
no effect on the liquidity risk, but can cause a lower trading volume and a lower market 
depth. Ozsoylev and Werner (2009) also found that ambiguity can increase the 
probability of excess volatility.  
Eichberger and Spanjers (2007) model ambiguity and market liquidity by using 
another approach, but they obtain similar results.  Eichberger and Spanjers (2007) 
assume that ambiguity arises from the uncertainty of individuals and aggregate liquidity 
demand from consumers who do not know their own liquidity needs, in the first stage. 
In the second stage they learn their liquidity needs and the proportion of consumers with 
high liquidity needs become publicly available. Consumers with a higher demand for 
liquidity strictly prefer to hold a bank deposit which has a yield of risk-free rate, while 
the rest would accept illiquid assets. The market contains many small investors with one 
unit of initial wealth, which they can decide to hold as a deposit or as more illiquid 
assets. The return on the bank deposit depends on the bank’s reserve rate and the 
expected rate of withdrawal in the future.  In the period 0 both individual and aggregate 
liquidity needs are unknown. In period 1 the consumers privately learn their liquidity 
needs and the proportion of consumers with high liquidity needs become common 
knowledge. In period 2 the return on the asset or on the bank deposit is paid out. The 
two sources of the ambiguity are the unknown individual and aggregate liquidity needs 
of the consumers. Even though the consumers do not know their own liquidity needs in 
the beginning, they have to decide on what to do with their initial wealth in the period 0. 
In different scenarios they can choose proportions of holding their cash or investing it in 
illiquid assets.  
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d. Ambiguity premium and investor sentiments 
 
Antoniou et al. (2014) carried out empirical studies and he found that investors can be 
pessimistic about the returns of companies with low information quality. The historical 
data implies that the excess return of small companies is too high for any pure risk 
measurements.  Thus one possible explanation for this fact is that the price of a small 
company bears some premium for the ambiguity. The paper also assumes that a  
pessimistic mood changes over time, and will be more significant during a downward 
market. By applying a weighted-average of the analysis forecast as measurement of 
information quality, Antoniou et al. (2014) find that the forecast for small companies 
does have more bias as the investors receive a lower quality of information for small 
companies and are more uncertain about their beliefs. They further believe that the 
premium depends on the mood in the market. The de-trended market P/E ratio is picked 
as the indicator, and obviously a high P/E means that the market is more optimistic at 
that time. The results show that a small company’s premium changes with the market 
sentiment, and only exists when the sentiment is low. So small companies are very 
likely to be undervalued when the market is more ambiguity averse. Similarly, Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) conclude that when a market sentiment is low, stocks that are 
‘highly subjective and hard to arbitrage’, such as young stocks, small companies stocks, 
high volatility stocks, distressed stocks and no-dividend paying stocks, will have a 
positive excess return afterwards. And when the sentiment is high, the excess return 
becomes negative.   
However, there is also a possibility that such a premium is negative because 
some of the investors are the ambiguity seekers. Brenner and Izhakian (2011) argue that 
the attitude to the ambiguity depends on the probability of loss which the investors are 
facing: if there is a high probability of loss, they will be the ambiguity loving, and if the 
chance of gain is high they will be ambiguity averse.  Brenner and Izhakian (2011)’s 
research finds ambiguity loving behaviour in the market, and so the corresponding 
premium for the ambiguity is negative. It is plausible that under some circumstances, 
investors can see ambiguity as a chance. However for a long-term period and 
aggregated level of market, the ambiguity premium is much more likely to be positive 
as there are a lot of studies which support the fact that the majority of the population 
shows ambiguity aversion behaviour.  
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e. Ambiguity premium from limited market participation  
 
Another important link between ambiguity aversion and the price premium is through 
limited market participation. Some models suggest that ambiguity aversion can limit 
investors’ participation in the market and thus decrease the demand for ambiguous 
assets, and therefore makes the prices lower and results in a premium. An example is 
discussed by Easley and O’Hara (2009).  Assuming there are two types of investors in 
the market, one type is sophisticated with a fraction of     of total investors and the 
type is not sophisticated with a fraction  . The investors are j=1,2….J; they all have a 
CARA utility function with the risk aversion parameter set constant to 1:       
        , where w is the investor’s wealth. The market has three types of assets: 
risk-free asset, with a constant price of 1 and net supply of 0; two types of risky assets 
with independent and normally distributed returns of           and supply       The 
possible mean return and variance of the risky assets are:     
        
   and 
    
        
  ,i=1,2;        
      
   is the set of all possible combinations of mean and 
variance of asset i. The sophisticated investors know about the true pay-off         } and  
have EU utility, while the naive investors follow a max-min approach of all possible 
distributions. The investors have a budget constraint as:              and can 
go either long or short on each asset. If the investor chooses portfolio           then 
his wealth in the next period would be                .  
Thus for the sophisticated investors, the problem is to solve: 
                      
 
 
         
 
 
                              (2.27) 
And their demand for each asset is:  
   
       
     
  
                                                        (2.28) 
For the unsophisticated investors, the problem is: 
   
       
   
       
                      
 
 
           
 
 
          
                      (2.29) 
And their demand for each asset is: 
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If the market price of the asset is between the min and max of possible pay-off, the 
unsophisticated investors will not participate, and this decision is irrelevant to the 
variance. Also the unsophisticated investors only consider the maximum value of 
volatility if they do participate, since they always take the worst case scenario.  
The difference between the position of risky holdings of two different types of 
investors,   
         
      , is always positive, thus the sophisticated investors always 
have more risky assets because they do not have ambiguity averse behaviour. Since per 
capita supply and demand must be matched: 
   
              
                                                   (2.31) 
If the market price is between the max and min of expectation of the 
unsophisticated investors, there is no participation by them and the entire asset class is 
owned by the sophisticated investors. Thus the market clear price is: 
      
     
   
                                                            (2.32) 
Since     
               
  is the real constraint, for such situation to happen  
         
  need to be satisfied. 
If there is participation from both types of investors, the clear price is: 
    
       
           
          
   
             
                                           (2.33) 
The participation of the naive investors happens only when:         
      
   
      
 . 
Since the previous result shows the constraint for non-participation case which is 
         
 ,  it can be seen that only one equilibrium can exist  at the same time.  
It is notable that in this model the naive investors will never go short (although 
they are allowed), since they require the price to be greater than     
   for going short. 
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However, by this time all sophisticated investors will go short and therefore none of 
them will take the long position.  Also, the naive investor will only participate when:  
      
     
   
     
                                                    (2.34) 
If the naive investor has a really low anticipation of       
 , the chances for such an 
investor to participate in the market are low .  
To test the effect of ambiguity aversion on the market return, let us assume there 
are two risky assets:  one is the stock of a large firm and another is the stock of a small 
firm. For the first asset both types of investors participate and for the second asset there 
is enough ambiguity to stop naive investors from participating. Thus the price for the 
first asset would be:        
         and the price for the second asset would be: 
     
              . Now assume there is an outsider, a classic representative 
CARA investor, who observes the market price and analyses the information to form a 
‘market belief’. Such an investor will have the following  results:  
           
  
   
                                             (2.35) 
The market representative agent then calculates the return on each asset as:     
   
  
  , 
and the market return is      
           
         
  . Since the assumed agent observes  
                , which are correct, the estimation on the market return is therefore 
correct. And he also sees that       , which is again correct. However for the second 
asset, due to the non-participation of the naive ambiguity averse investors, the assumed 
CARA investor would miscalculate the variance as      
  
   
. Therefore, when the 
assumed agent tries to apply the CAPM model, it would not work perfectly because 
there is now an overestimation of the second asset’s true variance. Therefore, the 
agent’s calculation of beta would be different from the real beta, and lead to result:  
                                                                  (2.36) 
where:  
      
            
                     
      
            
                     
                    (2.37) 
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Thus from the outsider’s view, there is a positive excess return with the 
ambiguity assets, which is affected by the non-participation of ambiguity averse 
investors, when the traditional CAPM model is used.  This is due to the fact that 
ambiguity averse investors overweigh their portfolios of the non-ambiguous asset, 
which increases its price and lowers its return. On the other hand, since the ambiguous 
assets have a lower demand from the ambiguity averse investors, other investors will be 
able to buy them at a lower price and to gain a higher return.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
The recent crisis has proved that traditional risk theories can be faulty, due to imperfect 
information.  For such models as CAPM to work, some strict assumptions are required 
such as perfect market information and rational investor behaviour. However, in the real 
market investors normally have imprecise information when they are building up 
models, or selecting model input. In addition, the behaviour of investors is not perfectly 
rational.  
Frank Knight (1921) believed that investors do not face a simple risk: he argued 
that risky events are events with a known probability of distribution, and if the 
distribution is unknown then the situation is ambiguous. For example, if a firm has a 
lack of historical data, or the opinions of different analysts towards the same company 
conflict with each other, the market is ambiguous rather than risky. Knight further 
suggested that investors deal with ambiguity differently to risk, as their decision making 
process is different. Savage (1954) disagreed with this idea, and suggested that investors 
can change an ambiguous event into a risky event by sticking to a single prior 
assumption. However, this theory was denied by Ellsberg (1961), whose results 
revealed that people change their prior assumptions when they are making decisions 
under the ambiguity. Moreover, Ellsberg (1961) found that people try to avoid 
ambiguity more than risk, thus he provided the evidence for ambiguity aversion. 
Therefore, similar to risk, it is also reasonable to assume an ambiguity-return trade-off, 
which suggests that the ambiguity should be an independent asset pricing factor.  
Based on Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961)’s results, further studies 
constructed different models to explain ambiguity aversion. Most of the literature agrees 
on the fact that when investors are engaged with ambiguity, instead of being perfectly 
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rational and seeking for the optimised solution, they might be dominated by their 
emotions and make sub-optimal decisions. The two mainstream models are the ‘worst 
case scenario’ model and the ‘alpha-max-min’ model. The worst case scenario model 
assumes that investors are pessimistic towards the ambiguity, and thus they always 
choose to prevent loss in the worst possible case. The alpha-max-min model, however, 
allows investors to be both ambiguity averse and ambiguity loving. Under this model 
the final decision is the combination of the best and the worst outcomes, and the 
weighting depends on how optimistic the investors are.  
Apart from distinct behaviour, the sources of ambiguity are also different from 
risk. For example, Zhang (2006) suggests that ambiguity may come from a low quality 
of information. He argues that young firms or firms with a lack of analysts’ coverage 
are ambiguous.  Zhang (2006) found that investors require a higher return on these 
stocks.  On the other hand, Arin et al. (2007) believe that ambiguity may also come 
from the model fitting process. They state that there are 17 suggested proxies for the 
degree of politicians’ freedom in previous studies, and they showed that due to model 
ambiguity, the relationships between market return and political events are very weak.  
Moreover, investors can even be ambiguous about which model they have to rely on. 
For example Baele, Pungulescu and Horst (2006) studied the degree of home bias and 
found that investors did combine different models to estimate the global market return, 
and the weights of different models are time-varying.  
Such unique features of ambiguity have resulted in difficulties in empirical 
studies. In particular, measuring ambiguity is always a controversial process. Zhang 
(2006) suggests that some fundamental variables such as firm age, analysts’ coverage 
and dividend payment are good indicators of ambiguity. On the other hand, Anderson et 
al. (2009) use the divergence of analysts’ opinions as measure of the ambiguity. They 
applied a beta-weighted variance of analysts’ opinions to measure stock market 
ambiguity and found that the excess market returns are positively correlated with this 
variable. In addition, Anderson et al. (2009) found that under a given risk being 
controlled, a high-ambiguity portfolio can outperform a low-ambiguity portfolio by 3% 
annually which means a significant ambiguity premium.  
Further studies suggest many different reasons for the ambiguity premium to 
exist. Firstly, investors can be ambiguous about expected market returns. (Anderson et 
al., 2009; and Zhang, 2006). Secondly, investors can be ambiguous about market 
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volatility (Epstein and Schneider, 2006; Campbell, et al. 2006). Thirdly, ambiguity 
aversion can result in no trade and thus bring a liquidity pressure (Routledge and Zin, 
2009; Ozsoylev and Werner, 2009). Fourthly, ambiguity can be related to investors’ 
sentiments and it can affect trading (Antoniou et al. 2014; Baker and Wurgler, 2006). 
Finally, ambiguity aversion may result in limited market participation (Easley and 
O’Hara, 2009). Although, there is sufficient theoretical knowledge which suggests the 
existence of an ambiguity premium, little of this knowledge has been empirically tested. 
Therefore, there is a motivation in the next parts of this thesis to study the impact of the 
ambiguity empirically, in order to test the existing models and provide evidence for the 
ambiguity-based pricing model.  
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Chapter3. Ambiguity and Stock Market 
Participation 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter reviewed literature about ambiguity and its behavioural models. 
As it can be seen, the theories have been well developed and many classic laboratory 
experiments, such as Ellsberg (1961), have been performed. However, there are a lack 
of empirical studies regarding ambiguity’s effect in the real market. Therefore, in this 
chapter, the relationship between ambiguity aversion and stock market participation is 
explored by using the mutual fund data. According to the ambiguity-based explanation 
of the participation puzzle, stocks are involved with both risk and ambiguity. And since 
most people are ambiguity averse, their participation should be negatively related to 
their ambiguity level. So the main purpose of this chapter is to test these models 
empirically and to find the evidence for ambiguity aversion in the real market.  
 As a start, the reasons for the limited market participation and the ambiguity-
based behaviour model are reviewed here. After formulating the research questions, it is 
examined whether ambiguity aversion can reduce a capital entry in the equity market. 
The starting point for this analysis is that non-professional investors, whose major 
investment approach is through mutual funds, are known to have a low participation 
rate in the stock market. Two empirical proxies are used for market participation: 
mutual fund net flow, which is the net cash flow into equity funds; and mutual fund 
exchange, which is the switching of capital between funds of different asset classes 
managed by the same investment house. The first measure captures stock market 
participation in absolute terms, and the second measures stock market participation that 
is relative to other asset classes.  
Following Anderson et al. (2009), the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) 
data is used to build the ambiguity measure, which is a weighted divergence of analysts’ 
opinions from SPF. According to Ellsberg (1961), ambiguity can be objectively 
measured by the quality of information, or by the degree of conflict. Therefore, when 
divergence amongst analysts’ opinions towards the future stock markets is high, 
ambiguity is also likely to be high, since the fundamental information for future 
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economy is conflicting. In this chapter it is tested whether such a measure can explain 
the changes in market participation after controlling past fund returns (Ippolito,1992; 
Sirri and Tufano, 1998), capital gains (Kamstra et al., 2011), past flows (Ben-Rephael, 
Kandel, and Wohl, 2011), seasonal effects (Kamstra et al., 2011), advertising expenses 
(Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks, 2006), past market returns (Ben-Rephael, et al., 2012) and 
savings (Kamstra et al., 2011). In particular, conditional volatility is used as proxy of 
risk to make sure the results are not simply caused by risk aversion. The result shows 
that, with the listed controlling variables, the ambiguity level is significantly and 
negatively related to both fund flow and fund exchange, which supports the assumption 
that ambiguity aversion can reduce stock market participation.  
In addition, the fund data is further divided by equity type in order to see 
whether the holding of a certain stock is more sensitive than others. The result shows 
that the effect of ambiguity is concentrated in funds which are classed as ‘aggressive 
growth’ and ‘growth’.  These funds invest in more ambiguous, non-dividend paying 
firms. Furthermore, the result shows that while ambiguity has negative influence on the 
equity fund exchange, it increases the net exchange for money market funds. Based on 
the Investment Company Institute (ICI)’s definition the money market funds invest in 
low-risk, high-grade assets that receive full principal and interest within 90 days on 
average. Thus a plausible explanation for this result is that investors seek a safer and 
more liquid asset class when faced with higher ambiguity in the expected equity returns. 
For checking the robustness of this chapter’s result, quarterly regression is used instead 
of monthly regression and different risk measures such as realised volatility, implied 
volatility and GARCH predictions are tested, and the result is still held.  
Previous studies built ambiguity-based theoretical explanations for the limited-
participation puzzle, for example Epstein and Schneider (2010), Dimmock, 
Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2013). This chapter empirically supports these 
theories and shows that ambiguity aversion is an important factor in the stock market 
participation decision-making process. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, ambiguity 
models can resolve many market puzzles including the familiarity-bias (Uppal and 
Wang, 2003), the price momentum (Caskey, 2009) and the equity premium puzzle 
(Chen and Epstein, 2002). In this chapter it is shown that the divergence of analysts’ 
opinions from Anderson et.al (2009) could be a useful empirical measurement and may 
help to test these theories with financial data.  Furthermore, the result also contributes to 
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the studies of mutual fund flows as it shows that the fund flows are negatively 
correlated to the uncertainty of future market returns.   
 
3.2 Literature review 
 
The previous chapter provides an introduction into the limitation of traditional risk 
models, and thus offers a motivation for research of ambiguity. The concept of 
ambiguity aversion and its potential impact on the market have also been reviewed. This 
section of the chapter reviews this topic even further and reveals a link between 
ambiguity aversion and market participation, and introduces background knowledge 
about the mutual fund flow in order to construct control variables. 
 
3.2.1 Non-participation puzzle and possible explanations 
 
In the last century the global stock market had a 3.5% annual premium over government 
bonds on average (Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, 2006), which led to a remarkable risk-
adjusted return for equity investors. Based on this high risk-return trade-off, the 
expected-utility model predicts a very high willingness for the risk-averse investors to 
participate in the stock market. However, stock market participation is very low when 
comparing it to the predicted level: during the period 1982-1995 the US Consumer 
Expenditure Survey found that two thirds of all households do not invest in stocks. The 
study of Campbell et al. (2006) shows that even at the eightieth percentile of wealth, 
almost 20% of households have no public equity. Such results are difficult to explain 
using the basic expected-utility model, and this phenomenon is widely known as the 
non-participation puzzle. 
The non-participation puzzle is widely debated in the literature and there are 
various explanations of this puzzle. The main-stream theories focus on the cost of 
participation: Williamson (1994) and Allen and Gale (1994) suggest that liquidity needs 
and transaction costs can reduce the stock market participation. Yaron and Zhang (2000) 
suggest that the fixed cost of entering the stock market for the first time is too high and 
that limits the participation.  This point of view is also supported by Vissing-Jorgenson 
(2002) and Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003). On the other hand, there are studies 
explaining the puzzle from consumers’ demand and market limitations: Hsu (2012) 
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argues that a household with low human capital has less diversification demand for 
stocks, and Haliassos and Bertatut (1996) suggest that borrowing constraints and 
minimum investment requirements can also reduce market participation. However, none 
of these assumptions are strong enough to explain the non-participation puzzle 
completely, thus some other studies suggest more behavioural-based explanations.  
One behavioural explanation is that non-participation is driven by ambiguity 
aversion (Dow et al., 1992; Mukerji and Tallon, 2001; Easley and O’Hara, 2009; 
Epstein and Schneider, 2010; Werner, 2011; Takashi, 2011). As stated in Chapter 2, 
ambiguity was initially developed by Knight (1921), and it describes a situation where 
the probabilities associated with future states are unknown. Ellsberg (1961)’s result was 
the first that stated that people are particularly averse to ambiguity rather than to pure 
risk only. This result was confirmed later by many studies in experimental economics 
and psychology. Various research results starting from Knight (1921) and Keynes 
(1921), followed by Ellsberg (1961) and, more recently, Ahn et al. (2009) show that 
situations which involve ambiguity are treated differently from those that involve risk. 
Hsu et al. (2005) and Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini and Glimcher (2010) present 
evidence that ambiguous situations produce a unique neurological fingerprint, 
suggesting that ambiguity aversion  has a root in the fundamentals of human cognition. 
According to the ambiguity-based explanation of the non-participation puzzle, stocks 
involve both risk and ambiguity. Since the majority of people are averse to ambiguity, 
their willingness to invest in stocks is lower than is implied by the EU model. The next 
section of this chapter reviews details about the relationship between the ambiguity 
aversion and the market participation puzzle.  
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3.2.2 Ambiguity and non-participation: reviews, models and hypothesis 
 
The key of asset pricing is to evaluate future incomes with various possibilities. The 
expected utility (EU) theory suggests the utility of risky events can be presented by a 
weighted sum of each outcome’s utility multiplied by their probabilities. In general, let 
us consider a bet on a series of events g = {   on   , …     on   }, where events    are 
mutually exclusive, and {      } is a complete collection of all the events. If there is a 
utility function U for the gain     and probability distribution   for event    , individuals 
will have an expected utility of g: 
                  
 
   
                                                             
In real life, however, the probabilities are very likely to be unknown. Savage (1954) 
believes that the problem can be solved by generating a subjective prior distribution that 
leads to the subjective expected utility (SEU):  
                             
 
                                        (3.2) 
Although the assigned probabilities are subjective, SEU assumes these 
subjective beliefs will be treated the same as real distributions. Thus each       will not 
be changed unless it can be updated by a Bayesian process. SEU is deeply embedded in 
the asset pricing theory since it is a default way to calculate the expected returns. Under 
the SEU theory, decisions for risky and ambiguous events are identical, because 
individuals have the same subjective priors. However, as reviewed in Chapter 2, 
Ellsberg (1961) showed that ambiguous events lead to different behaviour as the priors 
are situational in the presence of the ambiguity.  Moreover, his results suggest there is a 
unique premium for ambiguity aversion. 
Easley and O’Hara (2009) have a detailed model which describes how 
ambiguity aversion could affect demand and pricing in the stock market. Assume there 
are two types of investors in the market. One is the sophisticated type with a fraction of 
    of total investors and the rest is the unsophisticated type of investors with a 
fraction  . The investors are j=1,2….J; all have CARA utility function with the risk 
aversion parameter set constantly equal to 1:               , where w is the 
investor’s wealth. The market has three types of assets: risk-free asset, or money, with a 
constant price of 1 and net supply of 0; two types of risky assets with independent and 
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normally distributed returns of           and supply       The possible mean return 
and variances of the risky assets are:               and               , i=1,2;     
            is the set of all possible combinations of mean and variance of asset i. The 
sophisticated investors know about the true pay off       } and so they have a EU utility, 
while the naive investors follow a max-min approach for all possible distributions. The 
investors have a budget constraint of:              and can go either long or 
short on each asset. If the investor chooses portfolio            then his wealth in the 
next period would be              . Thus for the sophisticated investors, the 
problem is to solve: 
                      
 
 
       
  
 
 
       
                                
And their demand for each asset is: 
     
      
     
  
                                                                   
For the unsophisticated investors, the problem is: 
   
       
   
       
                       
 
 
        
  
 
 
       
                  
And their demand for each asset is: 
  
       
 
 
 
 
 
        
     
            
                     
        
     
            
                                         (3.6) 
Therefore, if the market price of the asset is between the min and max possible pay-off, 
the unsophisticated investors do not participate, and this decision is irrelevant to the 
variance. Also, the unsophisticated investors only consider the maximum value of 
volatility if they do participate, since they always take the worst case scenario.  
The difference between the position of risky holdings  for two different types of 
investors,   
         
      , is always positive, thus the sophisticated investors always 
hold  more risky assets, because they do not have ambiguity averse behaviour. Since per 
capita supply and demand must match, there is: 
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                                                    (3.7) 
If the market price is between the max and min of expectations of the unsophisticated 
investors, there is no participation from them and the entire asset class is owned by the 
sophisticated investors. Thus the market clear price is: 
      
     
   
                                                        (3.8) 
Since                      , the real constraint for  the situation to happen is that 
           If there is a participation from both types of investors, the clear price would 
be equal to: 
    
                               
              
                                             (3.9) 
The participation of the naive investors happens only when:         
      
   
        
Since the previous result shows the constraint of a non-participation case is           , 
it can be seen that only one equilibrium can exist at the same time.  
It is notable that in this model the unsophisticated investors never go short 
(although they are allowed to do so), since they require a price greater than     
  to go 
short. However, by this time all of the sophisticated investors will have gone short and 
none of them will take a long position. Since the unsophisticated investors only 
participate when:  
      
     
   
                                                   (3.10) 
and, in the case that        is very low, then the chances for them to participate in the 
market are low as well.  
To check the effect of ambiguity aversion on the market return, assume there are 
two risky assets of one large firm’s stock and one small firm’s stock. For the large 
firm’s asset (asset 1), both types of investors participate; and for the other asset (asset 2), 
there is enough of the ambiguity to stop the naive investors from participating. Thus the 
price for the asset one would be:             and the price for the asset two would 
be:                   . Now, let us assume there is an outsider, a classic 
representative of a CARA investor, who observes the market price and analyses the 
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information to form a ‘market belief’, and he would have the following calculated 
results:  
            
  
   
                                                (3.11) 
This assumed market agent then calculates the return on each asset as:     
   
  
  , and 
the market return is      
           
         
  . Since the assumed agent observes      
         , are correct, then the estimation on the market return is correct as well.  
The agent also sees that         , which is again correct. However, for the asset two, 
due to the non-participation of the naive ambiguity averse investors, the assumed 
CARA investor has miscalculated the variance as      
  
   
.  If the assumed agent tried 
to apply the CAMP model, it would not work perfectly, because now there is an 
overestimation of the asset two’s true variance.  Therefore, the agent’s calculated beta 
would be different from the real beta, and results: 
                                                                        (3.12) 
     
            
                   
      
            
                   
                              
Thus from an outsider’s view, there is a positive excess return with ambiguous 
assets, which has resulted from the non-participation of the ambiguity averse investors, 
and a negative excess return for the non-ambiguous assets, when a traditional CAPM 
model is used.  This is due to ambiguity averse investors overweighing their portfolios 
by non-ambiguous assets, and thus increasing its price and lowering its returns. On the 
other hand, since ambiguous assets have a lower demand from ambiguity averse 
investors, others can buy them at a lower price and gain a higher return. From the stated 
model, one can see that ambiguity aversion could lower the demand for ambiguous 
stock assets, and result in a premium. Moreover, it implies that different assets may 
have different levels of ambiguity, which may lead to a cross-section varying ambiguity 
premium. Thus the research questions which will be answered by the empirical 
results of this chapter are:  
Does ambiguity aversion affect stock market participation at all? And if it does, 
what is the scale of the impact? Is there any asset class which is affected by the 
ambiguity aversion more than others?  
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3.2.3 Measuring ambiguity and market participation empirically 
 
a. Ambiguity and SPF data  
 
To answer the research questions empirically, the first step is to build an empirical 
ambiguity measure. According to Ellsberg (1961), although ambiguity is a subjective 
variable, a high ambiguity level could be objectively recognised by noting the situations 
where available information is unreliable or highly conflicting. Thus, this chapter relies 
on the measure proposed in the recent study by Anderson et al. (2009), which reflects 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts using the data from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) issued by the Federal Reserve.  
The SPF data starts from 1968 and provides forecasts to many different horizons, 
based on the responses from large financial institutions. Each quarter the participants 
are asked about the forecasts for the previous, current and the next four quarters. The 
reason for forecasting the previous and current quarter is due to the fact that when the 
survey is conducted, these results are still not available. The variables used in this 
research are: forecasts of Gross National Product (GNP), before 1992Q1 and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) after 1992Q1; forecasts of the GNP deﬂator before 1992Q1 
and the GDP deﬂator thereafter, and corporate proﬁts after taxes. The number of 
forecasters participating in the SPF has varied:  in its early stage, there were more than 
100 forecasters, but this number declined through the 1970s and 1980s. After the SPF 
takeover in 1990 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia the average (median) 
number of forecasters each quarter  has been 36 (35), with a low of 29 and a high of 52.  
Since the SPF contains the forecast of quarterly data such as GDP growth and 
inflation from different analysts, it can be used for modelling a forecast of real 
aggregate stock market return for each analyst by taking the forecasts of aggregate 
company profit, GDP growth and GDP deflator from SPF, and apply the Gordon 
Growth Model to generate the forecasted aggregate market return. The divergence 
among forecasts can thus be calculated as the variance in a beta weighted way in order 
to reduce the influence of the extreme forecasts. This is because such extreme forecasts 
are more likely to be ignored by investors and a few outlined results can have a very 
large impact on the normal variance estimations. When divergence among analysts 
regarding the future performance of stock markets is high, ambiguity is also likely to be 
high, since experts have conflicting views regarding the fundamentals of the economy. 
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As stated above, this measure of ambiguity suggested by Anderson et al. (2009) 
corresponds closely to the general definition of the ambiguity provided by Ellsberg 
(1961), as high ambiguity means that the factors are more difficult to justify, and the 
forecasts of returns among different analysts should be less consistent. 
Meanwhile, since Ellsberg (1961) argues that ambiguity reflects poor 
information quality or conflicting information, it is reasonable to assume that the 
ambiguity measure is related to business environment factors. In fact, Anderson et al. 
(2009) states that the ambiguity variable is affected by the NBER dummy, which is an 
indicator of the US economy recession. Therefore, despite not being the primary interest 
of this research, it is also interesting to see whether the ambiguity measure can be 
forecasted by some other macro economical variables. Based on Sibley, Xing and 
Zhang (2013) the fundamental variables such as default rate, term spread, and 
unemployment could affect an investor’s sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006), thus  it 
is assumed a possibility that such variables can affect how analysts perceive information, 
and  make impact on the ambiguity measure.  
 
b. Mutual fund flows 
 
After choosing the ambiguity measure, the next step is to measure the stock market 
participation empirically. To observe the stock market participation, one way is to use 
the net mutual fund flow data, which measures the net value of all cash inflow and 
outflow through mutual funds. Therefore, the net flow of funds invested in the equity 
market should only give a direct measure of the stock market participation incremental.  
Previous research suggests that the fund flow can reflect investors’ behaviour of 
avoiding disadvantages in the market. For example, Gibson, Safieddine and Titman 
(2000) found there are negative fund flows due to tax evasion before the capital gain is 
announced, and Karceski (2002) found the investors’ return tracing behaviour on the 
underline asset market can be reflected in mutual fund flow as well. Therefore, the 
observations of ambiguity aversion behaviour on mutual fund-flow data are also 
anticipated. In addition, mutual funds meet the previous assumption of no short selling 
and mutual fund flows reflect majorly the investment decisions of individual investors, 
which is the main reason for the stock market non-participation: according to the 
Investment Company Institute (ICI) 90.4 million individuals or 44% of total US 
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households had 89% of the total mutual fund assets in 2011. The ICI estimated that 
around 68% of the mutual fund investors had over a half of their total assets in the 
mutual fund account.  
The previous studies suggest that many factors can significantly affect a fund 
flow data. Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl (2011) found the fund exchange is linked to 
following-year returns, and Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl (2011) show that fund flow 
data is auto-correlated association with lagging market returns. Edwards and Zhang 
(1998) show a link between the fund flows and the aggregate returns of their underline 
market, and causality tests suggest that the asset returns cause the fund flows. Warther 
(1995) shows that there is no correlation between the fund flows and past aggregate 
market return. However, he does find that the fund flows are correlated with the 
contemporaneous aggregate returns, with the stock fund flows showing correlation with 
the stock returns and the bond fund flows showing correlation with the bond returns. 
Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2006) argue that investors also react strongly to 
advertisements by fund, as they found that the fund flows are positively related to the 
adverting costs of the funds. Similarly, Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) also believe that 
other information which helps to reduce the search costs increases the mutual fund 
flows. 
 
In addition, Kamstra et al. (2011) show that the fund flows are influenced by 
capital gains and consumer behaviour, plus a need for liquidity  at the end of the year. 
They argue that capital gains can result in an increase in a fund flow due to the 
reinvestment of dividends’ distribution, and, when the saving rate is high, there are 
significantly higher capital flows into the mutual fund market. Also, since people have a 
need for consumption during Christmas and New Year time, they tend to withdraw 
money in November and December, and then bring the capital back into funds in 
January and February. Thus  the model includes the following controlling variables: 
lagged value of fund flow data; fund return of the last year; the lagged stock market 
return; capital gains; saving rates are included at the end of the year (January, February, 
November, December); and advertising cost.   
 
Furthermore, Kamstra et al. (2011) argue that changes in the level of risk 
aversion are negatively correlated to the mutual fund flows. According to their study, 
the investor’s risk aversion level change in different seasons: people are less risk averse 
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in the sunny summer, and during the winter they become depressed and thus more risk 
averse. Their results show that there is a significant fund outflow from the stock market 
which runs into other safer assets, and the opposite way round during summer time. 
Thus it is assumed that changes in the risk have a similar impact, and therefore, 
including the changes of risk in the model nets out its effect. In addition, since it is 
assumed ambiguity causes limited participation, the changes in the market participation 
(which can be measured by the net flow data) should be correlated with the incremental 
ambiguity level. Thus, there is a need to test the hypothesis of whether ambiguity 
aversion leads to market non-participation as there should be a negative correlation 
between the changes in market ambiguity and the mutual fund flows. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Measuring ambiguity with dispersion   
 
Following Anderson et al. (2009), this chapter measures ambiguity by a beta-weighted 
average disagreement of forecasts. This measure of the ambiguity uses data from the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), which has been run since 1968 and has a long 
time span. The forecasters in SPF majorly are from large financial institutions and the 
report is released by Federal Reserve officially, therefore it reflects professional 
opinions and can be widely applied to the market. The SPF forecasters give their 
forecasted results for economic variables such as GDP, GNP and deflator from the 
previous quarter to the next five quarters for the US market.  
Based on the forecasted variables the aggregate corporate profit after tax and 
GDP deflator are used to work out the real aggregate corporate profit. Let    be the real 
aggregate corporate profit level at time t,    be a deflator at time t,    be a nominal 
corporate profit at time t, the forecaster  ’s expected real aggregate corporate profit for 
time t+1 at time t is: 
          
       
         
                                                  (3.14) 
Then the Gordon Growth Model is applied to work out an aggregate level of the 
expected market return for t+1 at time t: 
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Here    is a value of all corporate values in the U.S, which is available from the Flow of 
Funds Accounts of The United States, prepared by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.     is a quarterly forecasted long-term rate of the real growth 
from forecaster i. The     between quarter m and n is: 
     
           
           
                                                   (3.16) 
Following Anderson et al. (2009) the longest forecast horizon used here is also 
four quarters, therefore n-m=4. Now, let X be a series of forecasts about the market 
return at time t, which has    forecasts in total and the forecasts are ranked from high to 
low. The weight of the  th lowest forecast is: 
       
            
   
                
  
   
                                              (3.17) 
Here   is a parameter, which decides the weight for the extreme forecast: if   =1, it is 
flat weighted; the higher the value of  , the less weight the extreme forecast has. To 
estimate this parameter, Anderson et al. (2009) used a maximum likelihood approach. It 
is assumed that the excess market return is positively correlated to both ambiguity and 
excess volatility, and therefore, we can maximize the quasi-likelihood of the excess 
market return as:  
                             
                                     
where       is the excess market return,         is the market ambiguity,          is 
the excess market volatility (details will be introduced in section 3.3.3). Anderson et al. 
(2009) used data between the years 1968 and 2003 to obtain the parameters, and the 
recommended value of   is 15.346 (the robustness of the result is also tested by using 
different values of  ) according to Anderson et al. (2009). Thus the disagreement can be 
measured by the beta-weighted variance of forecast series as below: 
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 Because the value of the ambiguity is relatively small, the original results are 
multiplied by 100. Since the ambiguity measure is produced quarterly and the fund flow 
data monthly, the quarterly ambiguity is decomposed into the monthly data by a linear 
method. To apply this method, the difference between ambiguity in quarter t and quarter 
t+1 is divided by 3, namely                , so the ambiguity level of the first 
month in quarter t+1 is:                     , and the ambiguity level of the 
second month in quarter t+1  is:                        . The models 
consider the change rather than the level of ambiguity, because the hypothesis here is 
that a degree of the equity market participation, as measured by total net assets held by 
mutual funds, is determined by the level of ambiguity. Therefore, fund flows, which 
represent the changes in total net assets, are determined by the changes in the ambiguity. 
In equilibrium, for a given level of the ambiguity, the fund flows are equal to zero, and 
so positive (negative) fund flows arise from a decrease (increase) in the ambiguity. 
Panel A in Figure 3.2 plots the quarterly ambiguity measure and Panel B the changes in 
the monthly interpolated series. Both measures produce spikes in the mid 1980s to mid 
1990s and in the 2000s. Table 3.2 reports the summary of statistics for the constructed 
ambiguity series and for the changes in the monthly interpolated series. Both series are 
moderately positively skewed and leptokurtic.  
 
3.3.2 Measure of mutual fund flow and mutual fund exchange  
 
In this thesis the main source of the fund data is the Investment Company Institute (ICI), 
which provides detailed information about monthly fund flows and investment 
objectives ranging from January 1984 to December 2010. For each type of fund, the 
monthly data contains sales, redemption, exchanges in, exchanges out and total net 
assets. The funds are divided into five categories by asset class: equity, hybrid, 
corporate fixed income, government fixed income and money market following 
Kamstra et al. (2011). The main focus of this research is the equity fund category; 
however, since the ambiguity measure is based on the US stock market only, the equity 
fund group must be modified in order to exclude non-domestic stocks. Therefore, the 
funds that invest mainly outside the states: global equity, international equity, regional 
equity and emerging markets have been excluded in the analysis, and the final 
components of the equity fund group are: aggressive growth, growth, sector, growth and 
income, income equity. For the rest of fund families, international focused funds, such 
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as the long-term global bond, short-term global bond and other world bonds have also 
been selected. Table 3.1 reports the classification of the funds by the investment 
objective category.  
[Table 3.1 here] 
Following Kamstra et al. (2011), the net cash inflow into asset class i in month t is 
computed as: 
            
                                                      
                   
                          
(3.20) 
Similarly, following Ben-Rephael et al. (2012), the net exchange into asset class i in 
month t is computed as: 
                
                              
                   
           
(3.21) 
[Figure 3.1 here] 
Figure 3.1 plots the net flows and exchanges for the equity group of funds. The 
net flows and exchange into equity had been much more volatile before 1993, with a 
large flow out of the equity asset class followed the October 1987 crash. Since 1994, net 
flows and net exchanges have been less volatile, but have also declined. Table 3.2 
reports the summary of statistics for the net flows and exchanges for the equity asset 
class. The average net flow is 0.51%, representing a substantial increase in the total net 
assets over the sample, while the average net exchange is close to zero. Net exchanges 
are negatively skewed and strongly leptokurtic, while net flows have much lower 
skewness and kurtosis. 
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3.3.3 Control variables: conditional volatility 
 
To ensure that the ambiguity measure is not just capturing the risk, a measure of 
conditional volatility is included in the model, following Anderson et al. (2009). 
Therefore, the weighted variance of past squared excess market returns is computed as 
proxy of risk. The weight for i
th
 lag is given by: 
      
        
             
                                                     (3.22) 
where s is the minimum number of trading days available for the previous 12 months 
over the entire sample, and the parameter   determines the speed at which the weights 
decline as the lag length increases. In the empirical analysis Anderson et al. (2009) is 
followed and         . (the estimating process of     is discussed in section 3.3.1, 
with formula 3.18) The conditional variance is thus presented in the formula below: 
                
 
          
 
 
      
 
    
 
                  
   
   *       
1  =1    ,    , +1 1  =1    ,    
(3.23) 
where       is the market excess return at ith lag, which is computed as the daily Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index (series VWRETD) return 
minus the daily return of the three month T-bill. Figure 3.3 plots the monthly 
conditional variance together with the monthly ambiguity for the period from March 
1985 to December 2010. It is clear that the two series capture very different dimensions 
of the market, with periods when the ambiguity is high but the conditional variance is 
low, and vice versa. Panel B of figure 3.3 further presents the data in a scatter plot, and 
shows that the ambiguity and the risk are not correlated. Table 3.2 reports the summary 
of statistics for the conditional variance. As expected, the conditional variance is highly 
positively skewed and leptokurtic. As with the ambiguity, the changes in monthly 
conditional variance are used in the regression, and Table 3.2 reports the descriptive 
statistics for this series. It can be seen that the changes in the conditional variance are 
also positively skewed and leptokurtic. 
To make sure the result catches the effect of the ambiguity rather than the risk, 
several risk measures are used for the robustness check: realized volatility, GARCH 
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predicted volatility and market implied volatility. These are the risk measures which are 
applied widely and they can present market volatility from different angles. The realized 
monthly volatility is the sum of the squared daily returns for the month, based on the 
CRSP value-weighted return series (series VWRETD), and the implied market volatility 
is based on Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) market volatility index (series 
VXO), which captures the expectations about the future volatility of aggregate market 
returns.  There are two GARCH models used in this chapter. The first one is a simple 
GARCH model, and the second one is based on the studies of Glosten, Jaganathan, and 
Runkle (1993), which catches the asymmetry of volatility: considering the return series 
  , that follows a GARCH process. The conditional distribution of the series Y with 
time t is given as:               ), where      is the available information at time t-1, 
and in normal GARCH model the conditional variance    can be found as:  
        
 
       
     
 
                                        (3.24) 
However there are differences in the influence of positive and negative return changes 
on the future volatility. Thus the model can be applied: 
                     
 
       
     
 
                          (3.25) 
where                   . So there is an extra slope coefficient for each lagged 
squared error:  the indicator         is 1 if   <0 and 0 for the rest. The model in this 
chapter is estimated by using the same time period of baseline regression.   
 
[Figure 3.3 here] 
 
3.3.4 Other control variables for mutual fund flows 
 
There are a number of other factors that have been  proven to be important in explaining 
the mutual fund flows such as past fund returns (Ippolito,1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998), 
capital gains (Kamstra et al., 2011), past flows (Ben-Rephael et al., 2011), seasonal 
effects (Kamstra et al., 2011), advertising expenses (Gallaher, et al., 2006), past market 
returns (Ben-Rephael, et al., 2012) and savings (Kamstra et al., 2011). To capture serial 
correlation in the fund flows lagged monthly net flows and net exchanges for the past 
one, two and three months are included. Also included in the regression are the personal 
savings rate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (series PSAVERT), and the capital 
gains data and advertising costs from Kamstra et al. (2011). The aggregate return of the 
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equity fund group over the previous 12 months is also added into the regression to 
capture a return-chasing behaviour. Following Ben-Rephael et al., (2011) and Oh and 
Parwada (2007), the regression further includes the aggregate market return over the last 
three months, from t-3 to t-1. In addition, transaction costs and liquidity needs are 
proposed as the reasons for the limited participation puzzle. Thus the measure of 
illiquidity proposed by Amihud (2002) is included in the model, which captures the 
responsiveness of prices to the trading volume. Following Amihud (2002), for each 
individual stock   the illiquidity measure in month t is defined as:  
            
       
     
 
                                                         (3.26) 
where j is the number of the available trading days in month t, and        and       are 
the daily return and volume of stock   in month t, respectively. Again the value 
weighted average is taken as a measure of market illiquidity level, and the rolling 
average is used over the previous three months, t-3 to t-1, in the regressions. Finally, 
dummy variables for the months of November, December, January and February are 
included to capture the year-end effect. Table 3.2 reports the summary of statistics for 
the control variables over the period from March 1985 to December 2010. Table 3.3 
reports the correlations between the variables, and it can be seen that the changes in the 
ambiguity series is negatively correlated with both net fund flows and net fund 
exchanges.  
[Table 3.2 here] 
[Table 3.3 here] 
 
3.3.5 Macro economic variables 
  
As stated above, it is suspected that the ambiguity measure of Anderson et al. (2009) 
can be predicted by some of the fundamental macro variables. To test this hypothesis, 
based on Sibley et al. (2013) the following macro-economic variables are used: U.S. 
recession dummy (NBER), U.S. unemployment rate (Unemp), change in consumption 
(dCons), default spread (Def), term spread (Term), the value-weighted market return 
including dividends (VWRETD). The NBER recession dummy indicates the US 
recession period, which is a period between a peak and a trough based on the National 
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Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)’s business cycle data. The unemployment 
(Unemp) rate is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Data, series ID: 
LNS14000000. The changes in consumption (Cons) are the changes in the consumption 
rate of real personal consumption expenditures per capita, which is constructed by 
dividing the CITIBASE series of the seasonally adjusted real consumption (excluding 
durables) by the number of monthly population according to the Bureau of Census, 
following Chen, Roll and Ross (1986). The default spread (Def) is defined as the 
difference in yields between Baa-rated corporate bonds and AAA-rated corporate bonds 
as it is performed in Fama and French (1989). The term spread (Term) is defined as the 
difference in yields between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month T-bill as in 
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986). Vwretd is the Centre for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP)’s value-weighted stock market return index. The sample period is from Dec 
1968 to Dec 2010, and all the variables are taken as a quarterly average to match the 
ambiguity data.  
 
3.3.6 Regressions 
 
After clarifying all the variables, the regression for the net flows is:  
                                                           
                                         
                     
                                                                   
       
where      is the aggregate cost of print advertising across all the funds divided by the 
previous year’s total advertising costs,      is the capital gains,      is the personal 
savings rate,               is the aggregate fund return for the previous year, 
            is the return on the value-weighted CRSP index over the last 3 months. 
   
       
 is the average market illiquidity during the previous three months, and     , 
    ,     , and      are dummy variables that are equal to one in the respective 
month and zero otherwise.  
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For the net exchanges a similar model is constructed, but excluded are the 
savings variable and the seasonal dummy variables. The model for the net exchanges is 
therefore: 
            
                                                     
                                                 
                                      
       
Models 3.27 and 3.28 are constructed as a system of equations using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Hansen, 1982) with heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors following the procedure of Newey and West 
(1987, 1994). In addition, the regression uses the Bartlett kernel, where the auto-
covariance lag structure is equal to 4*(N/100)2/9; N is the number of observations in 
the regression. The instruments in each regression model include the full set of 
independent variables. The hypothesis is that in both regressions the estimation of    is 
negative and significant.  
To examine the model’s goodness of fit, the result of a Breusch-Godfrey 
autocorrelation test is reported.  To perform the test, firstly the models shown in 
equations 3.26 and 3.27 are jointly estimated for all 5 fund families using GMM, and 
then the residuals are used to test whether they exhibit autocorrelation up to the sixth lag. 
For example, after the finishing estimating equation 3.27, there is residual series  , and 
let                                     Then the following model is estimated 
with OLS method: 
                                            
                    
and it is tested whether:               . 
Meanwhile, to test if ambiguity can be predicted by macro variables, this chapter 
uses a regression of the one-quarter-ahead ambiguity on the following macro 
economical variables: U.S. recession dummy (NBER), U.S. unemployment rate 
(Unemp), change in consumption (dCons), default spread (Def), term spread (Term), the 
value-weighted market return including dividends (VWRETD). To adjust for serial 
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correlation, the model also contains two lags for the one-quarter-ahead ambiguity. 
Therefore the regression is: 
                                                            
                    
(3.30) 
The model is also estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
(Hansen, 1982) with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
following the procedure from Newey and West (1987, 1994). 
 
3.4 Results analysis  
 
This section reports the results of the empirical analysis. It firstly focuses on the equity 
asset class, and then considers the effects of the ambiguity on the non-equity fund flows 
and exchanges. Finally, the last part of the section conducts some of the robustness 
checks. 
 
3.4.1 Ambiguity and Equity Fund Flows 
 
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the results of the estimating model (3.27) for the net flows 
for the equity asset class. The coefficient on the change in the ambiguity is negative and 
significant at conventional levels (-1.36, p= 0.00). Therefore, in support of this study 
hypothesis, an increase in ambiguity is associated with a net outflow of capital from the 
equity mutual funds. In contrast, the changes in conditional variance do not have the 
statistically significant impact on net flows (-0.002, p =0.41). The savings variable a has 
significantly positive coefficient (0.03, p=0.00), which is consistent with a “free cash 
flow” effect on the fund flows. Consistent with the previous research (Kamstra et al., 
2011) the lagged net fund flows from the previous month and three months are positive 
and highly significant, showing a strong autocorrelation in the flows.  
[Table 3.4 here] 
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Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the estimation results from (3.28) for the net 
exchanges of the equity asset class.  Similar to the net flows, the changes in the 
ambiguity are negatively associated with the net exchanges, and this relationship is 
statistically significant (-0.50 p=0.01). Again, the changes in the risk have a negative 
and significant impact (-0.002, p=0.02). The one month and three months lag of the net 
exchanges is positive and statistically significant, reflecting a strong autocorrelation in 
this series.  
These results suggest that an increase in the ambiguity has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the net flows and the net exchanges, supporting this 
thesis hypothesis that an increase in the ambiguity leads to a reduction in the equity 
market participation. Moreover, while there is a clear link between the ambiguity and 
the net fund flows and exchanges, the impact of the risk is negative but not statistically 
significant for the fund flow regression. These results are consistent with Anderson et al. 
(2009), who shows that excess market returns have a strong positive association with 
the ambiguity, but much less related to the conditional variance. In addition, since the 
standard deviation of the ambiguity measure is 0.0013 and the average total net assets 
for equity funds is $1.9 trillion; one standard deviation change in the ambiguity will on 
average yield a net flow of $1.7 billion and a net exchange of $0.05 billion. 
 
3.4.2 Ambiguity and Different Equity Styles 
 
The results in the previous section show that ambiguity aversion reduces stock market 
participation overall. However, since ambiguity varies across equities (Kelsey et al., 
2013; Brenner and Izhakian, 2011; Antoniou et al., 2014), this effect is more significant 
in the funds that invest in more ambiguous stocks. This section tests this hypothesis by 
investigating the relationship between ambiguity and the fund flows for the five 
investment objective categories separately, namely: ‘aggressive growth’, ‘growth’, 
‘sector’, ‘growth and income’ and ‘income equity’. According to the ICI definition, 
aggressive growth and growth funds invest in riskier, non-dividend paying stocks with a 
focus on capital gains. On the other hand, funds in the remaining categories focus on 
less risky, dividend-paying stocks (ICI Factbook, 2012).  
It is noteworthy that a dividend policy is a signal about the stability of the 
expected profitability of the firm, as well as the indicator of the ambiguity level. The 
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study of Michaely et al. (1995) argues that firms are concerned about the penalties 
related to dividend omissions, and tend to pay dividends when the firms reach a mature 
stage. In this way firms are expected to be able make these payouts in the future 
consistently and thus avoid penalties incurred from dividend omissions. Therefore, 
dividend payers tend to be more mature and stable, and the information about them is 
supposed to be of better quality and less conflicting. This conclusion is also supported 
by other studies: Denis and Osobov (2008) show that dividend payers tend to be larger 
and more profitable companies; and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli and Zame 
(2010) also believe that companies at a growth stage are likely to show a significant 
ambiguity. Furthermore, firms that do not pay dividends are typically those with 
significant growth opportunities, and it is often difficult forecast their future 
development. Therefore, on average, the ambiguity is considerably higher for non-
dividend payers which implies that the effect of ambiguity is stronger among the 
aggressive growth and growth categories.  
 
Thus this section runs the models 3.27 and 3.28 again for different styles of 
equity funds, and the variables that control for the aggregate market characteristics (risk, 
returns and liquidity) are the same as those in the baseline model. The results are shown 
in Table 3.5, and, for brevity, the table reports the estimated coefficient on the changes 
in the ambiguity only. For the ‘aggressive growth’ and ‘growth’ categories, the 
coefficient of the changes in the ambiguity is negative and highly statistically 
significant for both fund flows and exchanges. In terms of economical significance, on 
average one standard deviation change in ambiguity will cause the net flow of 
‘‘aggressive growth’ and ‘growth’ fund at $7549 million and $7318 million in respect. 
For net exchanges, on average one standard deviation change in ambiguity will cause 
‘aggressive growth’  fund $544 million and ‘growth’ fund $390 million.  
For the ‘growth and income’ and ‘income equity’ categories, the coefficient is 
negative but only significant for one of the two regressions. For the ‘sector’ category, 
the coefficient is insignificantly positive. In addition, regarding the absolute value of the 
estimations, the ‘aggressive growth’ and ‘growth’ categories are also much higher than 
the rest. Therefore, while the earlier results of this study show that an increase in the 
ambiguity leads to the flows and exchanges out of the equity asset class as a whole, it 
can be seen that within the equity asset class, the effect is concentrated on the funds that 
invest in more ambiguous, non-dividend paying assets. 
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[Table 3.5 here] 
 
3.4.3 Ambiguity and non-Equity Fund Flows 
 
This section examines the relationship between the changes in the ambiguity and the 
flows in the funds that invest in the non-equity asset classes, namely hybrid, 
government and corporate fixed income and money market. It is reasonable to expect 
that in response to an increase in the ambiguity in the stock market, investors will 
transfer funds into less ambiguous, non-equity investments.  
Thus the models 3.27 and 3.28 are tested again for the different asset classes and 
the variables that control for the aggregate market characteristics (risk, returns and 
liquidity) are the same as those in the baseline model. Panel A (B) of Table 3.6 reports 
the estimated coefficient of the change in the ambiguity from the net flows (exchanges) 
model. For the net flows the coefficients on the ambiguity are not significantly different 
from zero. For the net exchanges, however, the coefficient for the money market asset 
class is positive and significant. Thus, as the ambiguity increases, the investors 
withdraw their capital from the equity funds and reinvest, at least partially, in the money 
market funds. According to the ICI definition, the money market funds invest in low 
risky, high-grade assets that receive full principal and interest within 90 days on average. 
Since in this study the ambiguity measure is based on the stock market’s forecast of 
long-term growth, one possible explanation for this findings is that the investors seek 
safer assets with higher liquidity, when they are faced with a higher ambiguity in the 
expected stock returns. In terms of economical significance, on average one standard 
deviation of change in ambiguity will cause a $29 million of capital running into money 
market funds. However, this conclusion needs to be treated with caution, as the tests 
show that the serial correlation in the regression remains significant.  
[Table 3.6 here] 
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3.4.4 Ambiguity and macro variables  
 
This section examines whether the ambiguity measure used in this thesis can be 
predicted based on  Sibley et al. (2013) by the following macro economical variables: 
U.S. recession dummy (NBER), U.S. unemployment rate (Unemp), change in 
consumption (dCons), default spread (Def), term spread (Term), the value-weighted 
market return including dividends (VWRETD). Model (3.30) gives the regression to test 
this hypothesis, and Table 3.7 reports the result.  
It can be seen that the NBER dummy is positively and significantly correlated to 
the one-quarter-ahead ambiguity (p=0.01), while the stock market return variable 
VWRETD is negative and significant at 10% level (p=0.07). Therefore, when a 
recession is current, or the current market return is low, investors are more likely to 
perceive a higher ambiguity in the future. In addition, since one standard deviation 
change in the ambiguity will on average yield a net flow of $1.7 billion and a net 
exchange of $0.05 billion, this result can also be useful for fund managers, as it will 
help them to forecast the period of a high ambiguity and prepare for the outflows in 
advance.  
[Table 3.7 here] 
 
3.4.5 Robustness 
 
a. Quarterly regression  
 
As previously discussed in the methodology section, the baseline regression (Table 3.4) 
uses the linear interpolation for the ambiguity measure to obtain monthly estimates and 
hence increase the power of this study’s tests. This section estimates the models shown 
in the equations 3.27 and 3.28 using non-interpolated, quarterly data. Newey and West 
(1987, 1994)’s heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in 
continuous use here.  
The net flows and exchanges are calculated on a quarterly basis. The changes in 
the ambiguity and conditional variance are equal to                  , and 
                     respectively. Quarterly capital gains, savings and 
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advertising costs are equal to the sum of the monthly values over each quarter:      
      
 
                
 
      and           
 
     . Lagged market return, 
illiquidity premium and fund return are defined as previously. To control auto-
correlation, the lagged value of last quarter and last year is added into regression. The 
quarterly regressions are in the form of:  
                                               
                                           
                                                                
            
                                       
                                                
                                                                       
The results for these quarterly regressions are shown in Table 3.8. Even though 
the number of observations in these models are reduced, it has been found that increases 
in the ambiguity are negatively and significantly related to both fund flows (Panel A: -
1.48, p=0.00) and fund exchanges (Panel B:-0.68, p=0.00). In terms of economical 
significance, on average one standard deviation in change of ambiguity will cause the 
quarterly net flow to change $5.4 billion, and quarterly net exchanges to change 0.21 
billion. 
[Table 3.8 here] 
 
b. Sentiments  
 
Another concern about this study’s result of the ambiguity index is that it may be related 
to the investor’s sentiments toward the stock market, which has been shown  affect the 
equity investments through the mutual funds (Ben-Rephael et al., 2012). Therefore 
another robustness test has been run in order to control for this effect. In an expanded 
version of the baseline model the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) and the 
median forecast from the SPF data have been controlled. These two variables represent 
investors’ attitudes towards the stock market’s performance, and therefore, ensure that 
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findings of this research do not simply reflect the effect of investors’ sentiments on the 
market participation. 
[Table 3.9 here] 
The results from the estimation of this expanded model are shown in Table 3.9, 
in which the ambiguity variable continues to be negative and significant (coefficient: -
1.56, p-value=0.00 for the net flow; and coefficient: -0.54, p-value= 0.01 for the net 
exchange, which means on average one standard deviation change in ambiguity will 
cause the net flow to change 1.93 billion and net exchange to change $0.06 billion). The 
sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) is not significant, which is consistent with 
the previous studies of Ben-Rephael et al. (2012). The coefficient on the median SPF 
forecast is positive but also insignificant. Thus the results in Table 3.9 suggest that the 
baseline findings in Table 3.4 do not capture the effect of the investors’ sentiments 
toward the stock market. 
 
c. Alternative risk measures  
 
In addition, to ensure the main factor that affects participation is the ambiguity rather 
than the risk, as an experiment the regression in Table 3.4 has been run with alternative 
measures of risk, including realised volatility, GARCH predicted volatility and market 
implied volatility. The realised volatility is calculated as the sum of daily squared 
market returns, using the CRSP value of the weighted return series. The GARCH 
predictions are the forecasts from a simple GARCH model, and an asymmetric GARCH 
model is based on Glosten, Jaganathan, and Runkle (1993). These models allow for 
asymmetries in the effect of positive and negative current returns on the future 
volatilities due to leverage effects. Both GARCH models are estimated within the full 
sample period of this study. The market implied volatility variable is the CBOE market 
volatility index (series VXO), which captures the expectations about the future volatility 
of aggregate market returns. Due to the data availability on the volatility index, the time 
period is 1986-2010. The same model from Table 3.4 is estimated for both net flows 
and net exchanges, replacing the original risk measure with these alternative definitions. 
[Table 3.10 here] 
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 The results are shown in Table 3.10. Briefly, this table reports the results for the 
coefficients on the change in the ambiguity and the risk. The risk is significant for the 
implied volatility and both GARCH predictions, but is negative and insignificant when 
it is measured using the realised volatility. The coefficient on the ambiguity is negative 
and significant in all four cases, suggesting that the findings of this research are robust 
to the different risk specifications, and, therefore, the main factor that affects market 
participation is ambiguity rather than risk.   
 
d. Different weighting parameters of ambiguity 
 
As has been previously discussed in this thesis, the ambiguity measure is constructed by 
a beta-weighted average of analysts’ opinions to reduce the influence of extreme 
forecasts, and the weighting parameter   is 15.346 according to Anderson et al. (2009). 
To examine whether the result is robust to this weighting parameter, the baseline 
regression is tested again for the equations 3.27 and 3.28; with different ambiguity 
series generated by  = 1, 5, 10, and 20 respectively. Table 3.11 shows the results of the 
regression and, for brevity, it reports an estimation of the changes in the ambiguity only. 
It can be seen that, while the analysts’ forecast is not flatly weighted (   ), the 
changes in the ambiguity are negative and significant for both the net flow and net 
exchange among all three different   values. Therefore, the results are robust to the 
different values of the weighting parameter  . On the other hand, while the value of   
decreases and, therefore, the weight of extreme forecasts increases in the ambiguity 
measure, the significance of the ambiguity decreases as well. If     and the forecasts 
are flatly weighted, the estimation of the ambiguity becomes insignificant. This result is 
consistent with Anderson et al. (2009)’s findings, which state that in order to measure 
the ambiguity correctly the extreme forecasts must be diluted.  
[Table 3.11 here] 
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3.5 Limitations and future developments  
 
This chapter studies the impact of the ambiguity aversion on the stock market 
participation, through the mutual fund flows. The results shows that the fund flows and 
exchanges are negatively correlated to the changes in the market ambiguity, which is 
measured by the disagreement among the analysts’ opinions from the SPF.  This 
research provides the empirical evidence that supports the existence of ambiguity 
aversion in the stock market and the corresponding premium. However, there are still 
limitations in this study: 
Firstly, a mutual fund only takes part in stock market investments, thus the 
impact of the ambiguity on mutual funds cannot fully explain the limited stock market 
participation. Secondly, a disagreement in the analysts’ opinions is the only one of 
many ways to measure the ambiguity empirically, thus it may not fully present the real 
ambiguity level. Thirdly, there are still other factors which could contribute to the 
changes of the mutual fund flows and exchanges, such as the fast development of 
substitute products, for example, the exchange trade funds. Due to the limitation of the 
data source, such factors have not been presented in the model and their impact is 
unclear. Finally, this research is based solely on the American stock market; therefore, it 
is still questionable if the impact of ambiguity aversion on the market participation is a 
worldwide phenomenon.  
Thus future studies can extend this chapter by a variety of approaches:  firstly, 
alternative ambiguity measures such as firm size, firm age, and analyst coverage (Zhang, 
2006) can be used in order to test the model developed in this chapter. This would 
provide a more well-rounded understanding of how ambiguity affects stock market 
participation. Secondly, the model can be extended into other markets outside the US.  
Finally, a further test can be conducted on other approaches of stock market 
participation in order to see whether the ambiguity solely affects the mutual fund flows 
or the market participation as a whole. The next chapter will conduct further research 
based on the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) to investigate the influence of 
ambiguity on the aggregate level of individual stock market participation.  
 
77 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
Theories about the ambiguity indicate many possible applications in the financial 
markets such as home-bias (Uppal and Wang, 2003), price momentum (Caskey, 2009) 
and the equity premium puzzle (Chen and Epstein, 2002). Meanwhile, the limited stock 
market participation is a longstanding puzzle in the area of finance and there are many 
explanations including frictions-based and behavioural ones. In this chapter, one 
behavioural explanation for non-participation is the consequence of ambiguity aversion 
having been tested. According to the ambiguity-based explanation, stocks involve both 
risk and ambiguity, and since investors are ambiguity averse, their propensity to invest 
in stocks is lower than is predicted by EU models, and is negatively correlated to the 
level of the ambiguity in the marketplace. This measure is negatively and significantly 
correlated to the lagged value of the stock market return, and positively and 
significantly correlated to the lagged value of the US recession indicator.  
 Market participation is measured by flows of the capital in and out of the U.S. 
equity mutual funds.  In this research the measure of the ambiguity is based on a recent 
study by Anderson, et al. (2009) and reflects the dispersion in analysts’ implied 
forecasts about market returns.  The results show that if other factors that affect the fund 
flows are controlled, increases in the ambiguity are significantly and negatively 
correlated to the equity fund flows and exchanges, and thus it supports the notion that 
limited stock market participation arises, because the stock market contains ambiguity, 
which is disliked by investors. The results of this chapter provide empirical evidence 
that supports the existence of ambiguity aversion in the financial markets, and point out 
that ambiguity aversion is an important factor in the decision-making process regarding 
stock market participation.  
In addition, the initial interest of this research has been in the study of ambiguity 
heterogeneity in different asset classes. It was suspected that the non-dividend payers 
are more ambiguous than other stocks, since the dividend paying companies are 
normally more mature and stable companies. This assumption has been confirmed by 
the result, as the fund flows of the ‘aggressive growth’ and ‘growth’ groups are more 
sensitive to the changes of the ambiguity level compared to others. According to the ICI 
definition, the ‘aggressive growth’ and ‘growth’ funds invest in riskier, non-dividend 
paying stocks with a focus on capital gains, and thus are more ambiguous. Furthermore, 
it is found that, while high ambiguity reduces the capital within equity funds, the net 
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exchanges of the money market fund are positive. Based on the ICI definition, the 
money market funds invest in low risk, high-grade assets that receive full principal and 
interest within 90 days on average. Thus investors could switch to the short-term 
investments with a higher liquidity to avoid stock market uncertainty.  
To test the robustness of this study result, four alternative risk measures have 
been applied to ensure the regression does not catch the influence of the risk only; and 
the market sentiment variables have been added to ensure the result is not just a pure 
effect of market sentiments. The regression with quarterly data has also been run in 
order to check whether interpolation would affect the conclusion, and to test the model 
with different values of the weighting parameter    , which is used to construct the 
ambiguity measure. The results show that the conclusion of this chapter is robust to all 
of the tests.  
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Chapter4. Heterogeneity in Household 
Ambiguity Aversion 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter investigated the factors that affect stock market participation in 
aggregate level and the sensitivity of different asset classes to ambiguity. This chapter 
mainly focuses on the factors which can affect individual investors’ ambiguity aversion, 
and investigates the reasons for ambiguity aversion behaviour.  
Easley and O’Hara (2010)’s model argues that ‘while ambiguity can affect stock 
market participation and stock price, the impact is a subject to the level of individual’s 
ambiguity aversion’. Their work suggests that market participation relies on the most 
optimistic and the most pessimistic investors, when facing the same level of ambiguity. 
In other words, individual ambiguity aversions are heterogeneous, and can affect stock 
market participation. To explore the factors which determine individual ambiguity 
aversion further, one must first understand the psychology behind ambiguity aversion. 
Previous studies state that ambiguity aversion may come from the outcome generating 
process of perceived information, as people prefer familiar events over unfamiliar ones. 
Frisch and Baron (1988) argue that when people believe they have insufficient 
information, they will avoid making decisions. Chow and Sarin (2001), Fox and 
Tversky (1995) and Fox and Weber (2002) conclude that this happens more often if an 
alternative process with a higher perceived informational content is available. Therefore, 
ambiguity aversion is likely to be the consequence of avoiding the unpleasant 
experience of decision making under an ambiguous situation. While some studies 
believe that the fear of negative evaluation by others (FNE) is the cause of ambiguity 
aversion (Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986)), others suggest that self-evaluation, 
anticipated cognitive dissonance or regret are the causes of the observed ambiguity 
aversion (Krahmer and Stone, 2010).  
The theories above provide a good explanation of how ambiguity aversion could 
work on an individual level and what factors could determine ambiguity aversion; 
however these theories have not been empirically tested. Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter is to test Easley and O’Hara (2010)’s model empirically, in order to examine 
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whether heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion could affect stock market participation, 
and also to explore the psychological reasons behind it.  
 These tests are run by using Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) data from the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. This survey has been conducted every three 
years since 1989.  It gathers demographic and financial information from a large 
number of different households. This chapter includes the tests which use data from 8 
different surveys, from the year 1989 to the year 2010. The stock market participation is 
measured from the stock holding status of households from the SCF: if a household has 
either direct stock holding or stock-based funds, it is considered a participant in the 
stock market. To be consistent with the previous chapter, the dispersions of analysts’ 
opinions are used (Anderson et al, 2009) as an ambiguity measure.  In addition, since 
the SCF uses a multiple imputation technique to impute missing values, standard errors 
for multiple imputations (RII) are adjusted following the method of Rubin (1987). 
As a further development of the results in the previous previous chapter, this 
chapter firstly tests if ambiguity affects individual stock market participation in general, 
rather than only via mutual funds. After controlling the variables that affect individual 
stock market participation, such as income, race, age, marriage, education and 
anchoring of past prices, the results show that ambiguity can still significantly reduce 
household stock market participation.  
Furthermore, to test whether heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion exists in 
households as Easley and O’Hara (2010) suggested, several hypotheses are developed, 
based on the Fear of Negative Evaluation by others (FNE) and the self-evaluation 
theory. Since FNE suggests that negative evaluation from others  is the main cause of 
ambiguity aversion, in this chapter the assumption is made  that households with a 
higher income (>$125000 income in 1993) and education level (with college degree) 
should be less ambiguity averse,since such households normally have a better social 
status and are less subject to others’ opinions. For the same reason, it is assumed here 
that older people (>65 years old) are less ambiguity averse, because FNE is partly 
caused by a low self cognitive level, such as over-estimating awkwardness and feeling a 
lack of confidence or self-assurance. But when individuals become more mature, they 
improve their self cognitive level, and therefore suffer less from FNE. For example, 
Aydin (2008) finds that younger students have a higher level of FNE than mature 
students in a foreign language environment.  
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 FNE also suggests that when people form a group, their decision making has 
more ambiguity aversion than the average of individuals, thus another assumption is 
made that married couples are more ambiguity averse.  In addition, based on FNE, 
people with higher ambiguity aversion are less social; therefore it is assumed here that a 
lower social capital brings a higher ambiguity aversion level.  
On the other hand, the self-evaluation theory believes that the negative feelings 
of regret are the main reasons for ambiguity aversion, thus those who are more 
optimistic are naturally less ambiguity averse. The level of optimism is measured by the 
response towards the future US economic situation, and those who believe the future 
will improve are considered more optimistic and are assumed to be less ambiguity 
averse. Similarly, people who experienced a low life-time stock market return before are 
more likely to be pessimistic towards the stock market and, therefore, become more 
ambiguity averse. In this chapter, based on Malmendier and Nagel (2009), a weighted 
life-time stock market return is produced with an assumption that those who have had a 
negative life-time return should be more ambiguity averse.  It is also noteworthy that, in 
contrast to FNE, self-evaluation theory predicts that low income households should 
have less ambiguity aversion as they will regret it more if missing the rewards from 
ambiguous stocks, and vice versa to high income households. Finally, the research 
reference also points out that people who smoke are less ambiguity averse, so this 
hypothesis is also tested here.  
The result obtained shows that older or more optimistic investors are less 
ambiguity averse, while investors with high incomes, married or who have experienced 
negative life-time stock market returns are more ambiguity averse. These results support 
Easley and O’Hara (2010)’s model empirically, and also show that ambiguity aversion 
is the combined result of both: fear of negative evaluations from others and regret from 
self-evaluations.  
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4.2 Literature review  
 
4.2.1 Heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion and market participation  
 
As Easley and O’Hara (2010) state, the presence of ambiguity renders the market price 
to be derived from fair pricing and thus can cause non-trade.  They come to the 
conclusion that, instead of ‘the price that would be received to sell an asset or transfer a 
liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date’ 
(definition of fair pricing from Financial Accounting Standards Board), ambiguity 
makes the prices become individual beliefs about the best and the worst case of 
outcomes.  
Assume there is one risky and one risk-free asset in the market, and two periods 
0 and 1. The risk-free asset always has a value of 1 per unit, and the risky asset has a 
price          at each period and an uncertain future pay off at the end of period 1, 
namely    which is believed to be normally distributed with a variance   . However, the 
agents (with a total amount of I) disagree with the value of the mean, and for agent   the 
expected mean is    and for at least two agents     we have      . Trader i’s 
endowment of the risky asset is     . The per capita endowment of the risky asset is thus 
       
 
   . At time 1 an unanticipated shock to trader’s beliefs about the future value 
of the risky asset occurs and traders can re-trade. All traders have constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) utility of wealth, w, at the end of period 1 and at time 0 each trader 
maximizes the expected utility of wealth w, given beliefs and the time zero price of the 
risky asset. Traders are unaware of the possibility of a shock at time 1 and thus do not 
plan for it. Therefore, after the shock, the set of possible declines in the expected value 
of the risky asset is described by   α and α   [α α] with 0< α<α<1. If trader i chooses 
the portfolio (       ) at period 0, his future wealth after period 1 will be the random 
variable            . So his expected utility from such random wealth is: 
          
      
 
 
                                                               
where         the trader i’s initial wealth. Thus trader i’s period 0 demand for the risky 
asset has the standard form: 
  
  
     
δ
                                                                     
83 
 
In equilibrium, per capita demand for the risky asset must be equal to per capita supply, 
so: 
 
    
      
                                                                     
The average belief about the future mean value of the risky asset is: 
    
 
   
 
                                                                       
Therefore, the price and individual holding of the assets at period 0 are:  
     δ
      
   
    
δ
                                               
Thus, the period 0 price of the risky asset is the average mean future value 
reduced by a factor that compensates traders for holding the market risk.  The individual 
holding is generated according to their relative optimistic level in relation to the average 
optimistic level.  Now at period 1, let (     ) be the trader i’s trade of risky asset and 
cash. The trader i’s period 1 budget constraint is then: 
                                                                                   
Thus the trader i’s future wealth, given his endowment and trade is then: 
        
              
                                                  
 Therefore, for any expected future value of the risky asset         , that the trader i 
believes is possible, his expected future wealth is: 
              
                    
                                                
And the variance of his future wealth is: 
          
                                                         (4.9) 
If the trader wants to carry out a transaction   , it should satisfy at least two conditions:  
1. It will add utility in any possible distribution of returns.  
2. It will be better than any other possible transaction. So the trade    must firstly solve 
the following equation for all          α   α   : 
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             (4.10) 
Meanwhile, for all          α   α    there should be no trade  
  which can result:  
         
                    
  
      
      
 
          
                    
  
      
     
 
 
        
       
Thus the condition for an agent    not to trade is that the price satisfies:  
    α    
    
  α    
    
                                                 
And for the entire market to have no trade is:  
    
  α    
    
  α    
    
                                        
This means no trade happened when: 
      
      
 
  α
  α
                                                    (4.14) 
We can see here that the probability of no trade will depend on two conditions: the 
dispersion of opinions among investors and the level of ambiguity. The higher the 
dispersion, the less will be the probability of no trade, meanwhile if the ambiguity goes 
higher (which enlarges 
  α
  α
   the result is more likely to be a cessation in trading. Once 
such ‘no trade’ equilibrium is established regardless of the price change the total 
demand and supply will not match at all.  
Furthermore, in this model ambiguity level is no longer the only factor which 
affects market participation; the participation level now also depends on the investors’ 
dispersion 
      
      
. If we assume that the level of ambiguity   α α ] is absolute and 
objective, it will be the same to all investors. Thus market participation will rely on the 
most optimistic and pessimistic investors, which gives         and      . As we can 
see, the agents with beliefs of        and       react totally differently towards the 
same ambiguity level because they set the bidding and asking prices respectfully. Thus, 
in other words, they have different ambiguity aversion levels, which determine their 
market participation rate.  
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4.2.2 Psychological roots of ambiguity aversion 
 
As has been discussed above in the previous section, households may have 
heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion and thus may react differently towards the same 
level of ambiguity. Furthermore, since those with the belief of       are always the 
sellers of assets under ambiguous circumstances, they are the main reason for low 
market participation. This assumption is supported by the result of Dimmock, 
Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2013)’s experiment, which revealed that while 
the majority of investors are ambiguity averse, a small fraction are still ambiguity 
seeking. Therefore, it is important to understand which categories of investors could 
have a higher ambiguity aversion level than others. To find the factors that could lead to 
high ambiguity aversion, the following section explores the subtle psychological causes 
of ambiguity aversion.  
A key point of the explanation of ambiguity aversion concerns the perceived 
informational content of the outcome generating process: people prefer to avoid making 
decisions when they think they have insufficient information (Frisch and Baron, 1988). 
As Chow and Sarin (2001), Fox and Tversky (1995), Fox and Weber (2002) believe, 
this particularly happens if an alternative process with a higher perceived informational 
content is available. In other words, people prefer familiar events over unfamiliar ones. 
In Ellsberg’s (1961)’s case, this effect leads to a preference for the urn with a known 
probability of winning and where subjects feel more knowledgeable, and such behavior 
officially is described as an ambiguity aversion.  In the section below the mainstream 
explanations of ambiguity aversion is reviewed, which will help to further derive the 
testing variables.   
 
a. Negative evaluation by others 
 
Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986) argue that the fear of negative evaluation by others 
(FNE) is the cause of ambiguity aversion: the preference for the more informative 
process (i.e. the preference for known events or at least with known probability, which 
are risky) is driven by the expectation that one’s actions or judgments may be difficult 
to justify in front of others.  When people choose an ambiguous option and receive a 
bad outcome, they fear criticism from others as they fear that a failure in the right 
choice of ambiguous events could be an indicator of inferior decision making skills. On 
86 
 
the other hand, such criticism is easier to counter in a risky choice situation because a 
bad outcome is easier to explain if it is a result of bad luck rather than of having made a 
bad choice. This explanation is backed up by the empirical studies of Simonson (1989) 
and Lerner and Tetlock (1999). They found that when somebody is required to view an 
issue which is unknown and for which no prior commitment to any course of action 
exists, they simply make the decision which they believe is most easily justifiable to 
others rather than making the optimal one.  In this way they can minimize the risk of 
being judged by others negatively regarding their decision-making qualities. 
Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986)’s experiments found that an increase in the 
number of people aware of the decision of a particular individual leading to an increase 
in ambiguity aversion stronger than any other factors they had tested.  Also the studies 
of Tversky (1998), Fox and Weber (2002), and Heath and Tversky (1991), show that 
ambiguity aversion increases with the perception that others are more competent and 
more knowledgeable. Keller and Sarin (2007) also obtained similar results. Before the 
experiment, they assumed that a pair of people would reveal less ambiguity aversion in 
decision making than the average level of two separate individuals, due to information 
sharing. However, the result shows that the decisions made by the pair are more 
ambiguity averse, and hence this confirms that the FNE is a dominating psychological 
cause of ambiguity aversion. 
Moreover, Bochner (1965) believe that due to FNE, individuals with a higher 
ambiguity aversion level are less likely to adapt to new technology or, even, are less 
social. On the other hand, there is evidence which presents the fact that social 
networking with other people enhances learning through ambiguous cases and helps to 
reduce ambiguity aversion. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) show that a farmer reveals 
ambiguity aversion when adapt to new technologies; however, this can be reduced by a 
higher level of the social networking. For example, the new high-yield-variety rices are 
known to have high productivity but are sensitive to inputs such as water, fertilizer and 
sowing times, and the optimal level of inputs are subject to the quality of soil and to 
temperature, which is very ambiguous to individual farmers. As a result, farmers have 
significant ambiguity aversion in adapting to the new rice variety and prefer the 
traditional one, because they do not want to be the ones in the village to break the old 
tradition and fail, and therefore suffer from FNE. However, if it is arranged that the 
farmers are able to share their experience about the new rice variety with each other, 
they can update their knowledge quickly due to the much larger amount of trials. As a 
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result, they know they are much less likely to fail, and therefore it is much easier to 
justify their choice of choosing the new variety.  
Finally, Gilbert (1998) finds that the results of FNE, such as shame, social 
anxiety and depression are highly related to feeling inferior and having a low social rank. 
McGuire and Gilbert (1998) further state that for households that have higher FNE, they 
tend to have a lower income, are less sociable and have a smaller living space. 
Therefore, since household high income and education is correlated to higher social 
rank, such households are supposed to suffer less from FNE and become less ambiguity 
averse. 
Based on this theory, in this chapter several assumptions are made in relation to 
the possible testing variables of ambiguity aversion. Firstly, and intuitively from the 
results of Keller and Sarin (2007), married people should have a higher ambiguity 
aversion level than single ones. Secondly, based on McGuire and Gilbert (1998), it is 
reasonable to assume that the people with a higher social status are less sensitive to FNE. 
Therefore, investors with a higher income will be less ambiguity averse, and similarly 
those who have a higher education level. Thirdly, since more ambiguity averse 
individuals tend to be less open or sociable, it is assumed that investors who are more 
socially active should be less ambiguity averse. Finally, since older people have a more 
mature personality and a higher level of self-cognition, they should be less influenced 
by FNE. Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, and Rui (2003) used investors’ ages as measure of 
investor sophistication, and found that older investors were more confident with their 
decisions and even had a higher likelihood of being over-confident. Thus it is expected 
that compared to younger people, older ones have a lower ambiguity aversion level. 
 
b. Self-evaluation 
 
Self-evaluation, anticipated cognitive dissonance, or regret, are also reasons for the 
observed ambiguity aversion. In other words, an evaluation of oneself can have a 
stronger effect than the fear of negative evaluation from others. The self-evaluation 
theory focuses on the ‘anticipated regret’ of individuals from future self-evaluation. It 
explains decision making as a process which results in minimizing self regret. The 
theory was originally developed by Ellsberg (1961), and Krahmer and Stone (2010) 
further model such ‘regret’ as an emotional gain after an agent finishes his choice. 
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Recalling Ellsberg’s urns as an example: the agent has to choose between a risky urn 
(50 black and 50 white balls) and an ambiguous urn (100 balls, comprising an unknown 
number of black and white balls), and after his choice one ball is randomly picked from 
the chosen urn. If the ball is black, then the agent gets a $100 reward, otherwise he gets 
0. In this case, after the ball has been drawn, the agent compares the actual pay-oﬀ with 
the prior expected pay-oﬀ, which would have been the best, based on his ex-post 
knowledge. This prior expected pay-oﬀ is the agent’s reference point, and, in addition to 
his real pay-off, the agent obtains an emotional pay-oﬀ, which is equal to the difference 
between his actual pay-oﬀ and the reference point. When the agent chooses the 
uncertain urn, the outcome shows the true information about the urn, and thus he revises 
his view of the urn’s expected pay-oﬀ. If he wins the bet, it indicates that his actual 
choice has been the best choice, since his posterior belief is that there are more black 
balls than white balls in the ambiguous urn. Therefore, in this case, his reference point 
is the uncertain urn and he obtains an emotional gain, because he compares his pay-oﬀ 
of $100 to the posterior mean of the uncertain urn, which is greater than $50 and less 
than $100. In the that case he loses the bet, his posterior belief is that there are more 
white balls than black balls. Accordingly, he believes that the risky urn would have 
been the best choice. Thus, in this case, his reference point is the risky urn, and he 
experiences regret because he compares his actual pay-oﬀ of $0 to the expected pay-oﬀ 
of the risky urn of $50.  
When the agent chooses the risky urn instead, no outcome leads to the state that 
the agent will revise his assessment of either urn’s expected pay-oﬀ. Therefore,  
regardless of winnings or losings, his choice is optimal because in either event his 
reference point is the risky urn, and he compares his actual pay-off to the posterior mean 
of the risky urn, which is $50. However, if he chooses the uncertain urn, his regret in the 
event of a bad outcome is greater than his rejoicing in the event of a good outcome, 
because in the latter event he changes his assessment of the optimal choice  in the light 
of his ex-post information, pushing up his reference point and diminishing his rejoicing. 
Consequently, the choice of the uncertain urn leads to higher expected regret and leads 
to the preference of riskier events over ambiguous ones, which we call ambiguity 
aversion. The worst-case scenario model can thus be seen as an extreme case of self-
evaluation theory application, where the agent aims for minimum level of anticipated 
regret, because he is always prepared for the worst outcome. In Ellsberg’s example, this 
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means that the agent will set his posterior choice of ambiguous urn as 0 black balls, 
therefore for any later outcome his regret will not be positive.  
Such an explanation naturally leads to the assumption that households with a 
lower income should be less ambiguity averse in the stock market. As stated in the 
previous chapter, stocks that are more ambiguous tend to be non-dividend paying 
growth stocks. These stocks are relatively cheap, but with the potential of significant 
capital gains. Therefore, given the low wealth level of low income households, the 
potential losses from the ambiguous stocks are limited, while the potential gains are 
much more significant, compared to high income households.  Therefore losing such an 
opportunity will cause much more regret in the low income households, compared to 
wealthier ones. This assumption is backed up by Kumar (2009)’s result, which will be 
discussed later. It is also interesting that this is exactly the opposite point of FNE’s 
prediction (FNE predicts that the higher income household should be less ambiguity 
averse).  
On the other hand, if individuals are more resistant to the self-anticipated regret,  
i.e. more optimistic, they are less ambiguity averse.  Since optimism and pessimism are 
defined as positive and negative outcome expectations, people with a predisposition to 
expecting things turning out well might perceive an ambiguous situation differently 
from someone who tends to expect the worst outcome to happen. Alpha-max-min model 
is a good example of showing the link between optimism and ambiguity aversion.  In 
this model, people use the formula below to adjust their expectations:   
                                                                 
Here the Max (w) and Min (w) are the max and min utility of event W respectively, and 
E (w) is the initial expected utility. The weight of estimations   indicates the level of 
ambiguity, when   is the increase in investors who become more reliant on their 
estimation than on their initial judgement        The weight of the worst outcome 
      can be seen as their ambiguity aversion level, when       is an increase in 
investors who have less utility from the ambiguous situation. As stated above, if the 
agent holds a prior belief of the worst case, which equals to      , they will minimize 
their regret. Thus the amount of regret which the agent overcomes is         , and it 
is directly related to the optimism level. Therefore it is assumed that those who revealed 
a higher level of optimism in the SCF should be less ambiguity averse. 
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In addition, various studies show that life experience could also change 
optimism and ambiguity aversion levels. For example, Pulford (2009) speculates that 
optimistic people consider themselves to be lucky and such feelings have come from 
their experiences. His experiments proved that a recently ‘lucky’ experience can make 
individuals seek more ambiguity than usual, but this effect does not last for long. On the 
other hand, Malmendier and Nagel (2009) argue that past experience in the market has a 
significant impact on an individual’s future investment decision as well as their risk 
attitude in the long-term. Hence, there could be a similar impact for the ambiguity 
attitude: those who have had a negative life-time experience in the stock market are 
more pessimistic about equity and become more ambiguity averse.  And the second 
assumption is that those who have experienced a negative life-time stock market return 
are more ambiguity averse.  
 
4.2.3 Empirical factors for ambiguity aversion 
 
The previous section introduced some the cause of ambiguity aversion, and listed 
several assumptions. This section discusses a method which is used to test these 
assumptions of heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion empirically.  
 
a. Level of optimism 
 
The first hypothesis is that the level of optimism affects the ambiguity aversion level, as 
the alpha-max-min model gives an intuitive explanation. Rigotti, Ryan, and 
Vaithianathan (2004) developed a model according to which optimists are more likely 
to accept ambiguous returns. In asset pricing, optimism among a small number of 
investors may cause stock prices to exceed fundamental values in the presence of short-
sale constraints (Miller, 1977). Puri and Robinson (2005) also argue that optimism is an 
important factor in investors’ economic decisions. To measure the level of optimism, 
this chapter relies on the studies of Puri and Robinson (2005), which used the SCF data 
and measured the level of optimism by the household’s self-reported life expectation 
and opinions towards future economic situations and income status.  Their studies show 
that optimists are more likely to believe that future economic conditions will improve. 
In the SCF the households were asked about what they thought about the US economy 
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over the next five years in comparison to the current situation, and the optional answers 
were: better, the same, or worse. If the household believed the economic situation 
would improve, they were identified as being more optimistic than the average. 
Therefore, it is further assumed that those who had more optimistic answers in the SCF 
not only invest more in stocks, but are also less sensitive to ambiguity changes.  
 
b. Income, race, age and education 
 
As stated above,  it has been assumed that income, age and education can also impact 
the ambiguity aversion level,  because these parameters are related to the capacity of 
dealing with the negative feedback of others, as well as the level of regret from self-
evaluation.  Moreover, such assumptions are backed up by empirical studies based on 
investment behaviour in lottery-like stocks. Walker (1992) and Kumara (2009) argue 
that common biological, psychological, religious and socio-economic factors jointly 
determine the psychological portrait of a gambler or a lottery-lover. It is credible that 
individuals with a preference for lotteries might adopt a gambling mindset in other 
domains of their lives. In particular, people’s investment choices may be affected by 
their attitudes toward lottery-playing and gambling. Kumar (2009) states that gambling, 
lottery-playing and speculation in the market are related albeit distinct activities. He 
defines speculation as an activity where a risk-seeking (or a less risk averse) individual 
takes relatively larger bets with large risks and gets rewarded appropriately. Under this 
definition, speculative stocks are those that have a higher variance and higher expected 
returns. In contrast, gambling refers to an activity where an individual takes large risks 
but the reward does not correspond to the level of the risk being taken, for example 
when the expected return is negative. Gamblers still undertake such bets because they 
gain a utility by simply being involved in a risky situation. In other words, gamblers are 
likely to trade with lower returns for the utility they derive from the thrill of gambling. 
Lastly, lotteries are distinct from speculative and gambling activities. When an 
individual buys a lottery ticket, he spends a small amount of money and expects to earn 
a low negative return with a high probability and a large positive return with a very 
small probability. Lottery players accept a negative expected return for the possibility of 
a large positive pay-off. Under this characterization of lotteries, stocks with lottery-type 
features would have lower prices, higher volatility, and large positive skewness.  It is 
important to emphasise that these features of lottery-like stocks are very similar to the 
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‘aggressive growth stocks’ in the previous chapter, where stock volatility is extremely 
high as well as its potential returns. The ‘aggressive growth stocks’  are recognized as a 
more ambiguous asset class in the previous discussion, and thus it is reasonable to 
assume that lottery-like stock investors may be less ambiguity averse .  
Kumar (2009) found that such lottery loving behaviour is correlated with status 
such as race, age, religion, income, and educational level. Those who are middle-aged, 
or live in urban, republican dominated regions and belong to minority groups (African-
American and Hispanic) and religious groups (Catholic) invest more in lottery type 
stocks. Additionally, investors who exhibit a stronger preference for lottery-type stocks 
experience a greater mean under-performance. Meanwhile, Clotfelter and Cook (1989) 
argue that poorer individuals are more likely to purchase lottery or lottery-like assets, 
and such a demand for lottery increases with the decrement of their income, according 
to Blalock, Just, and Simon (2004).  This result is also confirmed by Kumar (2009), 
who found that people with a lower income level (annual income<$15000 in 1993) have 
a significantly higher demand for lottery-type stocks, given that other factors are 
controlled. These results are consistent with the predictions from the self-evaluation 
theory in the previous section, that lower income households have more regrets about 
missing the opportunity of lottery and ambiguous stocks.   
Therefore, it is also reasonable to assume that people with different income 
levels may have different ambiguity aversion levels, and those who have lower income 
should be less ambiguity averse due to their relative preference for lottery-like stocks, 
and vice versa for the high income investors.  Following Kumar (2009)’s study, a test 
needs to be performed on whether people who are older (over 65 years old), have a 
lower income (annual income<$15000 in 1993) and are uneducated (without a college 
degree) are less ambiguity averse. It is also noteworthy that FNE and the self-evaluation 
theory make opposite predictions on the relationship between income and ambiguity 
aversion.  
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c. Social capital 
 
As stated above, it has been assumed that individuals with a higher level of social 
capital are less ambiguity averse because they might be less influenced by negative 
evaluations from others. To measure such social capital empirically, the method of 
social capital is applied. Putnam (1996), who popularized the concept of social capital, 
defines it as ‘networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more 
effectively to pursue shared objectives’. The World Bank is more expansive and it 
suggests that ‘social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape 
the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions’. In general, a higher social 
capital level means more social interaction between individuals, or more developed 
social networks. Since social capital is such wide concept, the empirical measures can 
be defined by various approaches. According to the British National Office of Statistics, 
one way to measure social capital is through participation, social engagement, and 
commitment: involvement in local groups, voluntary organizations, clubs, taking action 
regarding a local issue. Previous studies show that such empirical measures of social 
capital make a significant impact on investor’s financial decisions. Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingles (2004) use the frequency of interactions with communities, such as attending 
church and blood donation centres as indicators for the social capital level. They found 
that in Italian regions, where people attend church or donate blood more frequently, the 
stock market participation rate is significantly higher. Similarly, Hong, Kubik, and Stein 
(2001) use the interactions with neighbours as another indicator for social capital. They 
researched on how closely people are connected within the local community and they 
found that the social capital level significantly affects stock market participation. The 
SCF survey contains data pertaining to whether the household is involved in voluntary 
charity work, and the assumption is made here that  people who participate in voluntary 
charity activities have a higher level of social capital, and, therefore, their ambiguity 
aversion is lower.  
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d. Life–time experienced return  
 
Malmendier and Nagel (2009) argue that past experience in the market can have a 
significant impact on an individual’s future investment decision, as well as their risk 
attitude in the long-term. They found that individuals who experienced periods of low 
stock-market returns and who expressed a lower willingness to take a financial risk are 
less likely to participate in the stock market, and invest less in stocks. Malmendier and 
Nagel (2009)’s study shows that the relatively low stock-market participation of young 
households in the early 1980s can be explained by the disappointing stock-market 
returns in the 1970s; and the relatively high participation of young investors in the late 
1990s is the result of the boom years in the mid 1990s. This result is consistent with the 
self-evaluation theory’ prediction, that a pessimistic level will increase ambiguity 
aversion. Therefore, based on these studies, this chapter will also test the hothouses as 
to whether households which experienced a negative life-time market return are more 
ambiguity averse.  
 
e. Marital status  
 
As stated above, the research shows that when people are members of groups the 
influence of potential negative evaluations from others is higher: Blinder and Morgan 
(2005) found that groups make different decisions rather than individuals. The decisions 
made by groups are the most explainable solutions but are not always the optimal ones. 
Keller and Sarin (2007) state when people are put into a group of two, their decisions 
reveal more ambiguity aversion in comparison to the average person who is not 
connected. Consequently, the assumption is made that for those households which are 
reported as married in SCF, the ambiguity aversion level is higher.  
 
f. Smoking status  
 
Apart from the predictions from the FNE and self-evaluation theory, studies based on 
experiments have also suggested some factors that could possibly affect ambiguity 
aversion, for example, smoking. Previous studies suggested that smokers have a lower 
level of risk aversion compared to non-smokers, which indicates a possible difference in 
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their physiological portraits: Sutter, Rützler and Trautmann (2010) found that impatient 
people tend to consume more alcohol and tobacco, demonstrate less saving behaviour 
and have a lower ambiguity aversion level. Furthermore, Viscusi, Magat and Huber 
(1999)’s findings reveal that students who are more ambiguity averse smoke less in 
daily life. Therefore, it also needs to be tested whether households in which there are  
smokers are less sensitive to changes in ambiguity.  
 
4.2.4 Factors for individual household participation  
 
From previous studies, income and wealth level is regarded as one of the most 
important factors affecting individual stock market participation. It is known that high 
income groups are more likely to have financial assets and, therefore, they are more 
active participants in the stock market (Vissing-Jorgensen (2000), Kumar (2009), Hong, 
Kubik and Stein (2001)). The explanation is that for entering the stock market there is 
always fixed costs, such as the account fee, broker’s charge, and time invested in 
seeking the market information. A high income group has a significant advantage in 
handling such fixed costs as this only takes a small percentage of their wealth. In 
addition, because this group has a relatively larger investment scale, such fixed costs 
make less impact on their stock’s net returns. Also, normally, there is a required 
minimum amount of investment in the stock account, which represents another entry 
barrier for low-income individuals.  
Secondly, stock-market participation is found to increase with the level of 
education in the household. This result is confirmed by Kumar (2009), Hong, Kubik and 
Stein (2001). One natural interpretation of this fact is that education reduces the fixed 
information costs of participation. It is easier for educated investors to understand the 
market’s risk-reward tradeoffs, or to deal with the mechanics of setting up an account 
and executing trades. Thus, they spend less time and effort dealing with information 
costs. Hsu (2012) also argues that households with higher human capital have higher 
wealth level expectations, and will be more interested in financial assets such as stocks 
in order to achieve their desired wealth level.  
Another factor that can affect individual market participation on an individual 
level is the psychological anchoring to the historical price. George and Hwang (2004) 
state that traders might use the 52-week high as an anchor when assessing stock value 
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information.  George and Hwang (2004) argue that if a stock’s price is at or near its 52-
week high, then this is a stock that has recently had good news, and this can be the time 
when traders’ under-reaction to good news is at its peak. Therefore, closeness to the 52-
week high is positively associated with expected returns in the cross-section. Peng and 
Xiong (2006) show that limited investor attention can result in category-learning 
behaviour: investors tend to process more market-wide information rather than firm-
specific information. Due to the fact that the Dow index is one of the most widely 
available market information tools, investors are likely to use the Dow index as a 
benchmark when evaluating new market-wide information. As a result, the nearness of 
current price to the Dow 52-week high captures the extent of under-reaction, and it 
should forecast aggregate market returns. Li and Yu (2010) confirmed this result by 
showing that to evaluate information people use the Dow 52-week average and 
historical high/low price rather than the current price.   Li and Yu (2010) found that 
when the recent 52 week average is close to the historical level, the momentum is much 
stronger and, thus, brings about more herding behaviour with corresponding long/short 
positions. Therefore, the market participation increases when prices are closer to the 
anchoring point. However, in general, households cannot hold a short position in the 
stock market and hence, in this research, only the high price anchoring points are 
considered 
Finally, there is a documented link between race and participation. According to 
Kumar (2009), white, non-Hispanic households have much higher stock market 
participation rates, controlling wealth and education. In addition, Kumar (2009) also 
finds that age, marital and retirement status can also affect the demand for financial 
assets. This can be explained by the varying demand of income at different stages a 
person’s life cycle. It is known that demand for saving and financial assets increases in 
later stages of the life cycle, because investors need income streams for their children 
and retirement. Kumar (2009)’s results are consistent with this theory. 
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4.2.5 Research questions  
 
To sum up, Easley and O’Hara (2010) provide a theoretical structure to how 
heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion can affect the stock market. Ellsberg (1961) and 
Krahmer and Stone (2010) further argue that self-evaluation is the reason for ambiguity 
aversion, while Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986) believe that the reason is the fear of 
negative evaluation by others (FNE).  
Meanwhile, Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2013) observed 
strong heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion, as they found both ambiguity averse and 
ambiguity seeking decisions. However, their results are survey-based and do not use 
real market data. Therefore, it is worth investigating whether this model is held in the 
real market, and what the driving reason for the behaviour is. Thus, the research 
questions are:  
Does ambiguity affect the stock market participation at houshold level? If so, do 
different investors have a different level of ambiguity aversion? What are the 
reasons for it? 
 
4.3 Data and methodology  
 
To answer the research questions listed above, empirical evidence is required. The 
following section introduces the data and methodology used for the testing. 
 
4.3.1 Survey of consumer finance  
 
In this chapter the main data source is the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF). 
SCF can be obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. SCFs were 
conducted annually from 1946 to 1971, and were again administered in 1977, 1983, and 
then every three years after 1983. To produce the SCF, interviewing is conducted 
between January and August  to gather the demographic and financial information, such 
as consumer income, assets, debt, and major transactions, from a large number of 
different US households,. The samples of SCF are made up of a national cross-section 
of dwelling units to represent the total population of the US. In this sample the data 
from 8 different surveys ending in 2010 is included, with a total number of 176,160 
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available observations. It is noteworthy that each SCF survey picks its respondents 
independently from the previous survey and, therefore, provides randomly-sampled 
cross-section data of US households rather than time-series data. As a result, the data of 
SCF is suitable for the probability-based regression model, such as the logistic 
regression model.  
Although this survey has been used extensively in academic research (i.e., 
Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), it has a well-known technical issue for its multiple-
imputation. Multiple-imputation is a technique commonly used to deal with missing 
information on individual items in survey data. This technique employs multivariate 
statistical methods to impute missing data resulting in multiple complete data sets. Since 
1989, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data files have contained five complete 
data sets, referred to as implicates. The benefit to researchers of these multiply imputed 
data files is that they contain no missing values; however, an appropriate method of 
analysing multiply imputed data is also required. One major way of doing this is known 
as repeated imputation inferences (RII) from Rubin (1987), which combines the results 
obtained independently in each of the separate implicates using multiple imputation 
combining rules. In this research the RII approach is followed and the regression results 
of all five imputations of SCF data are combined to generate the final standard error and 
estimations of coefficients.  
 
4.3.2 Household’s participation variables from SCF 
 
In the SCF, households were asked whether they have any publicly traded stocks and 
whether they have any stock-based mutual fund assets. The variable of the stock market 
participation        is 0 if the household   has a negative answer to both questions at 
time  , and 1 otherwise. The gross income variable           is the logged reported 
total gross income of the household i in the last year of time t. For example, when the 
survey was completed in 1989, the reported income variable would be the logged gross 
income received in 1988, measured by nominal dollars. Marriage variable 
            is set to 1 if the household   is married at time   and 0 otherwise, and 
retirement               is set to 1 if the respondent (or couple) is (are both) retired. 
The race variable         is set to 1 if the household is white and 0 for the rest. The risk 
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attitude variable is based on the following questions in the survey (the following 
example is from the 2010 survey):  
Which of the following statements come the closest to describe the amount of financial 
risk that you are willing to take when you save or make investments?  
1. Not willing to take any financial risks 
2. Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
3. Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns 
4. Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average 
returns 
Thus a higher score in the risk attitude means more risk tolerance and and, therefore, 
less risk aversion. To present such a risk attitude, the dummy variable is set according to 
the answers: variable         is set to i if household i’s answer is number i at time t, and 
0 otherwise. Age variable        is the reported age of respondent i at time t, and the 
education variable        is set to 1 if respondent i at time t has a college degree, and 0 
otherwise. The social capital level        is the dummy that is set to 1 if members of the 
family have ever worked as volunteers for charity organisations and 0 otherwise. In 
addition, the market price anchoring variable       is a control variable for anchoring, 
which is equal to the average Dow index price for the last year of the survey/the 
historical high price of the Dow index till the last year of the survey  Since the survey is 
carried out every three years, the ambiguity            is measured by the average 
ambiguity between year t-1 and t-3 (again amplified by 100 times). The appendix of this 
chapter provides an example of the questions that were used to construct these variables 
in the SCF 2010.  
 
4.3.3 Ambiguity aversion variables 
 
To examine whether the empirical factors stated above can affect the ambiguity 
aversion, this chapter tests the corresponding variables including age, education, income 
level, social capital level, optimism level, marriage, life-time experienced stock market 
return and smoking status. Based on Kumar (2009)’s study the base line of the high and 
low income groups is drawn: the high income group comprises households that have 
higher than $125000 income per year in 1993, and the low income level households that 
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have below $15000 in 1993. This is adjusted by the CPI for every year and converted 
into the corresponding income level in each survey. If the reported household income 
exceeded the high income level for the year, the high income dummy           is set to 
1, and, if otherwise, 0. And vice versa for the low income dummy          .  For age, 
dummies of younger (below 40), middle aged (40-65) and older (above 65) are set 
according to Kumar (2009)’s study. The education dummy is set to 1 when a household 
claimed to have a college degree and 0 for the rest.  
In addition, it is also necessary to test whether there is a significant impact of the 
life-time experienced market return on ambiguity aversion. Following Malmendier and 
Nagel (2009)’s study the weighted life-time experienced stock market return is 
constructed as a controlling variable. The life-time experienced stock market return is a 
weighted average of S&P returns within an individual’s lifetime. According to 
Malmendier and Nagel (2009), individuals may not have sufficient experience towards 
the market from their early childhood, therefore in this study the experienced return is 
measured from age 10 to the survey time.   For household i at year t, the life-time 
experienced return is: 
                        
         
   
                                           
          
          
 
            
         
   
                                          
where     is the market return of S&P 500 at year t-k. 
 As Malmendier and Nagel (2009) suggest, the memory fades with time and 
returns in the earlier years have less weight, thus the weight parameter is set to 1.25 to 
give a reduced weight to the earlier experienced return. If such an experienced life-time 
market return is negative, then the dummy for the negative life-time return is set to 1, 
otherwise it is 0.  
 For the social capital dummy, the method from the British Office for National 
Statistics is used, which measures social capital through the degree of involvement in 
voluntary charity work. In the SCF, households report if they volunteered to work in 
charity organizations during the past year of the survey, and the social capital dummy is 
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set to 1 for those who participated, and 0 if otherwise. Similarly, the smoker dummy is 
set to 1 if the household claimed to be smokers, and 0 if otherwise.  
 
4.4 Regression results and analysis 
 
4.4.1 Testing ambiguity and individual stock market participation 
 
 Firstly, the test is performed on whether ambiguity makes a significant impact on the 
individual level of market participation. The model includes  individual-specific control 
variables: incomei,t, which is the natural logarithm of income deflated into 2010 dollars; 
risk attitudei,t (three dummies to present whether the individual is willing to take 
average, above average or substantial financial risks), racei,t (dummy equal to 1 if the 
household is white and 0 if otherwise), marriagei,t (dummy equal to 1 if the individual is 
married), retiredi,t (dummy equal to 1 if the individual is retired), agei,t (in years) and 
educationi,t (dummy equal to 1 if the individual has a college degree).   The probability 
that the household owns equities is modelled conditionally on the predictors in the 
vector X outlined above,                , and the linear logistic model is in the 
form: 
    
 
   
                                                                       
where a is the intercept parameter and b is a vector with slope parameters estimated 
with maximum likelihood. The main regression is, thus, set as follows: 
             
                                                       
                                             
                                             
                   
Since the SCF uses the multiple imputation technique to impute missing values, 
standard errors for multiple imputations (RII) are adjusted following the method of 
Rubin (1987) in this study. Table 4.1 shows the regression result for the main regression, 
and it can be seen that the ambiguity has negative and significant estimates. This result 
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confirms the hypothesis that on a household level market ambiguity can reduce 
participation. In addition, in this model it is estimated that a one standard deviation 
increase of ambiguity reduces the probability of participation by 4.66%. If the market 
risk (measured by realised volatility) increases, it makes a significant impact as the 
participation rate decreases. In addition, since the variables have positive and significant 
estimations, households with higher income and education levels have more chance to 
participate in the stock market.  Furthermore the result shows that white and retired 
people have a higher chance to become stockholders as well as married couples. The 
chance of participation also increases with age and risk tolerance.  Moreover, the price 
anchoring level has positive and significant estimates, which are consistent with 
previous studies. To test the robustness of the main result, a similar process to Kumar 
(2009) is used, which drops households with reported incomes of less than 1000 dollars, 
and households with a head who is less (more) than 24 (75) years old. Table 4.2 
presents the result and it can be seen that the main result of this section is robust. 
 
4.4.2 Testing heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion  
 
In this section the second research question is examined in order to test the empirical 
factors that could affect ambiguity aversion.  The RII is also applied here to adjust the 
results of this section to net out the influence of multiple-imputations in SCF.  
 
a. Income and ambiguity aversion 
 
As Kumar (2009) states income status affects people’s investment choice. In addition, 
FNE theory predicts that households with a higher level of income are less ambiguity 
averse, while the self-evaluation theory makes the opposite prediction. Following 
Kumar (2009), in this study the income is controlled by high and low income lines. The 
high income line is equal to $125,000 in 1993 and the low income line equal to $15000 
in 1993. The baselines of incomes are adjusted by CPI and, therefore, the corresponding 
baseline is produced each year. The regression is:  
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Table 4.3 shows the regression results. It can be seen that the ambiguity and the risk are 
still negative and significant (estimated coefficient= -228.27, p<0.01, which means a 
one standard deviation increase of ambiguity reduces the probability of participation by 
4.16%), and the signs and the significance level for most of the previous variables stay 
the same. On the other hand, interactions with the income level dummy produce 
significant results, as high income groups have significant and negative estimates and 
low income groups have significant and positive estimates. These results are consistent 
with the previous findings that low income groups show lottery-loving behaviour and, 
thus are less ambiguity averse. In addition, it also fits the predictions from the self-
evaluation theory.  
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b. Age and ambiguity aversion  
 
Since older people are mature and are supposed to have an advanced self-cognition 
level, it is assumed in this study that older people are more resistant to negative 
feedback from others and, thus, are less ambiguity averse. This result is supported by 
Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, and Rui (2003), who find that older investors are more confident 
with their decisions. Therefore, following Kumar (2009), in this chapter the households 
are divided by the age of the main respondents in the regression. The older group are the 
respondents with a reported age of above 65 years old, and the regression is presented in 
the formula below: 
             
                                                       
                                             
                                     
                                             
       
The result is shown in Table 4.4, and it can be seen that while the main result is still 
held (estimated coefficient= -287.56, p<0.01, which means a one standard deviation 
increase of ambiguity reduces the probability of participation by 5.24%), the older 
group has significantly less ambiguity aversion, since the interaction action of its 
dummy and the ambiguity has positive and significant estimates. Therefore, this result 
supports the hypothesis that older people are less ambiguity averse.  
 
c. Education and ambiguity aversion  
 
Previous studies discussed above indicate that education makes an important impact on 
the investors’ risk aversion level, even with income and other variables being controlled.  
According to the FNE theory it is assumed that those individuals with a higher 
education are affected by negative evaluation less. 
On the other hand, as Kumar (2009) suggest, individuals with lower education 
tend to be more interested in the lottery-type of stocks, which is more ambiguous as has 
been previously explained in this thesis. Therefore, it is also the research interest as to 
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whether education level has a direct effect on ambiguity aversion in the stock market, 
and the regression is presented below:  
             
                                                       
                                             
                           
                                      
       
The regression result is shown in Table 4.5. It does not show any significant outcome 
between the education and the ambiguity. Therefore, it cannot be concluded whether 
education level can affect ambiguity aversion.  
[Table 4.5 here] 
 
d. Marriage and ambiguity aversion  
 
The FNE theory also states that people can be more ambiguity averse when they act as a 
group. Keller and Sarin (2007) found that, if people are put into a group of two, their 
decisions reveal more ambiguity aversion compared to the average of the two people’s 
vaule. Thus, here the argument from the FNE theory is that married households can be 
more ambiguity averse. The test regression is presented below:  
             
                                                       
                                             
                           
                                             
       
Table 4.6 shows the result of the regression, and it can be seen that the interaction term 
of the ambiguity and marriage status has a significant and negative estimation 
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(estimated coefficient= -164.07, p<0.01, which means a one standard deviation increase 
of ambiguity reduces the probability of participation by 3%). Therefore this evidence 
supports the assumption that married couples are more ambiguity averse.  
 
[Table 4.6 here] 
 
e. Social capital and ambiguity aversion  
 
As stated above, the research based on the FNE theory (Bochner, 1965; Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 1995) states that more ambiguity averse individuals can be less sociable, 
and in this study it is assumed that those who have higher social capital are less 
ambiguity averse. To test this hypothesis the dummy variable for the high social capital 
level is added into the regression. According to the standard of British National office of 
statistics, the social capital level can be defined through many different approaches 
including the frequency of interaction with local communities, the intensity of working 
for a charity or a voluntary work experience, the level of trusting people and 
organisations. In the SCF a household is asked whether they have participated in any 
charity or voluntary work in the last year, and this is used as a dummy proxy for the 
social capital. The dummy for high social capital       is set to 1 if the household i had a 
charity or voluntary work experience at time t, and 0 for the rest. The regression is 
presented below: 
             
                                                       
                                             
                                     
                                          
       
The result is shown in Table 4.7. However, since the regression for the social capital is 
not significant, it cannot be confirmed that social capital can significantly affect the 
household’s ambiguity aversion.  
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[Table 4.7 here] 
 
f. Optimism and ambiguity aversion  
 
The self-evaluation theory indicates that optimism directly influences the behaviour of 
individuals under ambiguous conditions. The Alpha-Max-Min model states that 
optimistic individuals put more weight on the best possible outcome and, thus, have 
higher expectations of the ambiguous event. It is assumed, therefore, that for households 
which reveal a more optimistic attitude, the stock market participation is less sensitive 
to the changes on the ambiguity level. Since 1989, in the SCF households have been 
asked for their opinions about the economic situation in the US over the following five 
years, and how their family income will change in the next five years. Following Puri 
and Robinson (2005) these are both indicators of the household optimism level. 
Therefore in the section the dummy for optimistic       is set to 1 if the household 
believes both the future economy US is going to improve, and their family income 
growth will beat inflation growth; and 0 if otherwise. The regression is presented below: 
             
                                                       
                                             
                                     
                                    
                
[Table 4.8 here] 
The result is shown in Table 4.8. It can be seen that ambiguity is significantly and 
negatively correlated to the market participation (estimated coefficient= -164.07, p<0.01, 
which means a one standard deviation increase of ambiguity reduces the probability of 
participation by 4.8%), therefore the main result remains. On the other hand, the 
interaction variable between the market ambiguity and the optimism level is positive 
and has p-value of 0.07. This result is consistent with the previous assumption that 
people with a higher optimism level are less affected by ambiguity.  
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g. Experienced life time return and ambiguity aversion  
 
The empirical research states that people’s level of optimism is related to their past 
experience: those who have recently had a winning experience consider themselves as 
lucky and become less ambiguity averse. Meanwhile, a life-experience with the asset 
market can significantly affect people’s investment decision making: people who 
experienced the great depression would have become less likely to participate in the 
stock market and become more risk averse (Malmendier and Nagel, 2009). Hence the 
hypothesis is made that those who experienced the negative life-time stock market 
return are more pessimistic towards stock market and their ambiguity aversion should 
be higher. To test this hypothesis, the life-time experienced stock market return variable 
is constructed based on Malmendier and Nagel (2009), which is equal to the weighted 
life-time stock market return from the age of 10.  The negative experience dummy 
             is set to 1 if household i had a negative life-time experienced return at time 
t, and 0 if otherwise. The regression is presented below: 
             
                                                       
                                             
                                     
                                                                        
       
Table 4.9 shows the result of the regression and it can be seen that the negative life-time 
experience has a negative and significant estimation. Thus, this evidence supports the 
assumption that the life-time experience can impact the ambiguity aversion.  
[Table 4.9 here] 
 
h. Smoking and ambiguity aversion  
 
Apart from the FNE theory and the self-evaluation theory, there is empirical study 
(Sutter, Rutzler and Trautmann, 2010) which states that impatient people tend to be less 
ambiguity averse and are much more likely to be smokers. Accordingly, there is  
research interest in this study as to whether smoking status can affect a household’s 
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ambiguity aversion level in the stock market. In the SCF a household is reported on 
whether the occupants are smokers, and the smoker dummy           is set to 1 if there 
are reported smokers and 0 if otherwise. The regression is presented below: 
             
                                                       
                                             
                                     
                                                                              
       
The result is shown in the Table 4.10. Unfortunately the estimations of the ambiguity 
and the smoking status are not significant, therefore it cannot be concluded that there is 
a significant relationship between smoking status and ambiguity aversion.  
[Table 4.10 here] 
 
4.4.3 Robustness  
a. Joint test  
 
So far all of the factors have been tested individually, for robustness this section tests 
them all together. The regression is presented below: 
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The result is presented in the Table 4.11. When pooled together, the result is that some 
of the variables become insignificant. However, the ambiguity itself is still significant 
with negative coefficients (estimated coefficient= -267.53, p<0.01, which means a one 
standard deviation increase of ambiguity reduces the probability of participation by 
4.9%), and the interactions of the ambiguity with the age and the higher income status 
are still significant. Therefore, the joint test provides empirical evidence that while older 
people are less ambiguity averse, people with a higher income are more ambiguity 
averse, which supports the FNE and self-evaluation theory respectively.   
[Table 4.11 here] 
 
b. Robustness 
 
This section applies a similar robust-checking process to Kumar (2009), which removed 
the households with a reported income of less than 1000 dollars, and the households 
with a head that is less (more) than 24 (75) years old. The reason for removing these 
households is that they might lack the ability to make viable financial decisions. All of 
the results from Tables 4.2-4.8, and 4.10 are recalculated with the new data, and the 
results are reported in Table 4.12. However, the result for the life-time experienced 
returns cannot be processed in such a way, due to very the strong correlation between 
age and life-time experienced returns: because of the bull market in the 1980s and 1990s 
the average age of people who have experienced positive life-time returns is 32. 
Therefore, by removing all of the samples below 24 years old, it significantly reduces 
the number of households that have experienced positive life-time returns. As a result, 
for life-time returns the robustness check removes households with a reported income of 
less than 1000 dollars and with a head more than 75 years old.  
[Table 4.12 here] 
For brevity, Table 4.12 reports the estimation of the ambiguity variables and the 
interaction terms only. It can be seen that the ambiguity remains negative and 
significant in all of the regressions; therefore the conclusion is still held that ambiguity 
reduces the household’s stock market participation. The interaction terms of the 
ambiguity with age, marriage, income and life-time experience remains significant, 
while social capital, smoking and education status remain insignificant. In addition, the 
interaction between ambiguity and optimism becomes more significant (p-value 
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changes from 0.07 to 0.05). Therefore all of the results from the previous sections are 
robust.  
 
4.5 Limitations and future developments 
 
The main limitation of this chapter is the sample size. Since from 1983 the SCF data is 
only available every three years, there are up to 10 surveys that can be used for this 
research. In addition, many questions that have been used in order to construct the 
variables for this chapter have only been available since 1989, and thus further reduce 
the available number of surveys to 8. This relatively short time period may result in 
some bias in the conclusion. However, since each available survey still provides a 
considerable number of observations (176,160 observations in total), the results are still 
convincing.  
Another limitation is that, due to privacy protection, some of the survey results 
are not available for the public, for example, data on address, religion and political 
affiliation. Previous studies documented that these variables can affect a household’s 
financial decision, i.e. Catholics and Jews participate in lotteries more than Protestants 
and Mormons (Grichting, 1986; Clotfelter and Cook. 1989), urban people are more 
likely to buy lotteries than people located in rural areas (Kumar, 2009). However, since 
there is no evidence that these variables make an extremely strong impact on a 
household’s stock holding, their influence on the result should be limited as a decent 
number of control variables are already included in the regression.  
The final limitation of this chapter is the cohort effect. Due to the Great 
Depression in the 1930s and the bull market in the 1990s, a household’s life-time 
experienced stock market return is significantly correlated to its age. In addition, there 
was a rapid growth in the number of baby boomers in the 1940s and 1950s who, during 
the sampling period 1989-2010, retired and thus changed their investment goals. All of 
these facts may have an impact on the results of this chapter.  
Regarding future studies, the first suggestion is to test the stated models by using 
some annual or quarterly household data, or data which has a longer time period. The 
ambiguity measure used in this chapter starts from the year of 1968 and, therefore, is 
long enough to collaborate with most of the data sources. Secondly, the SCF also 
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reports the categories and the weights of the assets that households hold. Thus there is 
research interest to see of how ambiguity could affect a household’s portfolio choice. 
The results from the previous chapter show the stocks that pay no dividends are affected 
by ambiguity, and investors transfer their capital from the stock market into more liquid 
asset classes to avoid a high ambiguity period. Therefore, it might be worth testing 
whether a household chooses to hold more liquid asset during a high ambiguity period, 
and whether the interaction of ambiguity and the average market dividend yield has a 
significant impact on a household’s stock holding. Finally, efforts are also needed in 
order to test the data outside the US. As previously documented, ambiguity aversion has 
psychological roots that are correlated to people’s personality and social status, such as 
their age, income and level of optimism. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in 
countries which have a very different mentality and social structure the overall reaction 
to ambiguity might differ from that of the US. For example, China and Japan overall 
have an older population compared to the US as well as a very different culture. As a 
result, the Asian market may have a distinctive feature in terms of the household’s 
ambiguity aversion.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
From the Easley and O’Hara (2010) model it can be seen that different levels of 
ambiguity aversion can affect the individual’s market participation, and this thesis has 
had the aim of testing whether a such model is held in real life. Therefore, first of all the 
influence of ambiguity on the household level of stock market participation is tested. 
For the test, the data from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), which is issued by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, is applied. This survey is conducted 
every three years, and gathers demographic and financial information from a large 
number of different households. Since 1989 the SCF has applied the multiple-
imputations technique to complete the missing data, which results a data with five-
imputations in the final set. Accordingly, the repeated imputation inferences (RII) 
technique from Rubin (1987) is applied, which combines the results obtained 
independently on each of the separate implicates using multiple imputation combining 
rules. This provides unbiased standard errors and estimates. The result supports Easley 
and O’Hara (2010), as ambiguity have negative and significant estimations.  
Furthermore, the robustness check is applied by deleting data with an income lower 
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than $1000 and age less than 24 or more than 75, and the result is still held. Therefore it 
is suggested that ambiguity aversion can significantly reduce household stock market 
participation.  
 The research interest of this chapter also focuses on the factors that can 
influence the households’ ambiguity aversion level. There are two main psychological 
explanations of ambiguity aversion, which are based on the negative evaluations from 
others and self-evaluation theories. The FNE theory believes that the fear of negative 
evaluation from others is the main cause of ambiguity aversion, and the research shows 
that people become more ambiguity averse in groups, and those who are more 
ambiguity averse are also less social. Thus it is assumed that people with a higher social 
status (higher income/education) or a lower social capital are less ambiguity averse. 
Also married couples should be more ambiguity averse than a single person. On the 
other hand, since older people are more mature with self-cognition, it is supposed that 
their ambiguity aversion is lower due to greater self-confidence and the ability of 
resisting FNE.  The self-evaluation theory states the reason for the ambiguity aversion is 
that people prefer to minimise their regret. It points out that the level of optimism is the 
key for the ambiguity aversion. Thus, it is assumed that the household which is reported 
to be more optimistic in the SCF, should be less ambiguity averse. In addition, based on 
the self-evaluation theory, a low income household will regret more if it misses the 
reward from ambiguous stocks. Therefore, in contrast to FNE, self-evaluation predicts a 
high income household with high ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, previous studies 
show that an optimistic attitude can be related to life experience; therefore the 
hypothesis is that a negative life-time stock market return leads to a low optimism level 
and thus increases the ambiguity aversion. Moreover, the research shows that impatient 
people tend to be less ambiguity averse, and they are more likely to be smokers. As a 
result the hypothesis is tested whether smokers reveal less ambiguity aversion in the 
stock market.  
The results confirmed the majority of the assumptions made in this chapter, i.e. 
that heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion exists in the real market. In particular, older 
people  (more than 65 years old) and those who are more optimistic about the future 
economy are significantly less ambiguity averse, while married, high income 
(>$125,000 income in 1993) and those who experienced a negative life-time stock 
market return are significantly more ambiguity averse. Therefore, both FNE (older 
people are less ambiguity averse; married couples are more ambiguity averse) and self-
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evaluation (optimistic people are less ambiguity averse; high income people are more 
ambiguity averse) theories have successful predictions. Thus the results show that 
ambiguity aversion might not be the single result of fear of negative evaluations from 
others or self, but a combination of both.  
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Chapter5. Conclusion 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The study was set to explore the impact of ambiguity aversion in stock market 
participation, and its corresponding ambiguity premium empirically. The study has also 
sought to identify the psychological reasons for ambiguity aversion, and whether certain 
investor types are more ambiguity averse than others, particularly among US 
households. The general theoretical literature on this subject predicted that, similar to 
risk aversion, ambiguity aversion causes a price premium and thus should be another 
asset pricing factor. However, most of the theories have no empirical support or have 
only been tested in simulated environment. Therefore, this study has the purpose finding 
empirical evidence by using real market data, and the research questions are: 
1. Does ambiguity aversion reduce stock market participation? And if it does, what is 
the scale of the impact? Is there any asset class affected by ambiguity aversion more 
than the others?  
2. Does ambiguity affect stock market participation on an individual level? If so, do 
investors have a different level of ambiguity aversion? What are the reasons for it? 
 
5.2 Empirical findings 
 
The main empirical findings are chapter-specific, and have been summarised within the 
particular empirical chapters of this thesis. This section synthesises the empirical 
findings in order to answer the research questions stated above. 
1. Does ambiguity aversion affect stock market participation at all? And if it does, 
what is the scale of the impact? Is there any asset class which is affected by the 
ambiguity aversion more than others?  
a. Ambiguity aversion does reduce stock market participation. By using the American 
mutual fund flow data as a measure of the stock market participation, and the 
divergence of analysts’ opinions as a measure of stock market ambiguity, it has been 
found that the increment in the stock market ambiguity is positively and negatively 
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correlated to the mutual fund flows. Therefore, an increase in stock market ambiguity 
will result in the outflow of capital from the mutual funds, which means a reduction in 
the stock market participation level.  
b. Apart from the simple outflow, the results of this thesis also show that during a 
period of high ambiguity, part of the outflows from the stock market, which are caused 
by ambiguity aversion, are transferred into the money market. Based on the ICI 
definition, money market funds are invested in low risk, high-grade assets that receive 
the full principal and interest within 90 days on average, therefore investors can switch 
to the short-term investments with a higher liquidity in order to avoid stock market 
uncertainty. 
c. Stocks without dividend payments are more sensitive to changes in the ambiguity 
level. The result shows that in comparison to the rest of the equity funds, the ‘growth’ 
and ‘aggressive growth’ style funds have greater and more significant correlation 
coefficients with the ambiguity. According to the ICI definition, ‘aggressive growth’ 
and ‘growth’ funds invest in non-dividend-paying stocks with a focus on the capital 
gains, and thus are considered as more ambiguous. Consequently, their flows are more 
sensitive to the changes in the ambiguity level. 
 
2. Does ambiguity affect the stock market participation at household level? If so, 
do different investors have a different level of ambiguity aversion? What are the 
reasons for it? 
a. Ambiguity aversion does reduce stock market participation at household level. By 
using reported stock holding from the Survey of Consumer Finance as a measure of 
stock market participation, and the convergence of analyst’s opinions as a measure of 
the ambiguity (Anderson et al., 2009), it has been found that the probability of a 
household holding equity assets is negatively and significantly correlated to the 
ambiguity level. Therefore, an increment in the ambiguity level reduces the overall 
participation rate of US households. 
b. There is heterogeneity in the households’ ambiguity aversion level. The results show 
that the following households have a higher ambiguity aversion level: married 
households, households with higher income (>125,000 annual incomes in dollars, 
deflated into the 1993 level), and households which experienced the negative life-time 
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stock market returns. On the other hand, older (age>65) households and households 
which reveal more optimistic views towards the future US economy are less ambiguity 
averse. 
c. Ambiguity aversion is the result of a combination of the effect of the fear of negative 
evaluation from others (FNE) and the fear of negative self-evaluation. FNE theory 
predicts that investors, who make decisions as a group, are more ambiguity averse, 
while those who are more mature are less ambiguity averse. These predictions are 
confirmed by results from this thesis. Also the results prove that some of the predictions 
from the self-evaluation theory exist in the real market: investors who are more 
optimistic are less ambiguity averse, and investors who have had a negative past 
experience with the stock market, or who have a higher income, are more ambiguity 
averse. Therefore, ambiguity aversion is not driven solely by FNE or self-evaluation, 
but is the combined result of the two motivations.  
 
5.3 Implications  
 
5.3.1 Theoretical implications 
 
Knight (1921) suggested that when a situation is ambiguous an investor’s 
decision making process is different to when they are in a risky situation.  Based on 
Knight’s study, many theoretical works predicted a distinctive price premium for 
ambiguity aversion, which is independent from the risk premium (Dow and Werlang, 
1992; Maenhout, 2004; Cao, Wang and Zhang, 2005; Garlappi et al., 2007; Epstein and 
Schneider, 2010).  Easley and O’Hara (2009) stated further that the price premium for 
ambiguity can be a result of limited market participation caused by ambiguity aversion, 
and that the individual ambiguity aversion level can be heterogeneous. Such 
heterogeneity can be the result of either a different level of fear of negative evaluations 
from others (FNE) (Curley, Yates, and Abrams. 1986), or a different level of self-
evaluation (Ellsberg, 1961; Hamm & Bursztajn, 1979). 
This study measures stock market participation in two ways: using US equity 
mutual funds capital flows from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) data, and using 
the proportion of the households that invest in equities, estimated in the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF). The measure of the market-wide ambiguity is based on a 
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recent study by Anderson et al. (2009) and reflects the dispersion in analysts’ implied 
forecasts about market returns. This measure corresponds closely to the definition of the 
ambiguity provided by Ellsberg (1961). 
The results show that ambiguity is significantly and negatively correlated to 
equity fund flows. As a result, an increment of the market ambiguity leads to a capital 
outflow from mutual funds, which means a reduced level of market participation. 
Therefore, this thesis empirically supports the theory that predicts limited market 
participation due to ambiguity aversion (Easley and O’Hara, 2009). The thesis also 
provides strong empirical evidence for the existence of the ambiguity premium and, 
therefore, supports all of the corresponding literature (Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961; 
Dow and Werlang, 1992; Maenhout, 2004; Cao, Wang and Zhang, 2005). In addition, 
the results show that for funds investing in non-dividend paying assets, their flows are 
more significantly affected by ambiguity. This is consistent with the results of Zhang 
(2006) who argues that non-dividend paying stocks have low information quality, or, in 
other words, high ambiguity and, therefore, carry the ambiguity premium. Moreover, it 
is found here that, during periods of high ambiguity, capital flows from equity funds 
into the money market funds, suggesting that investors fleet to safer and more liquid 
asset classes when faced with a high ambiguity about stock returns. This is supporting 
evidence for Ozsoylev and Werner (2009)’s and Eichberger and Spanjers (2007)’s 
studies, which argue that illiquidity could be associated with high ambiguity and causes 
the price premium. 
The results from the SCF analysis data are corroborating. By using the data from 
multiple surveys, a logistic model has been estimated, where the dependent variable is a 
binary indicator of whether the individual owns equities. Controlling for various 
household and market level factors, it has been found that higher ambiguity leads to a 
reduction in the probability that the average household owns equities. This provides 
reinforcement of the findings from the mutual fund flow data, and further supports the 
existence of the ambiguity premium. In addition, it has also been found that there is 
heterogeneity in households’ ambiguity aversion. The results show that, as the FNE 
theory predicts (Curley, Yates, and Abrams, 1986; Ellsberg, 1961; Knight, 1921), 
married households are more ambiguity averse, while older (age>65) households are 
less ambiguity averse. Meanwhile, although the self-evaluation theory (Ellsberg, 1961; 
Hamm & Bursztajn, 1979) was not significant in Curley, Yates, and Abrams (1986)’s 
test, some of its predictions are significant here: households who have experienced 
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negative life-time stock market returns are more ambiguity averse, and households who 
reveal a more optimistic view towards the future are less ambiguity averse. In addition, 
as the self-evaluation theory suggests, households with a higher income have higher 
ambiguity aversion. Therefore, the result not only supports the Easley and O’Hara 
(2009)’s model of heterogeneity in ambiguity aversion, but also provides empirical 
evidence for both the FNE and the self-evaluation theory.  
 
5.3.2 Policy and practical implications 
 
In addition, this research also provides several policy implications concerning 
ambiguity, in order to improve the stock market’s performance and the participation rate. 
Higher stock market participation not only helps stabilise asset prices, but also helps to 
improve risk diversification which will benefit the whole economy.  Therefore, firstly, 
improving information disclosure should be an integral theme of policy. Adequate 
resources of information, and better communication between companies and investors, 
can reduce ambiguity and therefore increase overall stock market participation. 
Secondly, governments should consider policies that can reduce investors’ losses in 
extreme events. Ambiguity averse investors’ decisions are highly affected by the worst-
case results. If regulations can provide back up for losses in extreme events, the 
ambiguity premium could be reduced and, therefore, increase market participation and 
asset prices.   
The results of this study also suggest that mutual funds’ managers could 
improve their marketing efficiency by targeting the correct ambiguity averse group. The 
results of Chapter 3 show that the mutual funds which invest in non-dividend paying 
stocks (‘aggressive growth’ and ‘growth’) are more affected by ambiguity. Meanwhile, 
Chapter 4 shows that older households, or households with lower income or are not 
married, have a relatively lower ambiguity aversion. Therefore, for the ‘aggressive 
growth’ and ‘growth’ style of mutual funds, the marketing strategy of mutual fund 
managers should be more focused on these households. 
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5.4 Limitations of study  
 
This study has the motivation to empirically investigate the impact of ambiguity 
aversion on the stock market. As a direct consequence of the methodology, the study 
has encountered a number of limitations, which need to be considered. The main 
limitation of this study is that due to limited data access, the ambiguity measure is based 
on US market information only. As a result, all research in this study has been based on 
the US market. This could lead to a potential bias in the result, since ambiguity aversion 
relies on social status and mentality. American investors may reveal some distinct 
preferences towards ambiguity, and the result of this study can be market-specific. 
However, the American stock market is one of the most developed markets in the world 
and it is studied widely; therefore this research will be useful for further studies in the 
field.  
The second limitation of this study is the limited number of control variables. 
Again, due to limited data access, some control variables cannot be constructed and 
presented in the model. For example, the rapid growth of substitutes to mutual funds 
such as exchange-traded-funds (ETF), are suggested to impact changes of fund flow. 
But due to a lack of ETF data, this is not included in the models in Chapter 3. Similarly, 
religion and political preference are also suggested to have an influence on households’ 
stockholding. Due to privacy policy, such information is not available for the SCF’s 
public users, and therefore it is not presented in the models of Chapter 4. However, 
based on previous studies, there is no evidence to show that these missing variables 
have any overwhelming impact. Since the models in this thesis have already considered 
most of the control variables, missing a small number of control variables is not likely 
to affect the conclusions significantly. 
The third limitation of the study is the measure of ambiguity. The study majorly 
relies on Anderson et al. (2009)’s measure of ambiguity, which is the divergence of 
analyst’s forecasts about future stock market returns. Such a measure has been chosen 
as the measure of ambiguity because it is in line with Ellsberg (1961)’s definition of 
ambiguity, and it corresponds with many applications of ambiguity in finance (Hansen 
and Sargent, 2001; Ulrich, 2013; Drechsler, 2012; Shi, 2013). However, there are other 
empirical measures of ambiguity such as age of a firm and analyst coverage (Zhang, 
2006), which could be also significant. Therefore future studies could investigate 
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whether any other ambiguity measure is significantly correlated to stock market 
participation.  
The final limitation of this research is the coverage. This thesis mainly 
investigates the influence of ambiguity on stock market participation. However, 
investors can be ambiguous about other aspects of the stocks, such as volatility and 
liquidity. There are theoretical models which discuss the impact of ambiguity on stock 
market volatility (Epstein and Schneider, 2010), and  the result of this study also shows 
that investors choose more liquid assets in order to avoid a period of high ambiguity in 
the stock market. Therefore, it is worthwhile investigating the influence of ambiguity on 
the stock market volatility, or on market liquidity. Due to limited time it has not been 
possible to construct a reliable empirical measure of ambiguity on market 
volatility/liquidity, and thus the corresponding research cannot be accomplished. 
However, since there is a lack of prior empirical studies in these fields, this could be an 
important motivation for further research. 
 
5.5 Suggestions for further research  
 
The first suggestion presented here is to extend the research into markets outside the US, 
especially into non-western countries.  As the result indicates, ambiguity aversion has 
very subtle psychological roots which are related to the social status and mentality of 
households. Therefore it is very important to investigate ambiguity aversion in markets 
with a different culture and social structure. For example, Japan is known for its 
conservative culture and also it has a much older population compared to the US, 
therefore the scale of the ambiguity aversion could be very different in Japanese market.   
Secondly, the impact of ambiguity on volatility and liquidity also needs to be 
empirically investigated. The market return is not the only parameter that can be 
ambiguous to investors; various studies conclude that ambiguity in volatility (Epstein 
and Schneider, 2010) and liquidity (Ozsoylev and Werner, 2009; Eichberger and 
Spanjers, 2007) can also result in a price premium. Since these studies are still at a 
theoretical level, empirical evidence is of great importance.  
An effort is also required to perform a more detailed analysis of ambiguity on 
different asset classes. The results of this thesis show that flows of the funds that invest 
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in non-dividend paying stocks are more sensitive to ambiguous changes.  Therefore, it 
would be beneficial to produce more detailed ambiguity indicators for individual stocks, 
and to examine the long-term returns of such high-ambiguity portfolios in order to see 
whether they produce abnormal returns. In addition, this study also finds that during a 
high ambiguity period in the stock market, investors transfer their capital into much 
more liquid asset classes such as the money market. As a result, an effort to find the 
correlation of ambiguity between different asset classes will help to produce hedging 
strategies, or, at least, will help to avoid the ambiguity.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
In spite of being neglected by mainstream asset pricing models, ambiguity is an 
important factor in investors’ decision making. The behaviour of ambiguity averse 
investors is not only observed at an aggregate level, but also in individual household’s 
investment decisions. As much theoretical literature has predicted, overall ambiguity 
reduces the stock market participation and, therefore, results in a price premium. Similar 
to risk, heterogeneity of ambiguity aversion is observed in different asset classes and 
different types of investors. Investors in the US market have stronger reactions towards 
the stocks that pay little or no dividends; and when the stock market experiences a high-
ambiguity period, they transfer their capital into more liquid markets. In the US, the 
married, wealthier investors, and those who have had a negative experience in the stock 
market, are more ambiguity averse. Meanwhile, older and optimistic people are less 
ambiguity averse. Although some studies believe that education level can reduce the 
ambiguity aversion, this study did not find any correlation between education level and 
ambiguity aversion.  
This study fills a gap in knowledge in ambiguity studies by providing empirical 
evidence that ambiguity reduces the market participation. It also supports the literature 
that predicts an ambiguity premium in the stock market and helps to identify high/low 
ambiguity asset classes, and high/low ambiguity averse investor groups.  Due to lack of 
data, the study is limited to the American market and a has limited sample time period. 
Further research is suggested in order to expand this study into other markets or 
different asset classes. In addition, empirical studies of ambiguity in market volatility, 
or market liquidity, are also urgently needed.  
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Figure 3.1: Net flows and net exchanges for the equity asset class. 
 
The figure reports the monthly net flows and net exchanges for the equity asset class, which comprises 
funds within the ‘aggressive growth’, ‘growth’, ‘sector’, ‘growth and income’, and ‘income equity’ 
investment objective categories. The data is from the ICI and covers the period from March 1985 to 
December 2010. Net flows (Panel A) and net exchanges (Panel B) are calculated according to Equations 
3.19 and 3.20. 
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Figure 3.2: Ambiguity 
 
The figure reports the quarterly ambiguity (Panel A) and the changes in the monthly ambiguity (Panel B), 
from 1985 to 2010. The ambiguity measure reflects the dispersion in forecasts for market returns, 
obtained using the data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. To calculate this measure Anderson 
et al. (2009) is followed, and the forecasts of aggregate output, the output deflator, and corporate profits 
after taxes are used and combined as per Equation 3.19 with v=15.346. Monthly ambiguity is computed 
from the quarterly measure by linear interpolation. Both series are scaled by 100.  
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Figure 3.3: Ambiguity and Risk over Time. 
 
The figure reports the monthly ambiguity (dashed line) and the conditional variance of market returns 
(solid line) from March 1985 to December 2010. The conditional variance is calculated following 
Anderson et al. (2009) using data from the CRSP. In panel B a scatter plot of the ambiguity and risk is 
produced.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Continued. 
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Table 3.1: Classification of mutual funds 
 
The table reports the categorisation of the ICI fund investment objective categories by the asset class 
based on Kamstra et al. (2011).  
 
Fund Investment Objective Fund Asset Class 
Aggressive Growth Equity 
Growth Equity 
Sector Equity 
Growth and Income Equity 
Income Equity Equity 
Asset Allocation Hybrid 
Balanced Hybrid 
Flexible Portfolio Hybrid 
Income Mixed Hybrid 
Corporate - General Corporate Fixed Income 
Corporate - Intermediate Corporate Fixed Income 
Corporate - Short Term Corporate Fixed Income 
High Yield Corporate Fixed Income 
Strategic Income Corporate Fixed Income 
Government Bond - General Government Fixed Income 
Government Bond - Intermediate Government Fixed Income 
Government Bond - Short Term Government Fixed Income 
Mortgage Backed Government Fixed Income 
State Municipal Bond - General Government Fixed Income 
State Municipal Bond - Short Term Government Fixed Income 
National Municipal Bond - General Government Fixed Income 
National Municipal Bond - Short Term Government Fixed Income 
Taxable Money Market - Government Money Market 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Statistics 
 
The table reports the summary of statistics for the various variables for the period from March 1985 to 
December 2010. The ambiguity measure,      reflects the dispersion in forecasts for the market returns, 
calculated using the data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. To calculate this measure Anderson, 
et al. (2009) is followed, and the forecasts of aggregate output, the output deflator, and corporate profits 
after taxes are used and combined as per Equation 3.19 with v=15.346 and scale by 100.        is the 
conditional variance calculated according to Anderson et al. (2009). ∆ambt is the change in ambiguity, 
     is the aggregate cost of print advertising across all the funds, divided by the previous year’s total 
advertising costs,     is the capital gains in month t, from Kamstra et al. (2011, Table 1).      is the 
personal savings rate taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (series PSAVERT), rfund
t-1, t-12
 is the 
aggregate return of equity funds over the previous 12 months, rmkt
t-3, t-1
is the return on the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD) over the last 3 months and            is the Amihud liquidity measure 
aggregated on the value-weighted basis and averaged for the previous three months. 
 
 Mean Std Skew Kurt Max Min 
Net exchanges 0.000 0.003 -2.149 13.960 0.010 -0.021 
Net flow 0.005 0.007 0.242 1.692 0.035 -0.023 
ambt 0.002 0.001 1.800 4.206 0.008 0.000 
Δambt 0.000 0.001 0.296 5.993 0.002 -0.002 
cvart 0.032 0.051 5.496 38.664 0.485 0.003 
Δcvart 0.000 0.043 4.827 61.813 0.454 -0.276 
rfund
t-1,t-12
 0.167 0.218 -0.966 0.868 0.583 -0.580 
advt 0.086 0.012 0.811 5.933 0.144 0.038 
capt 8.408 19.446 2.938 6.827 72.000 0.900 
savt 0.049 0.019 0.007 -0.801 0.103 0.009 
rmkt
t-3,t-1
 0.028 0.085 -1.076 2.855 0.264 -0.367 
Ilq
t-3,t-1
 0.000 0.000 3.015 14.236 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3.3: Correlations 
 
The table reports the correlation matrix for the various variables for the period from March 1985 to December 2010, 
defined as in Table 3.2.  
 
 Net flows Net exchanges Δambt Δcvart advt capt savt rfundt-1,t-12 rmktt-3,t-1 Ilqt-3,t-1 
Net flows 1 0.655 -0.098 -0.033 0.048 0.158 0.316 0.482 0.210 0.291 
Net exchanges  1 -0.159 -0.035 -0.021 0.058 -0.049 0.059 0.031 0.001 
Δambt   1 -0.017 0.028 -0.003 0.046 0.010 -0.017 -0.018 
Δcvart    1 -0.028 -0.026 0.003 0.001 -0.137 -0.012 
advt     1 -0.007 0.025 0.159 0.074 -0.127 
capt      1 0.006 0.001 -0.072 -0.026 
savt       1 0.206 0.075 0.484 
rfund
t-1,t-12
        1 0.442 0.203 
rmkt
t-3,t-1
         1 0.050 
Ilq
t-3,t-1
          1 
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Table 3.4: Ambiguity and Equity Fund Flows and Exchanges 
 
The table reports the results of estimation of the net flows model (Panel A) and the net exchanges 
model (Panel B) for the equity asset class, for the period from March 1985 to December 2010. The 
variables are defined as in Table 3.2. PA is the p-value from the Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test. 
To perform the test firstly the models shown in equations 3.27 and 3.28 are jointly estimated for all 5 
fund families using GMM, and then the residuals are used in order to test whether they exhibit 
autocorrelation up to the sixth lag. PO is the p-value from the test of over-identifying restrictions. 
Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1994) 
estimator. The classification of mutual funds is based on Kamstraet.al (2011), and it is shown in Table 
1. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 1000. 
Panel A. Net flows 
 Estimate Std Err t statistic prob>t 
Intercept -0.75 1.08 -0.69 0.49 
Δambt -1359.33 323.70 -4.21 0.00 
Δcvart -2.21 2.69 -0.82 0.41 
advt 2.03 10.80 0.19 0.85 
capt -0.46 0.21 -2.23 0.03 
rfund
t-12,t-1
 0.57 0.53 1.09 0.28 
rmkt
t-3,t-1
 -3.50 1.72 -2.04 0.04 
Net flow t-1 357.39 40.70 8.78 0.00 
Net flow t-2 145.02 73.20 1.98 0.05 
Net flow t-3 303.99 32.10 9.46 0.00 
savt 30.48 10.50 2.89 0.00 
Ilq
t-3,t-1
 14884.77 20389.20 0.73 0.47 
Jant 1.20 0.63 1.89 0.06 
Febt 0.00 0.56 0.00 1.00 
Novt 5.03 1.70 2.96 0.00 
Dect 37.96 14.60 2.60 0.01 
N 309 Adj. R
2
 0.52  
PA 0.09 PO 0.99  
Panel B. Net exchanges 
Intercept -0.23 0.47 -0.49 0.62 
Δambt -502.43 204.10 -2.46 0.01 
Δcvart -2.12 0.94 -2.27 0.02 
advt -1.90 5.37 -0.35 0.72 
capt 0.01 0.00 3.05 0.00 
rfund
t-12,t-1
 0.28 0.22 1.28 0.20 
rmkt
t-3,t-1
 -1.02 0.81 -1.25 0.21 
Net 
exchange t-1 
71.06 24.00 2.96 0.00 
Net 
exchange t-2 
10.36 21.80 0.47 0.64 
Net 
exchange t-3 
213.28 23.30 9.14 0.00 
Ilq
t-3,t-1
 -0.23 0.47 0.50 0.62 
N 309 Adj. R
2
 0.04  
PA 0.17 PO 0.99  
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Table 3.5: Ambiguity and Different Style Equity Funds 
 
The table reports the estimated coefficients on the change in the ambiguity for each category when  
estimate the models net flows (Panel A) and net exchanges models (Panel B) for the different style 
equity funds separately for the period from March 1985 to December 2010. The variables are defined 
as in Table 3.2. PA is the p-value from the Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test. To perform the test, 
the models shown in equations 3.27 and 3.28 are jointly estimated for all 5 equity categories using 
GMM, and then the residuals are used in order to test whether they exhibit autocorrelation up to the 
sixth lag. PO is the p-value from the test of over-identifying restrictions. Standard errors are adjusted 
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1994) estimator. The classification 
of mutual funds is based on Kamstra (2011), and it is shown in Table 3.1. All coefficients and standard 
errors are multiplied by 1000. 
 
Panel A: Net flow  
Fund Style Estimate Std Err t statistic prob>t N Adj. R
2
 PA 
Aggressive Growth -2939.61 931.40 -3.16 0.00 309 0.41 0.75 
Growth -1446.01 482.50 -3.00 0.00 309 0.36 0.20 
Growth and 
Income 
-558.95 198.40 -2.82 0.01 309 0.66 0.92 
Income Equity -502.37 309.00 -1.63 0.11 309 0.75 0.86 
Sector 1465.36 1264.40 1.16 0.25 309 0.17 0.31 
PO 0.99 
   
   
Panel B: Net exchanges  
Aggressive Growth -1973.21 689.00 -2.86 0.00 309 0.16 0.17 
Growth -831.71 285.70 -2.91 0.00 309 0.13 0.13 
Growth and Income -162.82 89.00 -1.83 0.07 309 0.25 0.03 
Income Equity -333.22 141.00 -2.36 0.02 309 0.50 0.79 
Sector 1143.76 629.90 1.82 0.07 309 0.07 0.00 
PO 0.99       
  
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Table 3.6: Ambiguity and non-Equity Mutual funds 
 
The table reports the estimated coefficients on the changes in the ambiguity when  the net flows (Panel 
A) and net exchanges models (Panel B) for the non-equity mutual funds are estimated separately for 
the period from March 1985 to December 2010. The variables are defined as in Table 3.2. PA is the p-
value from the Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test. To perform the test the models shown in 
equations 3.27 and 3.28 are jointly tested for all 5 fund families using GMM, and then the residuals are 
used in order to test whether they exhibit autocorrelation up to the sixth lag. PO is the p-value from the 
test of over-identifying restrictions. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1994) estimator. The classification of mutual funds is based 
on Kamstra (2011), and it is shown in Table 1. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 
1000. 
 
Panel A: Net flow  
Fund Family Estimate Std Err t statistic prob>t N Adj. R
2
 PA 
Hybrid -582.00 309.20 -1.88 0.06 309 0.73 0.13 
Government Fixed 
Income 
-922.56 364.30 -2.53 0.01 309 0.87 0.23 
Corporate Fixed 
Income 
-1029.34 406.20 -2.53 0.01 309 0.60 0.73 
Money Market 1000.78 636.50 1.57 0.12 309 0.14 0.30 
PO 0.99     
  
Panel B: Net exchanges  
Hybrid -56.63 41.80 -1.35 0.18 309 0.61 0.13 
Government Fixed 
Income 
-358.85 139.30 -2.58 0.01 309 0.30 0.03 
Corporate Fixed 
Income 
-385.64 161.40 -2.39 0.02 309 0.09 0.79 
Money Market 223.50 75.70 2.95 0.00 309 0.04 0.00 
PO 0.99       
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Table 3.7: Ambiguity and macro economic variables 
 
This table reports the regression results of the one-month-ahead quarterly ambiguity (calculated by using 
equation 3.19) on quarterly average value of the U.S. recession dummy (NBER), U.S. unemployment rate 
(Unemp), change in consumption (dCons), default spread (Def), term spread (Term), the value-weighted 
market return including dividends (VWRETD), from Dec 1968 to Dec 2010. The NBER recession 
dummy indicates the US recession period, which is a period between a peak and a trough based on the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)’s business cycle data. Unemployment (Unemp) rate is 
from the Bureau of Labour Statistics Data, series ID: LNS14000000. Changes in consumption (Cons) are 
the changes in the consumption rate of real personal consumption expenditures per capita, which is 
constructed by dividing the CITIBASE series of seasonally adjusted real consumption (excluding 
durables) by the Bureau of Census’s monthly population, following Chen, Roll and Ross (1986). The 
default spread (Def) is defined as the difference in yields between Baa-rated corporate bonds and AAA-
rated corporate bonds as stated in Fama and French (1989, 1996). The term spread (Term) is defined as 
the difference in yields between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month T-bill as stated in Chen, Roll, 
and Ross (1986). Vwretd is the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)’s value-weighted stock 
market return index. To adjust for serial correlation, one and two quarter lags of the ambiguity are added. 
To make result more clear, the estimation of the parameters and the standard errors are multiplied by 
1,000,000.  
 
 Estimate Std Err t statistic prob>t 
intercept -1.77 5.92 -0.30 0.77 
nber 11.00 4.43 2.55 0.01 
unemp 1.70 1.55 1.10 0.27 
dcons 3.63 3.93 0.92 0.36 
def -1.83 3.15 -0.58 0.56 
term 0.05 1.38 0.04 0.97 
vwretd -0.98 0.54 -1.82 0.07 
Amb t 164010.00 88400.00 1.86 0.07 
Amb t-1 252844.00 70900.00 3.57 0.00 
N 166 Adj. R
2
 0.24  
PA 0.27    
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Table 3.8: Quarterly Regressions 
 
The table reports the results of estimation of the net flows model (Panel A) and the net exchanges 
model (Panel B) for the combined equity asset class, for the period from March 1985 to December 
2010 using non-interpolated quarterly data. Net flows and exchanges are calculated on a quarterly 
basis. The changes in the ambiguity and conditional variance are equal to               
                              , respectively. Quarterly capital gains, savings and 
advertising costs are equal to the sum of the monthly values over each quarter. Lagged market return, 
illiquidity premium and fund return are defined as in Table 3.2. In this table lags of one and four 
quarters are included for the dependent variables. PA is the p-value from the Breusch-Godfrey 
autocorrelation test. To perform the test the models shown in equations 3.31 and 3.32 are jointly 
estimated for all 5 fund families using GMM, and then the residuals are used in order to test whether 
they exhibit autocorrelation up to the sixth lag. PO is the p-value from the test of over-identifying 
restrictions. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-
West (1994) estimator. The classification of mutual funds is based on Kamstra (2011), and it is shown 
in Table 1. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 1000. 
 
Panel A. Quarterly Net Flows 
 
Estimate Std Err t-statistic prob>t 
Intercept -1.77 4.72 -0.37 0.71 
Δambt -1483.41 355.50 -4.17 0.00 
Δcvart -38.63 14.60 -2.64 0.01 
advt -21.95 19.40 -1.13 0.26 
capt -0.02 0.02 -1.08 0.28 
rfund
t-12,t-1
 6.62 1.92 3.45 0.00 
rmkt
t-3,t-1
 52.60 5.99 8.78 0.00 
Net flow t-3 630.61 29.50 21.38 0.00 
Net flow t-12 109.35 28.20 3.87 0.00 
Sav t-3,t 42.43 9.05 4.69 0.00 
Ilq
t-3,t-1
 52067.12 31622.60 1.65 0.10 
Dect 9.81 1.36 7.21 0.00 
N 102 Adj. R
2
 0.60 
 
PA 0.45 PO 0.99  
Panel B. Quarterly Net Exchanges 
Intercept 0.80 1.52 0.53 0.60 
Δambt -684.93 195.70 -3.50 0.00 
Δcvart -28.95 4.89 -5.93 0.00 
advt -9.65 5.91 -1.63 0.11 
capt 0.02 0.01 2.77 0.01 
rfund
t-12,t-1
 1.63 0.83 1.97 0.05 
rmkt
t-3,t-1
 9.26 2.17 4.27 0.00 
Net exchange t-3 230.87 29.60 7.79 0.00 
Net exchange t-12 49.61 38.80 1.28 0.20 
Ilq
t-3,t-1
 -195.61 15292.70 -0.01 0.99 
N 102 Adj. R
2
 0.15 
 
PA 0.36 PO 0.99  
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Table 3.9: Additional Control Variables 
 
The table reports the results of estimation of the net flows model (Panel A) and the net exchanges 
model (Panel B) for the equity asset class, for the period from 1986 to 2010. All the variables are 
defined as in Table 3.4. Sent is the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2007) at time t, 
orthogonalized to macroeconomic variables, and Medforecast is the median SPF forecast at time t. The 
remaining variables are defined as in Table 3.2. PA is the p-value from the Breusch-Godfrey 
autocorrelation test. To perform the test the models shown in equations 3.27 and 3.28 are jointly 
estimated for all 5 fund families using GMM, and then the residuals are used to test whether they 
exhibit autocorrelation up to the sixth lag. PO is the p-value from the test of over-identifying 
restrictions. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-
West (1994) estimator. The classification of mutual funds is based on Kamstra (2011), and it is shown 
in Table 1. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 1000. 
 
Panel A. Net flows 
  Estimate Std Err 
t-
statistic 
prob>t PA N 
Adj. 
R
2
 
PO 
Δambt -1500.67 333.6 -4.50 0.00 0.08 309 0.53 0.99 
Δrvt -28.47 14.3 -1.99 0.05         
Δambt -1246.75 281.2 -4.43 0.00 0.09 309 0.53 0.99 
ΔGARCH1,t -276.71 134.5 -2.06 0.04         
Δambt -1308.78 285.6 -4.58 0.00 0.11 309 0.53 0.99 
ΔGARCH2,t -132.62 36 -3.68 0.00         
Δambt -986.21 244.4 -4.03 0.00 0.61 298 0.65 0.99 
Δvixt -0.53 0.04 -12.72 0.00         
Panel B. Net exchanges 
Δambt -498.83 204.3 -2.44 0.02 0.24 309 0.04 0.99 
Δrvt -3.1 7.29 -0.43 0.67         
Δambt -512.01 207.4 -2.47 0.01 0.12 309 0.04 0.99 
ΔGARCH1,t -209.07 72.7 -2.88 0.00         
Δambt -502.7 209.1 -2.40 0.02 0.11 309 0.04 0.99 
ΔGARCH2,t -42.91 15.6 -2.75 0.01         
Δambt -393.28 128.6 -3.06 0.00 0.07 298 0.23 1.00 
Δvixt -0.26 0.03 -9.73 0.00         
 
145 
 
Table 3.10: Different Risk Measures 
 
The table reports the results of estimation of the net flows model (Panel A) and the net exchanges 
model (Panel B) for the equity asset class, for the period from March 1985 to December 2010. The 
variables are defined as in Table 3.2. The models are estimated using all controls as in Table 3.4, and 
only report results on the coefficients on the changes in the ambiguity and the changes in the risk. In 
each specification a different specification for the risk variable is used: rvt is realised volatility, which 
is the sum of daily squared market returns using the CRSP value weighted index. GARCH1 is an in-
sample forecast of volatility in month t+1 using a simple GARCH model specification, and GARCH2 
is an in-sample forecast of market return volatility in month t+1 using the GJR GARCH model 
specification. The specifications of the GARCH models are taken from Glosten, Jagannathan and 
Runkle (1993). vixt is the VXO index. For each risk measure the change from month t-1 and t is used 
in  the models. The fund flow regressions in Panel A where the risk is measured using the GARCH 
models, in addition to the controls in Table 4, include a fourth lag of the dependent variables. The fund 
exchange regression in Panel B where the risk is measured with VIX, in addition to the controls in 
Table 4, include a sixth lag of the dependent variables. PA is the p-value from the Breusch-Godfrey 
autocorrelation test. To perform the test the models shown in equations 3.27 and 3.28 are jointly 
estimated for all 5 fund families using GMM separately for each risk specification, and then the 
residuals are used to test whether they exhibit autocorrelation up to the sixth lag. PO is the p-value from 
the test of over-identifying restrictions. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1994) estimator. The classification of mutual funds is based 
on Kamstra (2011), and it is shown in Table 3.1. All coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 
1000. 
Panel A. Net flows 
  Estimate Std Err 
t-
statistic 
prob>t PA N 
Adj. 
R
2
 
PO 
Δambt -1500.67 333.6 -4.50 0.00 0.08 309 0.53 0.99 
Δrvt -28.47 14.3 -1.99 0.05     
Δambt -1246.75 281.2 -4.43 0.00 0.09 309 0.53 0.99 
ΔGARCH1,t -276.71 134.5 -2.06 0.04     
Δambt -1308.78 285.6 -4.58 0.00 0.11 309 0.53 0.99 
ΔGARCH2,t -132.62 36 -3.68 0.00     
Δambt -986.21 244.4 -4.03 0.00 0.61 298 0.65 0.99 
Δvixt -0.53 0.04 -12.72 0.00     
Panel B. Net exchanges 
Δambt -498.83 204.3 -2.44 0.02 0.24 309 0.04 0.99 
Δrvt -3.1 7.29 -0.43 0.67     
Δambt -512.01 207.4 -2.47 0.01 0.12 309 0.04 0.99 
ΔGARCH1,t -209.07 72.7 -2.88 0.00     
Δambt -502.7 209.1 -2.40 0.02 0.11 309 0.04 0.99 
ΔGARCH2,t -42.91 15.6 -2.75 0.01     
Δambt -393.28 128.6 -3.06 0.00 0.07 298 0.23 1.00 
Δvixt -0.26 0.03 -9.73 0.00     
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Table 3.11: Different   values for the ambiguity measure 
 
In this table different values of the weighting parameter   are used in equation 3.17 to construct four 
different time series of the ambiguity measure, and then the same regression is run as in table 3.4. 
Briefly, this table only reports the estimation of the changes of the ambiguity variable. Δambt. PA is 
the p-value from the Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test. To perform the test the models shown in 
equations 3.27 and 3.28 are jointly estimated for all 5 fund families using GMM separately for each 
risk specification, and then the residuals are used to test whether they exhibit autocorrelation up to the 
sixth lag. PO is the p-value from the test of over-identifying restrictions. Standard errors are adjusted 
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1994) estimator. 
 
Panel A. Net flows 
  value 
Estimate of 
Δambt 
Std Err 
t-
statistic 
prob>t PA N Adj. R
2
 PO 
1 0.01 0.02 0.45 0.65 0.14 309 0.52 0.99 
5 -0.35 0.10 -3.47 0.00 0.18 309 0.52 0.99 
10 -0.91 0.23 -3.96 0.00 0.13 309 0.53 0.99 
20 -1.95 0.41 -4.75 0.00 0.08 309 0.53 0.99 
Panel B. Net exchanges 
1 0.01 0.01 0.85 0.40 0.12 309 0.02 0.99 
5 -0.10 0.05 -1.96 0.05 0.12 309 0.02 0.99 
10 -0.28 0.13 -2.15 0.03 0.16 309 0.03 0.99 
20 -0.67 0.25 -2.67 0.01 0.14 309 0.04 0.99 
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Table 4.1: Ambiguity and household stock market participation 
 
In this table  the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three 
years (1989 to 2010), to estimate a logistic model where the dependent variable         is a binary 
indicator of the stock market participation of household i. The ambiguity measure            reflects the 
average ambiguity during the three years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity 
measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts for market returns.              is the corresponding 
realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the 
average Dow index price of the last year/the historical high price of Dow index until last year. The 
variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the previous year, deflated to 2010 
dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that flag whether the individual 
is  retired, married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported age of a 
respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when 
asked about his/her risk preferences.  Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err Prob>t 
    -255.479 32.136 <.01 
    -7.184 1.486 <.01 
    0.782 0.170 <.01 
      1.221 0.069 <.01 
      1.142 0.038 <.01 
      1.519 0.046 <.01 
    0.729 0.031 <.01 
       0.621 0.013 <.01 
     0.708 0.043 <.01 
         0.163 0.036 <.01 
           0.221 0.060 <.01 
    0.025 0.001 <.01 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.2: Robustness for ambiguity and household stock market 
participation 
 
In this table  the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three 
years (1989 to 2010) to estimate a logistic model, where the dependent variable         is a binary 
indicator of the stock market participation of a household i.  The data of those who have income less than 
1000 dollars and have an age below 25 and above 75  is removed. The ambiguity measure            
reflects the average ambiguity during the three years before year t when the survey is conducted. The 
ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts for market returns.              is the 
corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-weighted index (series 
VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price of the last year/the historical high price of Dow index 
until last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the previous year, 
deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,                are dummy variables that flag 
whether the individual is  retired, married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the 
reported age of a respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 
3 or 4 when asked about his/her risk preferences. Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err Prob>t 
    -275.552 33.789 <.01 
    -7.997 1.562 <.01 
    0.782 0.180 <.01 
      1.233 0.072 <.01 
      1.162 0.042 <.01 
      1.536 0.049 <.01 
    0.735 0.032 <.01 
       0.638 0.014 <.01 
     0.685 0.044 <.01 
         0.164 0.038 <.01 
           0.278 0.069 <.01 
    0.023 0.001 <.01 
N 156939 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.3: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: The effect 
of income 
 
In this table  the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic model, where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of the stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns, calculated using              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the 
CRSP value-weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price of the last year/the historical 
high price of Dow index until last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for 
the previous year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that 
flag whether the individual is  retired, married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported 
age of a respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when 
asked about his/her risk preferences. The dummy variable highic (lowic) is set to 1 if a household i in cohort t 
decaled income of more than $125,000 ($15,000) per year in 1993, and 0 otherwise. These figures are deflated 
using the CPI of each year and converted into the corresponding income level for each survey. Standard errors are 
adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    -228.269 36.194 <.01 
           -170.473 59.474 <.01 
          210.214 110.945 0.06 
    -7.140 1.483 <.01 
    0.783 0.170 <.01 
       1.217 0.069 <.01 
      1.126 0.038 <.01 
      1.506 0.046 <.01 
      0.719 0.031 <.01 
     0.505 0.023 <.01 
         0.702 0.043 <.01 
           0.154 0.036 <.01 
    0.201 0.060 <.01 
    0.026 0.001 <.01 
       0.538 0.111 <.01 
      -0.809 0.185 <.01 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.4: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: The effect 
of age 
 
In this table  the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic model, where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns.              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price of the last year/the historical high price of 
the Dow index up until the last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the 
previous year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that flag 
whether  an individual is  retired, married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported age 
of a respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when asked 
about his/her risk preferences. The dummy variable old is set to 1 if the main respondent of household i in time t is 
above 65 years old.  Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    -287.560 34.601 <.01 
        151.463 59.883 0.01 
    -7.239 1.487 <.01 
    0.757 0.171 <.01 
       1.222 0.069 <.01 
      1.148 0.038 <.01 
      1.525 0.046 <.01 
      0.627 0.013 <.01 
     0.705 0.043 <.01 
         0.162 0.036 <.01 
           0.193 0.061 <.01 
    0.022 0.001 <.01 
    0.733 0.031 <.01 
    -0.075 0.107 0.48 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.5: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: The effect 
of education 
 
In this table  the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic model where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns.              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price of the last year/the historical high price of 
Dow index until last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the previous 
year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that flag whether  an 
individual is retired, married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported age of a 
respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when asked about 
his/her risk preferences. Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    -231.957 41.940 <.01 
        -43.145 49.714 0.39 
    -7.178 1.485 <.01 
    0.787 0.170 <.01 
       1.221 0.069 <.01 
      1.143 0.038 <.01 
      1.520 0.046 <.01 
      0.621 0.013 <.01 
     0.708 0.043 <.01 
         0.163 0.036 <.01 
           0.221 0.060 <.01 
    0.025 0.001 <.01 
    0.794 0.081 <.01 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.6: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: The effect 
of marriage 
 
In this table  the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic model, where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of the stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns.              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price of the last year/the historical high price of 
Dow index until last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the previous 
year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that flag whether  an 
individual is retired, married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported age of a 
respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when asked about 
his/her risk preferences. Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    -164.074 53.618 <.01 
             -122.306 57.733 0.03 
    -7.368 1.489 <.01 
    0.764 0.171 <.01 
       1.221 0.069 <.01 
      1.143 0.038 <.01 
      1.520 0.046 <.01 
      0.620 0.013 <.01 
     0.707 0.043 <.01 
         0.353 0.097 <.01 
           0.218 0.060 <.01 
    0.025 0.001 <.01 
    0.730 0.031 <.01 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.7: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: The effect 
of social capital 
 
In this table  the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic mode,l where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of the stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns.              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price of the last year/the historical high price of 
Dow index until last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the previous 
year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that flag whether  an 
individual is  retired , married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported age of a 
respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen answers 2, 3 or 4 when asked about 
his/her risk preferences. The dummy variable for social capital sc is set equal to 1 if a household  is reported to 
have participated in voluntary charity work in the last year, and 0 for the rest. Standard errors are adjusted for 
multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    -261.841 37.628 <.01 
       -19.229 50.876 0.71 
    -8.417 1.504 <.01 
    0.618 0.173 <.01 
       1.209 0.069 <.01 
      1.132 0.038 <.01 
      1.506 0.046 <.01 
      0.612 0.013 <.01 
     0.709 0.043 <.01 
         0.149 0.036 <.01 
           0.219 0.060 <.01 
    0.025 0.001 <.01 
    0.711 0.031 <.01 
   0.223 0.083 0.01 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.8: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: The effect 
of optimism level 
 
In this table the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic model, where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of the stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns.              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price  for the last year/the historical high price 
of the Dow index up until the last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the 
previous year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that flag 
whether an individual is  retired , married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported age 
of a respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when asked 
about his/her risk preferences. The dummy variable optim is set to 1 if a household i in cohort t believe that both 
the US economy improves in the next 5 years compared to the last 5 years, and their family income will grow 
faster than the inflation. Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    -263.575 32.538 <.01 
          165.868 92.352 0.07 
    -6.894 1.493 <.01 
    0.822 0.171 <.01 
       1.218 0.069 <.01 
      1.141 0.038 <.01 
      1.515 0.046 <.01 
      0.727 0.031 <.01 
     0.620 0.013 <.01 
         0.712 0.043 <.01 
           0.161 0.036 <.01 
    0.222 0.060 <.01 
    0.025 0.001 <.01 
      -0.154 0.145 0.29 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.9: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: The effect 
of life-time experienced return 
 
In this table the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic model, where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of the stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns.              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD).        is the average Dow index price  for the last year/the historical high price 
of the Dow index up until the last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household i for 
the previous year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that 
flag whether  an individual is retired, married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported 
age of a respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when 
asked about his/her risk preferences. The dummy variable negative is set equal to 1 if the household has  
experienced a negative life-time stock market return, which is calculated from formula (4.16), and 0 for the rest. 
Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    689.101 381.062 0.07 
             -943.226 379.435 0.01 
    -6.761 1.517 <.01 
    0.758 0.174 <.01 
       1.222 0.069 <.01 
      1.142 0.038 <.01 
      1.519 0.046 <.01 
      0.621 0.013 <.01 
     0.706 0.043 <.01 
         0.163 0.036 <.01 
           0.221 0.060 <.01 
    0.025 0.001 <.01 
    0.730 0.031 <.01 
         1.173 0.458 0.01 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.10: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: The effect 
of smoking 
 
In this table  the data is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic model, where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of the stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns.              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price  for the last year/the historical high price 
of Dow index until last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the previous 
year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that flag whether  an 
individual is  retired , married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported age of a 
respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when asked about 
his/her risk preferences. The dummy variable smoking is set equal to 1 if the household is reported to be a smoking 
household, and 0 for the rest. Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    -276.414 33.239 <.01 
            -41.081 74.618 0.58 
    -7.618 1.483 <.01 
    0.782 0.171 <.01 
       1.217 0.069 <.01 
      1.138 0.038 <.01 
      1.513 0.046 <.01 
      0.614 0.013 <.01 
     0.714 0.043 <.01 
         0.155 0.036 <.01 
           0.215 0.060 <.01 
    0.024 0.001 <.01 
    0.698 0.031 <.01 
        -0.306 0.112 0.01 
N 176160 R2 0.34 
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Table 4.11: Ambiguity and household stock market participation: the joint 
test 
 
In this table  the data used is from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is conducted every three years (1989 to 
2010) to estimate a logistic model, where the dependent variable         is a binary indicator of the stock market 
participation of a household i.  The ambiguity measure            reflects the average ambiguity during the three 
years before year t when the survey is conducted. The ambiguity measure is based on the dispersion in the forecasts 
for market returns.              is the corresponding realised volatility based on the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index (series VWRETD).       is the average Dow index price  for the last year/the historical high price 
of Dow index until last year. The variable           is the logged reported income of a household for the previous 
year, deflated to 2010 dollars.               ,            ,               are dummy variables that flag whether  an 
individual is  retired , married, holds a college degree and white, respectively.        is the reported age of 
respondent, and                   is set to 1 if the respondent has chosen the answers 2, 3 or 4 when asked about 
his/her risk preferences. The dummy variable smoking is set equal to 1 if the household is reported to a smoking 
household, and 0 for the rest. The dummy variable negative is set equal to 1 if the household has experienced a 
negative life-time stock market return, which is calculated from formula (4.16), and 0 for the rest. The dummy 
variable optim is set to 1 if the household i in cohort t believes  that the US economy  improves in the next 5 years 
compare to the last 5 years. The dummy variable for social capital sc is set equal to 1 if the household is reported to 
have participated in voluntary charity work in the last year, and 0 for the rest. The dummy variable old is set to 1 if 
the main respondent of the household i in time t decaled is above 65 years old. The dummy variable highINC is set 
to 1 if the household i in cohort t reported income of more than $125,000 per year in 1993, and 0 otherwise. The 
regression model is 4.28. Standard errors are adjusted for multiple imputations.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t  Estimate Std Err prob>t 
    -267.531 67.970 <.01 op -0.088 0.087 0.32 
    -8.564 1.541 <.01 sc 0.166 0.085 0.05 
    0.535 0.178 <.01 smoking -0.287 0.115 0.01 
       1.206 0.070 <.01 negative -1.180 0.461 0.01 
      1.135 0.039 <.01 high inc  0.391 0.112 <.01 
      1.505 0.046 <.01           157.554 61.525 0.01 
      0.578 0.021 <.01        70.593 52.911 0.18 
     0.712 0.043 <.01        28.738 52.757 0.59 
         0.263 0.099 <.01        15.038 52.133 0.77 
           0.191 0.061 <.01             -46.879 75.879 0.54 
    0.021 0.002 <.01              -77.608 59.475 0.19 
    0.640 0.086 <.01              926.275 380.721 0.02 
        -0.100 0.109 0.36              -171.801 61.553 0.01 
older -267.531 67.970 <.01     
N 176160 R2 0.35     
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Table 4.12: Robustness for Table 4.3-4.10 
 
This table reports the results of robustness for tables 4.3 - 4.10. For tables 4.3 - 4.8 and 4.10, the model is 
again tested with the sample that removes the households who have an income lower than $1000, and the 
households who are older (younger) than 75 (25) years old. For table 4.9, due to a strong cohort effect, 
most of the samples that experienced positive life time stock market returns are young. Therefore, for 
table 4.10 the new sample removes the households who have an income lower than $1000, and the 
households who are older than 75 years old. For brevity, this table reports an estimation on the ambiguity 
and interactions only.  
 
 Estimate Std Err prob>t N R
2
 
amb -243.003 37.727 <.01 
156939 0.34 
amb*highic -184.199 61.371 <.01 
  
amb -301.167 35.501 <.01 
156939 0.34 
amb*old 172.304 73.168 0.02 
  
amb -243.698 44.901 <.01 
156939 0.34 
amb*edu -56.087 52.506 0.29 
  
amb -177.548 58.704 <.01 
156939 0.34 
amb*marriage -127.612 62.786 0.04 
  
amb -285.240 39.808 <.01 
156939 0.34 
amb*sc -11.235 53.448 0.83 
  
amb -285.438 34.250 <.01 
156939 0.34 
amb*optim 183.853 95.748 0.05 
  
amb -271.932 33.581 <.01 156939 
 
0.34 
amb*negative 819.818 390.290 0.04  
amb -295.696 35.006 <.01 156939 0.34 
amb*smoke -56.821 77.508 0.46   
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Appendix 
 
Here there are examples of the questions and variables taken from the survey to 
construct the regression variables. This example is based on the 2010 SCF survey. 
Please note that the content of the questions and the variable numbers can be changed in 
different years.  
Stock market participation: 
X3913: Do you (or anyone in your family living here) own any stock which is publicly 
traded? 
X3821:  I need to know what types of funds you have.  Do you have stock mutual funds? 
Race:  
X6814: Which of these categories do you feel best describe you:  
White, black or African-American, Hispanic or Latino, Asian, American Indian or 
Alaska Native, Hawaiian Native or other Pacific Islander, or another race? 
Marriage:  
X7372(#1): What is your current legal marital status?  Are you married, separated, 
divorced, widowed, or have you ever been married? 
Education:  
X5905(#1): What is the highest degree (you/he/she/he or she) have(s) ? 
Age: 
X13:  Respondent:  Age computed from date of birth 
Retirement:  
X4100(#1):  What is your current work status? 
Income: 
X5729:  Roughly how much was the total income you (and your family living here), 
received in 2009 from all sources, before taxes and other deductions were made? 
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Risk: 
X3014: Which of the following statements comes closest to describing the amount of 
financial risk that you and your husband/wife/partner are willing to take when you save 
or make investments? 
1.  Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns 
2.  Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns 
3.  Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
4.   Not willing to take any financial risks 
Optimism  
X301: How do you think the future of US economy in the next 5 years compared to the 
last 5 years? 
1. Better   2. The same 3. Worse  
X303 : Over the next five years, do you expect your total (family) income to go up more 
than prices, or about the same as prices?                        
1.  Up more 2.  Up less 3.  About the same 
 
 
 
